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This thesis presents a novel framework for security risk assessment (SRA) and identification,
comprising mathematical algorithms and a family of models. Recently, due to the growing
incidence of cyber-attacks and cyber-fraud, as well as terrorist attacks and other adversarial
activities, qualitative and comprehensive SRA and security risk management have become
increasingly important. For large-scale systems, SRA and related data processing
tasks are challenging due to the large amount of available information, as well as the diversity
and complexity of data sources. However, SRA relies mainly on procedures that, despite
being well-formalised, are manual, which introduces the “human factor" as early as the
system design stages. The existence of multiple possible threats, along with the variability
of the information received from different sensors, has increased the complexity of situation
awareness analysis, which often results in scenarios where security officers (operators) are
overwhelmed with data and, in certain cases, a high false positive rate. The primary
motivation behind this work was to develop a general mathematical approach to SRA based
on statistical data processing, data fusion techniques, and game theoretic models.
The proposed framework is based on a slight adjustment of the existing SRA methodology
for threat modelling, augmented by additional mathematical formalisations. In general, two
primary models are presented as the main contribution:
• “Static Model" for SRA, which is applicable at the stage of designing the protection
of the considered system.
• “Dynamic Model" for the processing of generic security-related data, which is applied
when the system is in operation.
Both models use graph theory as a basis. The static model uses game theory for optimal
protection design, while the dynamic model applies Bayesian inference techniques for
“online" data processing.
Extended Abstract
The static model proposed in this study relies on an extension of network security games.
It is used to leverage the advantages of the “standard" expert-based security risk assessment
(SRA) procedures, as well as to provide a robust formalisation for general large-scale
infrastructure protection issues. The proposed model’s instantiation procedure is designed
with a strong link to standard SRA methods. In this way, the resulting model provides
a mathematical formalisation that shares the entities and terminology of standard “manual"
methods. The security control selection problem is modelled as a multi-objective
optimisation problem.
The static model is built upon two interwoven models, the asset and attack models, thus
establishing an analogy with classical SRA methods. The asset model describes the system
and its parameters, while the attack model is used to formalise possible threat scenarios.
Both models are used to formulate a multi-objective optimisation problem. A specific solver
for this problem is described in detail with a theoretically-grounded justification for its
correctness. The model is validated using an airport case study, where some of the
methodology’s essential building blocks are discussed. The work reported in this paper
demonstrates the feasibility of a generalised mathematically-founded approach to SRA in
large-scale systems engineering. Proposed formalism provides means for significant
automatisation of some of the SRA phases, namely risk treatment (selection of security
controls) and risk acceptance (evaluation of the risk after deployment of security controls),
automatic evaluation of different scenarios, and “what-if" simulations.
Compared to the static model, the dynamic model shares the same asset and threat model, but
it also introduces the concept of “event detectors". The model performs online information
fusion and analysis in a manner similar to the use of Bayesian tracking algorithms. It
involves Kalman filter-like inference methodology combined with variational distribution
approximation methods. Theoretical properties of the model are proven and discussed,
resulting in an exact algorithm for attack detection. Similar to the static model, an event
detector allocation is considered an optimisation problem. The model is validated based on
a cybersecurity dataset, which demonstrates that the proposed framework is not limited to
infrastructure protection problems. The model shows significant improvement on standard
machine learning cyber event detection dataset, compared to stand-alone event detectors.
The two models described in the thesis suffer from design limitations, including:
• Model construction still requires expert judgment, thereby transferring the manual
analysis to another domain of operation. Heuristic and “automated" model construction
methods are given and demonstrated in the thesis, but these do not cover all possible
problems.
• Both the static and dynamic models focus on the case of a single attack (possibly
multi-stage) occurring at the same time, executed by a single attacker. While there are
mechanisms for a multi-attack analysis for the static model, the dynamic model does
not present such a possibility.
• Attacks executed in several phases, which are separated by long time intervals, are
challenging for both models. A heuristic for the dynamic model exists, which is
used and demonstrated in the experimental phase of this thesis. However, the current
formulation of the static model does not consider such attacks.
• The interaction of the security controls and event detectors with the attacker considered
in the models is over-simplified and should be extended. The same argument is valid
for the adversary’s motivation since only zero-sum games are considered, despite the
fact that this selection is justified.
None of the abovementioned limitations are major, and so this thesis did not seek to address
them. However, they will be addressed in future work.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my supervisors: professors Christopher Johnson and Alice Miller,
who offered invaluable guidance throughout my research. Special thanks also go to my
family, who supported me, as well as my research colleagues, who were a source of great
inspiration.
I dedicate this dissertation to my family.
Table of Contents
I Research Overview 1
1 Introduction 2
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Research Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Publication Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 Thesis Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 Existing Mathematical Models for Security Risk Assessment 6
2.1 Classical Methodologies for Security Risk
Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.1 ISO 31000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.2 ISO 27005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.3 Eurocontrol’s Security Risk Assessment
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.4 Security Risk Model Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Mathematical Methods in Security Risk
Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.1 Main Families of Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.2 Model Family Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Game Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.1 Game Theory Models in Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.2 Examples of Game Theoretic Models in Security . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.3 Los Angeles Airport Randomised Scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.4 Multi-objective Security Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.5 Network Security Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3.6 General Remarks on Game Theoretic Models . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4 Probabilistic Graphical Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4.1 Applications in the Domain of Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5 Attack Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5.1 Comparison with Network Security Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.6 Graph Models for Cybersecurity Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
II Proposed Threat Graph Model 40
3 Definition of Formal Threat Graph 42
3.1 Structure and Procedure of Security Risk
Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2 Proposed Modelling Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2.1 Asset Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2.2 Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2.3 General Recommendation for Model Development . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3 Comparison with Attack Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.4 Comparison with Cybersecurity Graph Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.4.1 Infrastructure and Evolution Graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.4.2 Compromise Graphs and Attack Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4.3 Network Security Risk Model State Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4 Static Security Model: Description and Evaluation 64
4.1 Generic Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.2 Alignment with Security Risk Assessment
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.2.1 Weak Pareto-Optimality of the Security Risk Assessment
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.3 Static Model Instantiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.3.1 Single-objective Optimisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3.2 Multi-objective Optimisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.4 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.4.1 Airport Model Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.4.2 Experimental Results with Artificial Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.4.3 Model Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.5 Comparison with Cybersecurity Risk Assessment Models . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.5.1 Hierarchical Risk Management using Evolution Graphs . . . . . . . 98
4.5.2 Quantitative Cyber Risk Estimation Methodology . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.5.3 Cybersecurity Modelling Using Attack Trees and
Vulnerability Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.5.4 Network Security Risk Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5 Dynamic Security Model 107
5.1 Threat Model Modification and Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.2 Bayesian Filter Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.2.1 Model Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.2.2 Optimal Assignment of Event Detectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.2.3 Attack Detection Method Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.2.4 Optimal Event Detector Placement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.2.5 Attack Detection Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.3 Model evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.3.1 Dataset Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.3.2 Event Detectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.3.3 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.3.4 Model Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
III Conclusion 151
6 Contributions overview and future work 152
6.1 Modelling Process Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.2 Model Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.3 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
List of Tables
3.1 Sequential attack TPG aggregation algorithm (SATAA) . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2 Multiple sequential attack TPG aggregation algorithm (M-SATAA) . . . . . 55
4.1 Links between supporting assets, primary assets and impact criteria, used in
the model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.2 Security controls’ costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3 Results of the static model validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.1 Initial attack detectors allocation and associated parameters . . . . . . . . . 122
5.2 Allocation of attack detectors and their parameters after optimisation . . . . 123
5.3 General precision metrics for selected models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.4 Per-attack precision metrics for selected models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
List of Figures
2.1 ISO 27005 process scheme. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Correspondence between impact area and value of evaluated impact . . 13
2.3 Example of the Pareto-optimal frontier in 2-dimensional space of criteria
1 and 2 for a set of four points. Points X, Y, and Z are Pareto-optimal
according to the definition; they form a Pareto-optimal frontier. Point P
is not Pareto-optimal, as point X is greater at each component. . . . . . 20
2.4 Probabilistic graphical model of Bayesian filters, where variables Xi are
hidden variables andYi are visible variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5 Example of a Bayesian network model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6 A simple attack tree against a physical safe. To open the safe, the
attacker can pick the lock, learn the combination, cut open the safe,
or install the safe improperly so that they can easily open it later [57].
Examples of “or" and “and" conditions are given. . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.1 Graph transformation process. Image on the left-hand side represents
the initial graph with three types of attack, two entry points, and a single
SA. Image on the right-hand side shows the corresponding extended graph. 49
3.2 Sub-graphs used as an input for M-SATAA. 3 connected components:
initial graph with /0 enablers (upper-left), sub-graph enabled by an attack
against SA1 or SA2 (upper-right), and sub-graph enabled by attacks against
SA2 and SA3 (bottom). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.3 Example of M-SATAA application problem showing the resulting graph
for sequential attacks constructed from the sub-graphs from Figure 3.2. 57
4.1 Scheme used for implementation of the airport threat model . . . . . . 79
4.2 Network nodes are related to different SAs, and directed edges indicate
information exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.3 Scheme used for implementation of airport threat model . . . . . . . . 88
4.4 Scheme used for implementation of remote tower threat model . . . . . 88
4.5 Threat graph model for remote tower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.6 Minimal feasible impact depending on cost limitation. Top image (solid
line) presents the dependency for the case of a “soft" model of security
controls, while the bottom image (dashed line) presents the dependency
for the “hard" model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.7 Dependence of impact function on efficiency of security controls . . . . 105
4.8 Execution time for problem (4.22) depending on the number of attack
types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.1 Propagation vs eigenvector component. It demonstrates the temporal
convergence to the limit pointed in the lemma. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.2 Propagation of “non-attack" probability with false positives . . . . . . 116
5.3 Ep approximation quality, difference between sample estimation and
Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.4 Graph used for dynamic model simulations, where the entry point is
labelled with 0, and SA nodes range from 10 to 13 . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.5 Sample projection (blue dots) and Ep approximations for two methods:
Sampling (violet dot) and Levenberg-Marquardt (red dot) . . . . . . . . 119
5.6 Simulated annealing optimisation process of the target function . . . . 123
5.7 Change of variance Dp after optimisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.8 ROC curve for attack detection of classification neural network and variational
autoencoder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.9 TPG for NAT Process. Here, an additional SA is introduced, representing
a consistency of the firewall rules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.10 TPG for brute force SSH attack against predefined host . . . . . . . . . 140
5.11 TPG for brute force FTP attack against predefined host. The distinguishing
feature compared to the SSH TPG is that there exists only one SA, DoH. 140
5.12 TPG for DoS attack against predefined host. Targeted SA: CCa . . . . 141
5.13 TPG for Heartbleed attack against predefined host. Targeted SA: DoH . 141
5.14 Joint TPG for 3 different types of WA after applying M-SATAA. SA
naming preserves the formalism introduced in the algorithm description. 142
5.15 TPG for infiltration attack against predefined host. Targets all types of
SAs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.16 High-level view of TPG for CICDS2017dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.17 Event detector placement optimisation process for CICDS2017 . . . . 146
5.18 “Under attack" detection ROC curves CICDS2017 . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.19 Behaviour of pna probability under no attacks for the optimised and
random allocation for CICDS2017 dataset. Orange line corresponds to
optimised allocation and blue line corresponds to random allocation. . . 148
5.20 Behaviour of pna probability under no attacks for the optimised and
random allocation for the CICDS2017 dataset, with detailed representation
of a specific false event. Orange line corresponds to optimised allocation








Historically, critical infrastructures relied on bespoke software, and because they were
loosely integrated, this limited the potential impact of knock-on effects between different
systems. Those days are gone. Now, most industries make extensive use of commercial “off-
the-shelf" systems [69], which are not specifically intended for security-related applications.
These systems include Linux, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), and augmentation systems
for GPS, the strengths and weaknesses of which are known by a growing number of attackers.
At the same time, a number of large-scale projects are increasing interdependencies both
within and between infrastructures.
Recent large-scale programmes in air traffic management (ATM), including the Single
European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) programme in Europe, along with the Next
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) in the United States, illustrate the
abovementioned points. In both cases, these programmes are readying novel operational
concepts and technological enablers [49, 39, 40]. These concepts rely on large-scale data
transfers across national boundaries and between a host of integrated systems. Regulatory
organisations are gaining an awareness of potential threats and vulnerabilities [34], as
reflected in the attempts of the Federal Aviation Administration and the European Aviation
Safety Agency to establish ATM security as an integral part of the system engineering
process.
This thesis addresses the challenge of supporting security risk assessment (SRA), as well as
the selection of control and event detectors, in large-scale engineering programmes. Current
practices and standards for security risk management involve the identification of security
risks and the implementation of associated controls at a system- or component-level.
Risk assessment is typically performed by experts, and it relies on the combined use of
qualitative and quantitative methods. However, the higher levels of interconnectivity across
1.2. Research Contribution 3
infrastructure components require the analysis of threat propagation within and across the
associated supply chains. Various security risk management methodologies exist, but few
are specifically tailored to the design and development process.
At the same time, in recent years, methods for mathematical modelling in infrastructure
protection have been proposed [5, 15, 16]. Several of these methods have been applied
successfully [63], the most prominent among which are presented in this thesis, and discussed
in terms of their methods and functionality. Different types of models deal with various
problems. For example, game theoretic methods are applied to randomised patrol scheduling
problems, while data mining and computer vision models are used for intrusion detection
(including in the cyber-domain). However, each model solves only a narrow scope of specific
problems. Even generic security-control allocation tasks deal with diverse cases, which are
not generalisable.
With the above considerations in mind, the goal of this research is to develop a
mathematically-founded method to support SRA in the general case, which involves
incorporating the main abstractions defined by the standards . In particular, the approach
evaluates the perceived optimality of the security controls and event detectors, analysing the
cumulative effect of the application of these security components to the system at the stages
of system development and operation. For different security system designs, an evaluation of
the “protection" of the system is given, as well as the quality level of “situation awareness".
It also assists in the development of “what-if" simulations in support of risk mitigation
decision-making processes. The latter allow for the identification of appropriate controls
and detectors, as well as their placement within the (sub-)system context. Additionally,
knowledge of the joint properties of different components of the security system allows a
high-level aggregated analysis to be performed of the alerts that are produced during system
operation, considering the temporal development of the received data. This is valuable in
lowering the rate of false positives in attack detection, or increasing the true positive rate.
Model development in this thesis is explicitly linked to the SRA process for the purpose
of ensuring the generality of the models. The framework is designed in a way that allows
a combination of lower-level models (e.g., data mining-driven detectors), as shown in the
validation sections of this thesis.
1.2 Research Contribution
This thesis seeks to target SRA at two stages of the condition of the system:
• Design Stage: In this stage, decisions are made about the nature, functionality, and
deployment of protection mechanisms.
1.3. Publication Summary 4
• Operation Stage: The system is deployed and launched in this stage. The data produced
by different components and security detectors can be analysed for attack prevention,
detection, and mitigation. In the thesis, the focus is given to attack detection.
Within the scope of this thesis, both stages are considered. The following two corresponding
research contributions are presented:
• Generic framework for security risk analysis domain, which is linked to the existing
SRA framework. The framework strictly translates the main entities used within the
Security Risk Assessment Methodology (SecRAM) into mathematical formalisms,
and provides a basis for building a graph-based model. Less strict correspondence
is built with ISO 27005 standard. The construction methodology for the graph-based
model is presented, which allows the modelling of complex, conditional, multi-step
attacks with multiple targets. The process of defining and selecting security controls
is represented as a multi-objective zero-sum security game. The solution is found
using standard methodology. For this, the game is converted to a sequence of pairs
of mixed-integer linear programming problems and proven to be consistent with the
requirements of the framework. In this research, the security game is referred to as a
“static model". The main scientific contribution is related to the designed
correspondence between the model and SecRAM (ISO 27005) and the derivation of the
Pareto-optimal search algorithm. The approach is functionally compared with several
competing methods, advantages and disadvantages of the “static model" are listed.
• Over the framework designed in the first chapter of the thesis, a method for security
awareness analysis is presented, which may be regarded as a logical continuation of
the static model. Problems relating to system design are further translated into system
operational problems. The proposed “dynamic model" is an “in-operation" online
data stream processing generic model, which is proposed and derived using standard
Bayesian inference. It does not provide a direct link to SRA, but it is based on the
framework of the static model, and can be understood as an additional security control.
Additionally, as shown in the corresponding chapter of the thesis, the dynamic model
formalises several system security design-related problems.
Both proposed models are validated in the thesis using real and synthetic datasets.
1.3 Publication Summary
• Kolev, D. and Johnson, C., “An Extension of Network Security Games for Large-
Scale Infrastructure Protection", Workshops at the 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial
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Intelligence. This paper summarises the model and the results presented in this thesis’
chapter “Static Security Model Description and Evaluation".
• Markarian, G. and Kolev, D., “Fully Automatic Electro-Optical Drone Detection
System", MSG-SET-183. This paper presents an example of a security detector
integrated within a sensor fusion platform, which can be analysed using the
methodology described in “Dynamic Security Model".
1.4 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 presents notable existing
approaches for addressing SRA problems using mathematical tools, mostly based on game
theory or Markov decision processes. This chapter also considers the state-of-the-art
approaches for Bayesian inference, as well as their applications in SRA and security control
design. It outlines the attack trees modelling method and aligns it with some of the game
theory formalisms. Chapter 3 describes the developed approach for security domain
modelling, building a parallel between the mathematical formalism and procedures of
currently existing methods for SRA. The two models that form the main contribution of
this thesis are given in this chapter. The following chapter, Chapter 4, states a generic
security control selection problem using the formalism defined in the previous chapter, and
it describes a solver for a specific case of the general problem statement. The developed
approach is applied to an airport model example, performing an experiment-based analysis
of the model’s theoretical properties. The model is functionally compared with several
competing methods. Chapter 5 presents a generic description of the “online" security
awareness model, which relies both on the Bayesian inference approaches and threat graph
formalism. The description is followed by model validation over a cyber-security dataset,
showing the advantages of the proposed method against the “per-detector" judgment. The
closing chapter of the thesis presents conclusions and potential areas for future research.
6
Chapter 2
Existing Mathematical Models for
Security Risk Assessment
This chapter presents state-of-the-art methodologies and models for security risk assessment
(SRA). A high-level review of the diverse approaches to SRA is given in order to
contextualise the models presented in this thesis. Special attention is paid to game theoretic
and probabilistic graphical methods, as well as the link between the corresponding approaches
and classical SRA methods, which are presented later in this chapter.
The purpose of a risk assessment methodology is to establish rules of the assessment, the
targets for actors involved, the terminology used to describe risk, and the quantifying and
qualifying criteria [36]. In addition, a risk assessment methodology allows degrees of risk
to be compared, and it specifies the documentation that must be collected and produced
based on the results of the assessments and the follow-on activities. The goal of a risk
assessment framework is to establish an objective measurement of the risk level, which
allows organisations to understand business risks related to critical information and assets,
both qualitatively and quantitatively. Ultimately, risk assessment frameworks provide the
tools needed to make business decisions regarding investments in people, processes, and
technology such that risk is reduced to an acceptable level [2].
The first part of this chapter, using examples, presents a description of the “standard" SRA
approach. Based on this description, a set of requirements for the proposed model is defined.
Thereafter, a high-level overview of families of models is given, which is used to narrow
the search for proper formalisation. Separately, an overview of the “attack trees" threat
modelling technique is presented and compared against graphical game-theoretical models.
The main concepts and most prominent results for each of the selected families of models
are then presented.
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2.1 Classical Methodologies for Security Risk
Assessment
In this section, a brief overview of SRA methodologies is given, using examples. Various
SRA and security risk management methodologies have been proposed in the literature. The
standards and best practices that have been identified vary substantially in terms of their
methods, rigour, and process steps. Nevertheless, the core artefacts of SRA include assets,
vulnerabilities, threat scenarios, and security controls.
Hereafter, the thesis considers several SRA methods, identifying the main similarities and
general structure of the approaches. This section concludes with an identification of the main
possible ways for automatisation of the methods and derivation of the requirements to the
proposed methodology.
2.1.1 ISO 31000
ISO 31000 is a security risk assessment standard based on Austrian, Australian, and New
Zealand’s national approaches. This method has evolved into a global and widely accepted
leading standard. Due to the generality of the approach, it can be applied to a wide range of
organisations and systems, regardless of their type or size [24].
ISO 31000 process consists of several high-level steps presented in the following list.
• Context establishment. During this phase, internal and external contexts are specified.
Internal context defines governance, organisational structure, processes, roles and
responsibilities, policies, objectives of projects, assets, and other characteristics of
the organisation. External context includes social, cultural, political, legal, regulatory,
financial, technological, economic, and natural aspects. They are used to build an
understanding of the stakeholders’ interests within the organisation and externally,
define the purpose of risk assessment, and identify risk criteria (which risks should
be considered and how to evaluate them).
• Risk assessment. This phase subsumes the complete process of risk identification,
risk analysis, and risk evaluation. The first part - risk identification - identifies the
sources of risk, areas of impact, risk events, and their consequences. The main output
of this part is a list of all possible risks. The next stage is risk analysis. For each
item in the list, the corresponding likelihood of occurrence and potential consequences
(impact) is defined. Risk analysis focusses on determining the sources of the risks,
communicating with the stakeholders for collecting information relevant for
decision making, evaluating the risks against the risk criteria. Risk analysis can be
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Figure 2.1: ISO 27005 process scheme.
of a quantitative, semi-quantitative, or qualitative nature. The risk evaluation stage
ranks the risks for further treatment.
• Risk treatment. This last phase of the analysis deals with the selection and
implementation of one or more options for modifying (mitigating) risks. ISO 31000
defines a number of possible strategies that include deploying additional security
controls, moving the responsibility for risk mitigation to other organisations, changing
the specifics of the organisation’s activity, and accepting the risk as it is.
Each stage of the assessment should be linked with communication with the stakeholders
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and experts in the field. The approach is considered to be iterative and should be repeated
periodically.
ISO 31000 suggests a high-level description of the process. This level of precision allows
it to be adopted for a large variety of different systems/organisations. However, most steps
of the process are not detailed and rely purely on the stakeholders’ decision-making and
expert judgement. At each stage, supportive information may be used presented in the form
of charts, graphs, statistics, and others. However, the standard does not provide any explicit
suggestions for possible automation of the decision-making process at each step and lacks
pre-defined ways for quantitative evaluation of the risks. The standard suggests that relevant
interconnections between systems and cumulative effect of the attacks should be taken into
account during risk assessment, but no explicit procedure or algorithm to be followed is
given. This may be explained by the requirement for the standard to be on a high level and
be applicable in various range of domains.
2.1.2 ISO 27005
ISO 27005 [36] belongs to the ISO 27000 family of standards and represents an extended
risk management process, which is specifically adapted to the requirements of information
security. The standard itself contains the description of the SRA process, which is still
applicable to information and infrastructure security. On a high-level, the ISO 27005 process
is represented in figure 2.1.
The first step of the analysis is context establishment. It defines the following subjects of the
analysis:
• Impact criteria definition, for example, financial, human, or reputation losses. Impact
criteria could vary depending on the specifics of the protected system. Impact criteria
are defined as real-valued parameters, characterising the level of caused damage. The
usual range of impact criteria is from 0 to 5, where the scale is determined by the
security officers conducting the analysis.
• Scope identification, which represents the general view of the organisation on the
assets to be protected. The assets could be both tangible (buildings, computers, or
personnel) and intangible (data, functions).
• In case the assessment is planned to be a part of some standard process within the
organisation, it is important to identify the unit responsible for carrying that out.
The next step of the analysis is risk assessment, which is split into three parts.
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• Risk Identification examines what kind of incidents can happen and which of them
lead to a loss. This includes both the incidents which are under the control of the
organisation and those that are based on external influences. Identification of possible
threats involves listing critical assets of the system (that could be both tangible and
intangible); definition of main vulnerabilities and ways of their exploitation; creation
of a set of possible “controls", i.e. means for mitigation or prevention of the attack;
setting different types of consequences of the attack, for example, money, reputation,
human losses, or any other relevant criteria.
• Risk Analysis analyses the threats in terms of the likelihood of their appearance and
numerically evaluates them against the set of criteria identified at the previous step.
Risk analysis can either be of qualitative or quantitative nature, depending on the
type of considered criterion. For example, some of the criteria could be defined as
exact numerical value or range of values (financial losses), some of the criteria could
be characterised using descriptive scales (like "low", "medium", "high"). Likelihood
assessment considers how often a specific threat might occur and how easily related
vulnerabilities can be exploited. This can be assessed by the experts in the field and
using historical data.
• Risk Evaluation re-considers the list of threats, given the evaluated criteria and
likelihoods. Based on expert judgement, risks are ranked, and a list of prioritised
threats is produced.
The next phase of the process is risk treatment, described as a complex step consisting of four
possible options: risk modification, risk retention, risk avoidance, and risk sharing. Those
options are not mutually exclusive; a combination of strategies is possible. Risk modification
strategy assumes a selection of (new) controls to mitigate the risk. This decision should
be taken with respect to the existing resources. The rest of the strategies define different
measures for transferring the responsibility of the risk handling to a different
organisation or accepting the low-impact risks as they are.
The last phase of the analysis is risk acceptance, when all identified risks are re-evaluated
given the treatment strategies selected and accepted or not accepted based on the residual
impact levels (estimated impact levels after treatment). ISO 27005 provides a high-level
algorithm for risk assessment, defines the vocabulary and main entities of the SRA process.
It is more detailed compared to ISO 31000, specifying exact types of entities to be analysed
during the context establishment phase. However, it does not specify a constructive approach
for quantitative evaluation of the risks, relying significantly on expert judgement at each step
of the analysis. The standard does not provide any suggestions and instructions for a detailed
formalisation of the attacks and any means for automation of the decision-making during risk
identification and risk analysis.
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2.1.3 Eurocontrol’s Security Risk Assessment
Methodology
Within the SESAR context, work package 16.02 devised a “Security Risk Assessment
Methodology" (SecRAM) based on ISO 27005 [2]. SecRAM is used in the present thesis to
build a correspondence between the proposed formalism and SRA standards. SecRAM was
selected as a baseline from the side of classical risk assessment for the following reasons:
• The methodology was developed using international SRA methods as a baseline, and
it is applied in practice in the scope of SESAR for some of the operational focus areas
(OFAs) (i.e. large-scale system development projects with several sub-components).
• Various papers [34, 42] have explained how to apply SecRAM both to infrastructure
and cybersecurity problems. Additionally, the methodology has been used in several
Horizon 2020 projects, including GAMMA, which demonstrates the applicability of
the method and its usage within the European Union.
• The author consulted with security specialists who are responsible for the development
of SecRAM. This fact is important for the validation of the thesis results, particularly
those relating to the static model, as well as the establishment of the correspondence
between the mathematical formalisms and SecRAM.
This SRA method has been extensively used within SESAR programme in a number of
OFAs. SecRAM was applied in a number of OFAs, some of them are listed below.
• OFA 01.01.01: Low visibility procedures using ground-based augmentation system
(for satellite positioning augmentation).
• OFA 01.03.04 Extended Flight Plan targets to develop enhanced aircraft routing
procedures.
• OFA 03.03.01 Ground-Based Separation Provision in En-Route targets to develop
systems and processes to increase airspace capacity, reduce flight variability, optimise
the costs of operation.
• OFA 04.01.02 Enhanced Arrival and Departure Management. This project aims to
increase the capacity of airports, reduce the environmental impact, and reinforce the
safety of air transportation by using different decision-support techniques and enhanced
processes.
• OFA 05.03.07 Network Operations Planning. The project aims to deploy integrated
airport collaborative planning processes, including surface routing planning activity.
The goal is to optimise airport processes and airline operations on the ground.
2.1. Classical Methodologies for Security Risk
Assessment 12
• OFA 05.06.02, Continuous Descent Operation. In this project, a set of means for an
improvement of the aircraft descend procedures.
In this section, in parallel with the description of the methodology, a mathematical
formalisation for some of the steps is given. This formalisation is further used
for the alignment of the proposed model instantiation process and the main steps involved in
SecRAM.
The first step in SecRAM defines the scope of the analysis (i.e., impact assessment) and
distinguishes between primary and supporting assets. The principal idea is that the protected
system is modelled as an information system. The term “primary asset" (PA) is used to
denote the intangible services and information elements. A formal definition of PA is given
as follows:
Primary Asset: An intangible function, service, process, or piece of information that is an
element of the system within the scope of the project, and which has value to the system.
These services and information are instantiated and enabled by "supporting assets" (SAs), as
defined below:
Supporting Asset: An enabling entity for the PA. SAs relate to operational, organisational,
and technical means that possess vulnerabilities, and which might be susceptible to security
attacks.
As shown in due course, SAs can be considered to define the set of targets for adversaries.
Each SA is related to one or more PA, which establishes the relationship between the services
and components of the system.
For each PA, three high-level criteria are considered, often referred to as comprising the CIA
triad:
• Confidentiality: Property of information that is not made available or disclosed to
unauthorised individuals, entities, or processes.
• Integrity: Property of safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of assets.
• Availability: Property of being accessible and usable on demand by an authorised
entity.
In turn, it is necessary to provide an account of the impact. It is defined for seven impact
areas (or types of impact), and this occurs for each PA. The value of the impact ranges from
0 to 5, and this value is evaluated as shown in Figure 2.2 [43]. In this way, a value is defined
for each PA, each impact area, and each element of the CIA triad. As shown in Figure
2.2, the impact measures not only tangible damage to personnel and the system, but also
it measures the qualitative decrease in system operation (e.g., capacity and performance),
reputation losses (e.g., branding), and others. Therefore, the result of the impact definition
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Figure 2.2: Correspondence between impact area and value of evaluated impact
stage is a 3D table. From a mathematical perspective, the impact can be defined as a function
of three variables: I(p, i,c), where p is one of the PAs, i is one of the seven impact areas, and
c ∈ {C, I,A}. The values of this function are defined by security experts.
The next step involved in SecRAM is to define the impact for each element of the CIA triad
for each PA, which is independent from the impact area. This is accomplished by considering
the maximal impact among all impact areas for a given PA and for each function. Finally, a
2D table of impact values is obtained, which is defined for all PAs and, furthermore, for all
of the elements in the CIA triad.




The function IPA is the result of the asset analysis of the system.
The next step involves defining the threat scenarios against SA. Each threat scenario
compromises a subset of {C, I,A} functions of the corresponding supporting assets. To
evaluate the impact of the threat t against supporting asset s, a list of criteria compromised by
the threat for each PA must be defined, which highlights the relevance of the table produced
in the previous step. Therefore, for every threat t, a set of relevant “service-criterion"
pairs is designed by security experts. Formally, we can define these pairs as a function
r(t) = {(p,c)}, p ∈ PA,c ∈ {C, I,A}.
After defining the service-criterion pairs, the impact of threat t on each SA is defined as a
maximal impact among all PAs linked to the current SA, and among all the criteria in the set.
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Formally, an impact for each SA and for each threat is defined as follows:
ISA(s, t) = max
(p,c)∈r(t),p∈PA(s)
IPA(p,c) (2.2)
Here, PA(s) defines the list of PAs linked to the SA s.
Using the procedures defined above, it is possible to obtain the lists of threats, SAs, and
corresponding threats. Additionally, a corresponding likelihood value is assigned for each
threat. Depending on the likelihood and impact values, the final risk score is given using a
predefined “impact × likelihood" matrix, where risk varies from low to high.
The next step involves selecting security controls, where – for each threat – one of the
following actions should be chosen:
• Accept or tolerate the threat when no additional action is needed.
• Reduce or treat the threat by installing security controls.
• Avoid or terminate the threat by stopping the activity.
• Transfer the threat to another party.
Expert judgement is primarily used to select the actions and, potentially, the security controls,
and the decision-making process is informed by system-specific details. The way that security
controls or selected actions mitigate the risk is not formally given by the standard, and so
should also be considered on the basis of expert judgement.
The formal functions and definitions introduced in this subsection are further used to describe
the proposed model, and to compare it to SecRAM.
In summary, it is clear that SecRAM provides a more detailed and strict formalisation of
high-level management procedures compared to ISO 31000 and ISO 27005, all the while
leaving room for expert judgement. In the following chapters, mathematical properties of
the SecRAM “solution" are considered on the basis of this type of analysis. Despite the
fact that some of the steps of SecRAM support partial automation (impact evaluation, for
example), the decision-making at the threat mitigation phase is done manually.
2.1.4 Security Risk Model Criteria
After introducing 3 standard methodologies, we discuss their distinctive features that are
important for incorporation to the proposed mathematical model. These features can be
understood as required conditions that must be satisfied so that the security risk experts can
use the proposed formalism.
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1. System Description Generality: The approach should be applicable to any type of
system, and so it should deal with high-level entities that can be adjusted to match the
scope of the interest of the security expert.
2. Attack Description Generality: The approach should allow the user to describe an
arbitrary threat scenario and diverse types of attack. The attacks can be interdependent,
and the scenario could include multiple steps.
3. Protection Description Generality: The approach should be able to introduce diverse
security controls and protection means.
It is important to recognise that the list given above is not necessarily sufficient for a
qualitative SRA. However, meeting these requirements would allow the model to be
technically applied to SRA problems. It is possible to add numerous further restrictions and
requirements, such as the necessity to model sequential counter-actions explicitly, to capture
simultaneous attack effects, and to consider different types of impact. It is also obvious that
meeting the requirements listed above would require a level of simplification compared to
the models that deal with specific attacks against a specific system.
In addition to the definition of the modelling criteria, it is essential to outline the application
specifics of the developed model (i.e., the group of end-users and required expertise). As
stated in the motivation section of this thesis given in Chapter 1, the models were developed
to provide support for the SRA process. Therefore, the model’s end-users are security
officers and specialists who perform the analysis and observe the system in operation. It is
clear that the lower the instantiation complexity, the less mathematical skill that is required
from the user. Therefore, it is preferable to use “low-complexity" abstractions such as lists,
tables, graphs, and other visual elements, which are well-aligned with the entities used in
SecRAM.
2.2 Mathematical Methods in Security Risk
Assessment
The mathematical methods used for SRA are diverse. They cover a broad spectrum of
methods, including formalised methodologies [15], crossing the intermediate expert-based
assessments with supporting formal structures (e.g., attack trees and correlation plots)[57],
and converging to fully expert-based decision tree methods used to classify or give a
quantitative assessment of the security level.
In this thesis, automatisation and artificial decision support techniques were the focus, as
discussed in the motivation section. Therefore, a wide collection of families of methods is
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considered in the next subsection, which is given to define further a more detailed model
selection.
2.2.1 Main Families of Models
In recent years, the following areas of applied mathematics have been successfully exploited
in the area of SRA for similar applications: data mining and statistical learning, operation
research-based algorithms for security problems, and statistical graphical models.
• Data Mining and Statistical Learning: These areas have been successfully applied
in various security problems, especially in intrusion detection (both in cybersecurity
and infrastructure security). The designed methods are usually formalised as anomaly
detection tasks, solved using techniques such as principal component analysis (or any
other subspace projection method) [47], one-class support vector machines (SVMs)
[68], or kernel density estimations [18]. Recent advances in deep learning have also
been successfully used in applications such as malware detection [56]. For
infrastructure protection, object tracking techniques are commonly applied, for
example, in automatic video surveillance [62] or radar systems [53]. The advantage of
these methods is that it is unnecessary to develop a detailed model of the system, as
the training procedure aims to adapt a parametric model to the specifics of the target
domain. However, these algorithms are used for specific tasks with a narrow domain,
and exploitation is performed at the level of systems components using dedicated
equipment (e.g., network analysers, protocol scanners, and malicious code or botnet
detectors). Statistically-based algorithms depend on training data and on the structure
of the selected algorithm, which significantly narrows the scope of the application. In
the case, one exception may be online self-learning models, which can adjust to novel
data. Nevertheless, this family of models still requires that the data are presented in
the standard format of generic security-descriptive “feature-vectors", which form a
separate problem to be solved. Another typical problem associated with statistical
methods, especially more complex examples (e.g., deep neural networks), is poor
interpretability of the output and complex error analysis/debugging. For this reason,
despite the fact that data mining models are used in the experimental part of the thesis
as sub-components, they will not form a basis for the development of the main research
contributions.
• Operation research-based algorithms for security problems: These are usually designed
for large-scale applications, and they solve tasks such as patrol randomisation and
security control allocation. As an input, these methods take a formal description of
2.2. Mathematical Methods in Security Risk
Assessment 17
the system, a set of variable assets to be optimised (e.g., security control allocation),
and a single – potentially several – target “gain" function. The gain function should
be optimised subject to the model’s variables. The adversary is usually presented
explicitly as an actor, and their targets may be explicitly modelled by the formalisation
means of game or decision theory. This family of models usually operates on a higher,
system-wide level. Existing methodologies may differ depending on the modelled
variable assets and system, but at the same time, the operation research framework (and
game theory in particular) provides a high-level formalism, which may be utilised in
order to support the decision making during SRA for large-scale systems. Additionally,
an explicit definition of the gain function simplifies the interpretation of the results.
Operation research serves as a basis for the development of the static model in this
thesis.
• Family of statistical graphical models [13]: This can be understood as a mixture of
statistical inference and operation research, despite being formally related to the first
one. They do not suffer from the limitations of data mining models, and they are widely
applied in safety tasks for the identification of sub-system failures [4], and well as to
promote cybersecurity [72]. In contrast to data mining models, statistical graphical
models have a preliminary design phase, which seeks to capture the specifics of the
system described. The models state an explicit probabilistic dependency between
the data observed during operation and a high-level descriptive system state (e.g., a
failure of specific modules or possible attack presence). Therefore, graphical models
make it possible, for instance, to derive the probability distribution of the system-state
variables depending on the data observed. Graphical models, including the Bayesian
filter model, were used for the definition of the dynamic model in this thesis.
It is worth mentioning that, in recent years, the abovementioned separation between operation
research and data mining has become increasingly flexible. One of the main reasons for this
relates to the emerging area of generative adversarial networks (GANs) [31]. GANs can be
regarded as a combination of operation research methods and data mining. Some theoretical
setups model a zero-sum game between the generator and the classifier [51], the intention
being to teach the generator to produce objects that are indistinguishable from the “real"
training dataset. However, this does not set an explicit target to model a behaviour between
the attacker and defender, and it does not solve the problem of poor interpretability.
In addition to the methods already discussed, there exist a variety of approaches for
addressing generic security problems, including generic attack detection methods,
as presented in [52]. The paper proposes a framework for the development of a dynamic
model for generic attack detection. However, the proposed model is noted linked to the
standard “manual" SRA methods. The generic optimisation problem for security control
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selection is stated in [11], but on a high level and with no details of the design of the system.
A generic data mining framework was proposed in [60] for cyber-attack detection, but it is
not linked to the SRA and is limited to a specific set of attacks.
2.2.2 Model Family Selection
Presented families of methods are applied in operation along with classical methods for
security risk analysis. The data mining models are usually used at a low level, enhancing
security on a per-component basis, and usually excluding the higher-level picture.
Considering that the present thesis sought to explore decision support for SRA in large-
scale systems, operation research and statistical graph models were selected as the main
frameworks. Game theory is used, in particular, because it is a common mechanism for
attacker-defender models, as discussed in greater depth in due course. Additionally, game
theory provides a mechanism that allows the problem to be analysed, and which permits
the creation of strict derivation of the model to specific mathematical problems (usually
discrete). In turn, these can be further optimised using well-known techniques, ranging
from classical gradient-based algorithms [14] to swarm optimisation or neural network-
based solution inference [26]. Graph models and game theory could be used as a tool for
in-operation analysis and a high-level aggregation mechanism for the captured generic data
stream produced by the system. In this thesis some statistical learning elements are applied,
but only as a composite part of a general model, and mostly due to the specifics of the
selected dataset.
2.3 Game Theory
Game theory is a sub-field in operation research, which involves the study of mathematical
models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent, rational decision-makers. Game
theory has a wide range of applications in economics, political science, psychology, computer
science, and – as is relevant for the present thesis – the domain of security.
A classical two-player game is defined by a tuple Γ = 〈X1,X2,F1(x1,x2),F2(x1,x2)〉, where
X1,X2 are the strategy domains for the first and second player, and F1,F2 are real-valued gain
functions. Each of the players aims, for instance, to maximise their gain. The multiplayer
game is formalised as an extension of the 2-player game definition. The classical problem
in game theory is a Nash equilibrium search. A tuple of strategies (x∗1,x
∗
2) is called a Nash
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An intuitive understanding of the Nash equilibrium strategies is that all the players cannot
select a better strategy in case the strategy of the rest of the players is fixed. In a general case,
it is possible to have several equilibria for one game. When F1 =−F2, the Nash equilibrium
is an antagonistic equilibrium, and Γ is called an antagonistic (or zero-sum) game. This can
be interpreted as that the gain of one of the players is considered as a loss of another or that
the main intention is to cause maximal damage.
Another important definition in game theory is multi-objective optimisation and Pareto-
optimality. These definitions are essential for the case when the gain functions are vector-
valued
Fi : X1×X2× ...×Xn→ Rk,k ≥ 2 (2.4)
where n is the number of players. A simple example of a vector-valued gain or impact
function may be given by SecRAM impact areas and the CIA triad, which are further
accumulated into a single value.
For the cases of vector-valued gain functions, the ranking should be explicitly defined. A key
concept in multi-objective optimisation is Pareto-optimality, which allows for partial ranking
of vectors. The definition of a Pareto-optimal point is given below.
Definition: Let S⊂Rk,k≥ 2,∀x ∈ S, ‖x‖< ∞, where ‖x‖ is any norm defined in Rk. Then
p ∈ S is a Pareto-optimal vector if and only if @x ∈ S : x 6= p, ∀i≤ k xi ≥ pi.
Depending on the specifics of the problem, inequalities in the definition could be changed.
The definition given above is relevant for maximisation problems, while for minimisation
problem the condition may be changed to @x ∈ S : x 6= p,∀i≤ k xi ≤ pi.
As will be shown, some examples of game theory models set up a task to find the set of
all Pareto-optimal solutions, which is sometimes defined as a Pareto-optimal frontier. An
illustrative example of Pareto-optimal points in two-dimensional space is given in Figure
2.3.
2.3.1 Game Theory Models in Security
Game theory modelling has grown rapidly within the domain of security. Game theoretic
models represent interactions between opposing agents. Typically, one player is a defender
while the other agents are adversaries. The assumption is made that the defender will select
an optimal strategy (e.g., they will implement security controls), which is considered to show
optimality in terms of a variety of possible solution concepts: antagonistic equilibrium, Nash
equilibrium, Pareto-optimality, and others. [16, 63].
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Figure 2.3: Example of the Pareto-optimal frontier in 2-dimensional space of criteria 1 and
2 for a set of four points. Points X, Y, and Z are Pareto-optimal according to the definition;
they form a Pareto-optimal frontier. Point P is not Pareto-optimal, as point X is greater at
each component.
A classic example of an application of mathematical modelling grounded on a Bayesian
Stackelberg game is the ARMOR family of systems [54]. One system is deployed at Los
Angeles airport for solving the randomised patrol scheduling problem with limited resources.
Furthermore, game theoretic models have been applied in various areas by the US coastguard
[59], air traffic security [55], and police patrol [17].
The domain of cybersecurity is more challenging for the application of game theoretic models.
Normally, security mechanisms in the cyber-domain are based on techniques from fields
such as encryption [61], statistics [18], and others. Some papers have explicitly justified
why some of the standard approaches are not applicable to this domain. For example,
[32] described game theoretic models that are relevant to information warfare. Their paper
analysed several situations and outlined different courses of action with predicted outcomes
and what-if scenarios. In their work, the researchers analysed standard tree-based decision-
making, and they justified why – for the case of information security – the zero-sum game
might not be an appropriate solution. Based on this fact, as well as other reasons, the paper
concluded that standard tree-based game models are not directly applicable to the domain of
cybersecurity.
At the same time, [23] provided a comprehensive survey of different applications of game
theory in security for specific tasks, which include methodologies for secure routing,
addressing denial-of-service (DoS) attacks (i.e., detection and counter-action strategy), and
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so on. In [19], the researchers considered the Internet and its infrastructure as the basis
for exploring attacks and security issues. While the majority of studies have focused on
securing data transfers, the researchers discussed attacks on infrastructure, which can lead to
significant destruction due to the fact that different components of existing Internet
infrastructure have various trusting relationships with one another. The study of [46]
presented an ontology for distributed DoS attacks and protective methods. The mechanisms
classify the attack and defence strategies. Furthermore, the researchers highlighted common
attack features and important types of attack strategies, thus putting additional structure to
the attack and defence description.
However, each of the models focuses on case-specific details and attack types, with no
possibility to support generic SRA-type decision-making. SRA methodologies are well-
established and provide a level of abstraction that is suitable for general-case risk assessment.
However, existing standards do not provide any mechanism for strict mathematical
quantitative assessment procedures. This fact restricts the possibility for automatic “what-if"
studies, and it limits decision-making processes to expert-based judgements.
In the next subsections, the most successful game theory-based approaches to SRA are
detailed, and the network security game framework is introduced.
2.3.2 Examples of Game Theoretic Models in Security
One definition of game theory states that it is a mathematical theory for decision-making
in conflict situations [67]. As previously noted, game theory is viewed as a sub-field in
operation research, which intuitively leads to the assumption that it should be applicable to
the domain of security by modelling two opposing agents. Some trivial models (which are
not related to game theory) describe processes relating to the issue of how decision-makers
select actions from predefined sets of actions in order to optimise a given cost function, which
depends on the selected strategy. However, such models do not describe conflict situations.
The conflict situation differs because the decision is taken by multiple decision-makers (or
players). Each player’s cost function may depend on the strategies selected by other players
as well. Such a mathematical model is known as a game.
The standard formalisation for a multiplayer game is given as follows. Let A denote a set
consisting of players. Each player a ∈ A operates according to a set of strategies Sa. Each
player selects a strategy without any knowledge about the strategies selected by the other
players (this statement may vary depending on the model). Thus, it is possible to define a
strategy tuple s = (sa|a ∈ A) ∈ S = (Sa,a ∈ A), from the Cartesian product of all strategy
sets for all players. For each player, a gain or cost function is defined ua(s) : S→ R. Players
select their strategies to optimise their corresponding gain functions. The game is defined as
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a tuple:
Γ = (A;S;ua(s),a ∈ A) (2.5)
One of the most well-studied cases is the “game of two players" (i.e., the case where |A|= 2).
Application of game theory to the domain of security usually operates for games with two
players, where one of the players is the adversary (or attacker) and the other is the defender.
Furthermore, for purposes of unification, the following notation is used for security-related
games with two players: A = a,d is a set of players; d is the defender, referred to from
this point onwards as “she”; and a is the attacker, referred to as “he”. An important type of
game is the “zero-sum” game involving two players, where ua(s) =−ud(s), and where each
player is trying to maximise their corresponding cost function. Zero-sum games are often
reduced to settle point search problems. For these types of games, it is possible to assume
that the attacker and the defender have the same cost function, but one of the players tries to
maximise it while the other tries to minimise it.
Several basic theoretical models were described in [5]. This work gives a security domain
interpretation of the main theoretical properties of the games. The models define a cost
function, its dependence on the adversary’s adopted strategies, and the defender’s response
to the attack. The associated set of strategies and systems performance are represented
as a set of equations and constraints for the corresponding optimisation problem. Next
three examples demonstrate the the application of the game theory to a simplified pipeline
protection problem. They show several important ways for defining the characteristics of
the game like sequence of actions of the agents, protection formalisation, gain function
definition. All examples consider a pipeline structure, which is transferring oil from the
source to the sink. This pipeline structure is a subject of an attack from the attacker. The
goal of the defender is to select a counter-measure that would optimise the cost the damage
caused by the attacker.
Attacker-Defender Model. The adversary attacks first, the defender receives full
information about the ongoing attack, and – accordingly – the defender responds. The
attacker initially has full knowledge about the defender’s optimal response to every attack
strategy. The attacker’s strategy is to disable some subset of the pipes and the defender’s
response is to reorganise the oil flow within the rest of the pipes. The following optimisation
problem is stated in order to calculate the resulting cost function for the defender (assuming
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Here, y represents the vector of flows in every pipeline (i.e., the defender’s strategy); U is
a diagonal matrix where each element uii represents the capacity of pipe i, amount of oil
that could be transferred at a moment of time; x is a Boolean vector of enemy strategies,
indicating which pipes he is going to disable; M limits the number of pipes that the attacker
can disable; 〈x,1〉 defines a dot product of the vector x with a vector with all elements equal
to 1, resulting into a sum of all elements of x; structure limitations are given by Ay = b; and c
represents the vector of relative costs of passing a unit of the flow through a given pipe. Thus,
the term 〈c,y〉 estimates the cost of flow distribution y. Some of the structural limitations
are defined as inequalities, for example, the term 〈x,1〉 ≤ M defines the limitations for the
number of non-zero entries to the vector x, which is interpreted as the maximal number of
pipes damaged by the attack. Inequality y ≤ U(1− x) states that for each pipe i the flow
yi does not exceed the pipe capacity uii if the pipe is not attacked, and is equal to 0 if the
pipe is attacked. Equality Ay = b defines the limitations such as that the inflow of each pipe
should be equal to the outflow. In a general case, structural limitations could be augmented
by inequalities, for example, if there is a lower bound for the inflow for some of the pipes.
The defender tries to minimise the cost for each given adversary strategy x. This is done by
selecting a y that minimises the cost function. Thus, the inner “min" operator represents the
defender’s response for a given attack x. The attacker’s optimal strategy involves selecting
such an attack so that the cost will be maximized, given the optimal response of the defender.
The outer “max" is the selection of the optimal x with a known response, where the attacker’s
aim is to maximise the cost in case of an optimal response. Despite being a zero-sum game,
no attempt is made to search for any type of equilibrium. This is done due to the fixed order of
the agents’ actions in the game. The model gives a good representation of how the sequence
of “min/max" operators is linked to the sequence of actions, as well as demonstrating an
example of optimal counter-action selection. In addition, the model shows how it is possible
to define the structural limitations and attack impacts.
Defender-Attacker Model. For this model, the action sequence is exchanged. The
defender prepares using known information about all possible attacks, after which the attacker
strikes. The strategy of the defender is to put a protection for some of the pipes, so that they
can not be disabled by the attacker. The strategy of the attacker remains the same as in the
previous example. A formal description of the model is given below. In terms of what the
main notations are, these are listed as follows:
• The defender’s assets are indexed by k.
• ck denotes the gain of the attacker in case of an attack against unprotected asset k.
• pk denotes a reduction of the attacker’s pay-off derived from attacking asset k if
that asset is defended (i.e., the adversary receives a pay-off ck + pk, pk ≤ 0).
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• P denotes a diagonal matrix with pk at position (k,k)
The strategy encoding is given as follows:
yk =
{





1 if the asset kis attacked
0 otherwise
(2.8)
Formulation of the cost evaluation in the case where both players select the optimal strategy










where x corresponds to the attacker’s strategy, and y corresponds to the defender’s strategy.
Equality Ay = b represents structural limitations of the pipeline, Gy ≤ f represents the
defender’s constraints in terms of resource limitations, while Cx ≤ b is the corresponding
set of constraints for the attacker. Constraint inequalities can be considered as generalised
version of the limitations of form 〈x,1〉 ≤M from the previous model example.
In contrast to the previous model, the current model considers preliminary protection of the
system, where the concept of security controls is implicitly introduced. In addition to that,
the model demonstrates the sequence of actions considered in SRA, where often a static
protection is selected before an attack happens.
Defender-Attacker-Defender Model. The game considers a three-step action sequence:
the defender prepares, the attacker strikes, and the defender responds. Using the same













where w is a Boolean vector related to the protection, placed by the defender at the first
step of the game (outer ’min’ operator). If some pipe is protected then the corresponding
attack against it is blocked. After that, Attacker-Defender game is performed. A pair (w,y)
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represents the defender’s strategy, while x is the attacker’s strategy. The operator used at the
term (x−w)+ is defined as follows:
(a)+ =
{
a if a > 0
0 otherwise
(2.11)
This example shows how game theory allows the modelling of multi-step dynamic situation
development.
The three models described above give an important yet preliminary understanding of how
game theory allows some parts of the SRA to be performed in certain systems. Additionally,
it shows how differences in the sequence of actions undertaken by the attacker and defender
can be formalised as sequential per-component optimisation problems. The number of steps
performed by the adversary may increase in a similar manner, as shown in the defender-
attacker-defender model. It is a commonly used approach, and it is typically used in multi-
step games such as chess. An example of a security application of multi-step games is
described in [41]. Usually, in such cases, the number of strategies for both of the players
is finite and not large, which means that dynamic programming can be used to solve the
corresponding problems.
An interesting consequence of the game theory formalism is one that proves that, in case of a
zero-sum game with a gain function, it is always better to respond to a known type of attack
rather than adopting a general “worst-case" action. This is formulated in an implicit manner










where d denotes the defender’s strategy, and a denotes the attacker’s strategy. However,
in the defender-attacker action sequence, this is better for the provision of the general case
“static" protection, while the attacker-defender strategy is the best choice in terms of counter-
response.
2.3.3 Los Angeles Airport Randomised Scheduling
The ARMOR system is a real-world application of a game theoretic model in the field of
security [54]. The system was deployed at Los Angeles airport, and it is still used for security
patrol schedule randomisation.
The Bayesian Stackelberg game (BSG) is used as a basis modelling scheme. A classical
Stackelberg game (SG) is conducted between two players: the leader, the first player, and the
follower. The leader selects a strategy first al , after which the follower performs an action
a f , having full knowledge about al . In the scope of security games, the leader (defender)
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defines her strategy (security system), and then the adversary attacks (under the assumption
that he knows everything about the security system) by selecting an optimal attack strategy.
The corresponding mutual state is known as Stackelberg equilibrium. BSG differs from SG
in the way that the leader is allowed to select mixed strategies.
Mixed strategy for a player is defined as a probability distribution over the set of (pure)
strategies of the corresponding player. The gain function for mixed strategies is defined as
the expected value of the gain over the strategies of the player.
The main difference between ARMOR and the models that were described in the previous
section is that multiple types of attackers are taken into consideration (i.e., there are multiple
types of followers). Additionally, the pay-off functions of the attacker and the defender
are not opposite, and so the game is not a zero-sum, antagonistic game. These details give
rise to a far more complex motivation model for the adversary than is the case in any of
the previously explored models. However, the defender knows about the attacker’s pay-off
functions, and vice versa, which implies a full-information security game. Prior probabilities
over the attacker type are introduced in order to calculate the defender’s expected pay-off.
Security configuration (i.e., the system) is represented as a placement of a limited number
of patrols at checkpoints. To introduce uncertainty, the patrol schedule is randomised (i.e.,
stochastic strategy selection). The defender’s strategy is represented as a probability
distribution over the subsets of checkpoints which are to be protected. Therefore, a
probability distribution over subsets of checkpoints is optimised in the ARMOR system.
The scheduling plan is made by the machine, which selects a random configuration of
checkpoints with a given probability. The defender’s strategy is a probability distribution
over the checkpoints, which is a mixed strategy.
The strategies are solved by using the dual formulation of the game optimisation problem.
Consequently, the following mixed-integer quadratic optimisation problem must be solved:
max
q,x,a
∑x∈X ∑ j∈Q Ri jq jxi
∑i xi = 1
∑ j q j = 1





q j ∈ {0,1}
a ∈ R
(2.13)
where x and q represent a probability distribution vector over the set of checkpoints for the
defender and adversary, respectively; Ri j is the defender’s reward function in the case where
the adversary selects a checkpoint j to attack, while the defender has allocated a patrol to i.
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It is also notable that pay-off functions for the attackers and defender are created by experts.
The version described above encounters only one type of follower (attacker). However, in
the next versions of ARMOR, multiple types of followers were considered with different










where L denotes the set of follower types, and the strategies for each attacker are marked
by corresponding l. Prior probabilities pl are defined by experts. In order to generate a
randomised checkpoint schedule for k patrols, a tuple with no repeating samples is generated
from the distribution defined by x.
The ARMOR example is important not only because it shows how game theoretic models can
be applied to real-world problems (in this case, in the area of air traffic management (ATM)
security), but also because – from a theoretical perspective – it introduces an important
concept of attacker types, as well as a specific way to manage them. As such, this partially
addresses the point about attack generality mentioned in Section 2.1.4.
2.3.4 Multi-objective Security Models
Another notable family of models in the context of security games is known as multi-
objective (MO) models. The MO formalism allows an evaluation to be made of the different
types of impact, or the different types of attacks, that exist against the system simultaneously.
This approach makes it possible to avoid the process of “averaging" diverse types of impact
(e.g., economic, reputational, or human losses) into a single pay-off function, and instead
considers these values independently.
In several articles [54, 59], various types of adversaries are introduced, and different pay-off
functions are created to specify the corresponding types of adversaries. To avoid averaging
the pay-off (or impact) based on the type of adversary in the SG, each type of is considered
independently. The following entities are defined:
• Udi (c,a) – The pay-off of a defender in case of a game with attacker type i, security
strategy c, and attack a.
• Uai (c,a) – The pay-off of an attacker for the same configuration.
Therefore, in case of SG, the following definition can be given:
Ai(c) = ArgmaxaUai (c,a) (2.15)
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where Ai(c) is a set of optimal strategies of the adversary type i in case of security system c.













should be understood as Pareto-optimisation (i.e., the search of all Pareto-optimal
strategies). Several algorithms have been proposed in the literature to solve problems of this
kind [15].
The outcome of MO optimisation is usually defined as a set of optimal solutions, which
belong to a Pareto-optimal (or Slaiter-optimal) frontier. The complexity of the merging
process for multiple functions is transferred to the process of selecting the optimal solution
among the set of PO solutions, as well as their corresponding pay-off functions. It can be seen
that the proposed methodology builds a model resembling the defender-attacker approach,
as it is assumed that the adversary acts after the defender strategy is selected.
MO security games are important because they provide the following: firstly, a regular
approach for merging different types of impact, which is frequently undertaken in an artificial
manner (as in SecRAM, where only a maximum is taken); and secondly, an implicit
assumption of multiple adversary types, as each of the impact types is optimised
independently and each defender solution a corresponds to a set of adversary solutions c.
2.3.5 Network Security Games
The domain in a network security game (NSG) is defined by a graph, which encodes the
set of actions and strategies of the players. Research into NSG covers a broad domain
encompassing applications in nuclear smuggling interdiction [48], assignment of checkpoints
to urban road networks [37], fare evasion minimisation in public transport systems [22],
and others. In addition, the NSG may present a specific interest as it provides a flexible
framework for threat definition, which can help to address the problem of attack generality
noted in Section 2.1.4.
NSG is modelled using a graph, denoted as G = (N,E). The adversary begins an attack at
any of the source nodes s ∈ S ⊂ N, and selects a path in the graph to any one of the targets
t ∈ T ⊂ N. The set consisting of an attacker’s pure strategies are all the possible s-t paths
from any source s ∈ S to any reachable target t ∈ T . The defender attempts to block the
attacker by placing k available (homogeneous) controls on edges (or nodes) in the graph.
Each of the resources blocks the adversary if his path passes through the node. Therefore,
the pure strategies of the defender consist of all possible allocations of k controls within the
edges, amounting to |E|!k!(|E|−k)! in total. In the case of sufficiently large graphs, this number
may be too large for a brute-force solution to be viable. Assuming that the defender plays
allocation Xi ⊂ E, and also that the attacker chooses path A j ⊂ E, the attacker succeeds if
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and only if Xi ∩A j = /0. Each of the targets t has an associated pay-off I(t), such that the
attacker receives I(t) for a successful attack on t, and 0 otherwise. NSG is zero-sum, and so
the defender receives −I(t) in case of a successful attack on t, and 0 otherwise. The NSG
domain is modelled as complete information game. Thus, the set S of sources, T of targets,
and the pay-offs I for all targets and the number of defender’s resources k are assumed to be
known for both players.
The problem may be formulated as mixed-integer linear programming in the following way.
minD,p z
∀(ni,n j) ∈ E p j− pi ≤ Di j
∀t ∈ T ∀(n, t) ∈ E z≥ (1− pt)I(t)
∀s ∈ S ps = 0
∑i, j Di j ≤ k
(2.17)
The variables have the following meaning and range of values:
• D ∈ {0,1} – Variable for each edge in E, which is related to the controls placed at the
edges.
• p∈{0,1} – Variable for each node in N, which indicates whether the node is “protected"
(i.e., not reachable) from any of the source nodes (0 corresponds to unprotected, and 1
corresponds to protected).
2.3.6 General Remarks on Game Theoretic Models
The set of models presented throughout this section shows the possibility of formalising
the actions of the adversary and the defender for a specific domain. The order of actions,
restrictions of the domain, and the agents’ abilities are encoded in the final optimisation
problem. The order of actions between the defender and attacker are shown in an elegant
way by changing the order of the optimisation operators. In terms of the analysis of the
relationship between SecRAM and game theory, the security controls are selected based
on threat analysis, which itself relies on an understanding of the calculated type of impact.
Therefore, it may be assumed that SecRAM considers the defender-attacker type of actions.
This may not be the case if some of the controls are assuming any type of counter-action that
depends on the attack type. However, the type of counter-action could be encoded into the
calculation of the mitigated impact.
Another important point to recognise is that, in ARMOR, the types of adversaries are
separated, which provides greater flexibility and scalability for the model in terms of adding
new “threat scenarios". To take a novel type of threat into account, new impact and gain
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matrices should be defined, as well as the corresponding prior probabilities. However, the
domain in which ARMOR operates does not provide any flexibility because the only possible
output is a mixed strategy for the set of endpoints.
MO optimisation encapsulates two important real-world features: one is the type of adversary,
as mentioned before, and the second is the diversity of the types of impact. It is notable that
the second point is explicitly used in SecRAM.
Finally, specific attention should be paid to the NSG game type because the model of the
scenario is significantly more complex and flexible compared to the previously mentioned
models. Graph-based representations are used to represent attack actions in several domains.
Additionally, graphical representation is efficient for discrete-scenario multi-step security
games, especially in the context of information security. Therefore, special attention will be
paid in the next sections of this thesis to the graph-based representation of the scenarios.
2.4 Probabilistic Graphical Models
A probabilistic graphical model (PGM) is a probabilistic model for which a graph defines the
conditional dependence structure between random variables. PGMs use a graph
representation as a descriptor in order to encode a probability distribution over a multi-
dimensional space, where the graph nodes define the random variables and the graph arcs
define the dependencies between subsets of variables. Two different types of graphical
models are commonly used: Bayesian networks and Markov random fields. Both families
encompass the graphical representation of interdependencies, but they differ in terms of the
way they define the corresponding probability distribution. Given the graph G = (N,A), the
corresponding rules for the definition of the probability distribution include the following:
• Bayesian networks are defined by a directed and acyclic graph, where the directed
edges illustrate causal relationships between variables in the network. The probability
for a set of variables (or nodes) follows the following factorisation rule: P(x1, . . . ,xk)=
∏xi p(xi|Pa(xi)), where the operator Pa(xi) defines the set of direct “parents" of the
node xi (i.e., the nodes that have edges ending in xi).
• Markov random fields are defined by an arbitrary graph, and the interdependency is
defined in such a way that, for a set of variables (or nodes) {x1, . . . ,xk}, the following
holds:
p(xi|x1, . . . ,xi−1,xi+1, . . . ,xk) = p(xi|x j, j : (i, j) ∈ A or( j, i) ∈ A) (2.18)
Each variable is conditionally independent of the non-adjusted nodes, given the adjusted
nodes. No explicit causal relation is given.
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Figure 2.4: Probabilistic graphical model of Bayesian filters, where variables Xi are hidden
variables andYi are visible variables.
As mentioned in the motivation section of this thesis, the proposed framework intends to
address the SRA process not only at the stage of system design but also at operation, where
temporal data processing is required. From this perspective, Bayesian filters (BF) present
an interesting topic for consideration. BFs are a broad family of Bayesian network models,
which are applicable in the context of temporal data processing. This family includes the
well-known Kalman filters (KF), extended KF, particle filters, unscented filters, hidden
Markov models, and others. Each of these models relies on a different computational
methodology, but the following two properties are shared across all:
• The models incorporate two types of variables: “visible" variables, which are directly
observed by the user; and “hidden" variables, which are dynamically and temporally
connected, and which condition the visible variables. The main problems stated for
BF models are converged to an inference of the hidden variables, given some part of
the visible variables.
• The causal scheme between the hidden and visible variables always follows the
graphical representation shown in Figure 2.4. The hidden variables form a Markov
Chain time series (depending on the discrete variable t), while the visible variables are
connected to the corresponding hidden variable.
2.4.1 Applications in the Domain of Security
This subsection focuses on the application of PGMs in the domain of security. As previously
noted, an essential property of PGMs is the possibility they afford to estimate the internal,
hidden variables of the system, given the observed data. A toy example of the application of
Bayesian networks (BNs) to cybersecurity is given in Figure 2.5, as originally presented in
[21]. In the example in Figure 2.5, conditional probabilities are defined for observing “poor
connection" and “pop-up" events depending on the presence of denial of service (DoS) and
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Figure 2.5: Example of a Bayesian network model.
malware attacks. Given the observations and Bayes’ theorem, it is possible to derive the
conditional probabilities of the presence of any of the given attacks.
It is possible to derive and apply models that are significantly more complex, as described
in [21]. Furthermore, these models can be applied in various areas, including data breach
detection, evaluation of critical software vulnerability exploitation, and quantitative
assessments of network security attacks, DoS attacks, or intrusion detection. The software
exploitation model [35] defines a model that assesses the time required for a vulnerability of
a software package to become exploitable given some set of parameters (e.g., the language
used, availability of source code, and development practices in place). Proposed quantitative
assessments of network security often rely on compliance with given best-practices and
organisation’s rules for the mitigation of specific attacks, which limits the generality of the
application of the model and does not take into account temporal development during online
operation.
In [27], the authors introduced the concept of a dynamic Bayesian attack network, wherein
the temporal component is considered in a Markovian manner, similar to the BF domain. The
model relies on the concept of attack graphs, as discussed in [7], to provide a description of
the threat (albeit one that is narrowed to the domain of cybersecurity), and it builds a BN upon
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this model. The model considers how the threat and possible exploits evolve over time, thus
presenting an evolving mechanism for the assessment of the network security. Noteworthily,
the paper uses a generic mechanism for threat modelling, which is designed specifically for
the domain of cybersecurity. However, the paper does not suggest a method for in-operation
data analysis.
The set of models dealing with streaming data processing and attack detection are mostly
limited to a narrow domain of attacks. BFs are widely used in security operations, but mostly
as sub-components of radar or video-tracking systems [70], and not as generic methods for
streaming data analysis. In [52], a dynamic model, similar to the Kalman filter, was used to
solve the generic cyber-attack detection problem given the observed system-related data.
2.5 Attack Trees
Attack trees [57, 44] are graphs that represent how an asset might be attacked. Originating
from cybersecurity, they are used to describe threats on computer systems and sequences
of actions required to realise those threats. They are applied in various range of different
domains, including aviation and military.
Attack trees are directed tree graphs consisting of one designated root. Each node of the
graph has its own label, which defines some condition that might be in a “true" or “false"
state. In order for a condition to become “true", at least one of the conditions of the child
nodes must be “true". When the root condition is satisfied, the attack is complete.
As it follows from the definition of the attack tree models, the formalism models the “or"
behaviour: parent node (condition) is expressed as a disjunction of the conditions of the
child nodes. It is possible to model “and" conditions as well bu re-labelling the nodes. For
example, if a parent node is satisfied when conditions c1 and c2 are present, it is possible to
add a child node with a condition c1&c2. Another possible option is to explicitly describe
the “behaviour" of the connections for each node. The connectivity of the child nodes could
be denoted as “and" explicitly. By default, an “or" statement is assumed. An example of an
attack tree is given in Figure 2.6.
An attack within attack trees methodology is presented as a sequence of satisfied conditions,
which makes a direct link to SRA methodologies. Attack trees could be used within SRA
standards as explanatory models, for example ISO 31000 explicitly suggests the utilisation
of such models for different threat scenarios.
Attack trees are often used to quantify or qualify the existing threats. For example, all
leaves of the graphs are quantified with the guess of the “cost" of the condition for the
adversary. This allows for the estimation of the “cheapest" attack. It is possible to assign
labels to the nodes, for example, if the satisfaction of the node requires special equipment. In
addition, the concept of security controls can be introduced to the attack trees. Controls are
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Figure 2.6: A simple attack tree against a physical safe. To open the safe, the attacker can
pick the lock, learn the combination, cut open the safe, or install the safe improperly so that
they can easily open it later [57]. Examples of “or" and “and" conditions are given.
breaking the dependency of a subset of nodes with a subset of their child nodes. This may
be expressed as “blocking" of some of the edges in the graph. Often, an introduction of a
security control might require an introduction of additional nodes into the tree. For example,
password authentication on a computer might require an introduction of a node with a “break
password" condition.
One of the important features that make attack trees useful is that they capture knowledge
in a reusable form. It is possible to re-use the completed trees in different circumstances,
augment them, and apply them again at different iterations of the SRA process.
Attack trees are going into deep details of the system as this is needed to create a decent
description of the sequence of conditions required for an attack to happen. It is possible
to automatise the decision-making using attack trees, for example, protection selection.
Automatisation is done by using databases of pre-developed attack trees with best-practice
control suggestions. At the same time, the scope of the analysis of the attack trees is limited
to the event of the attack, with no consideration of the impacts, main assets, and other relevant
parts of the SRA process. For this reason, attack trees can be used as a supportive mechanism
for decision-making at the threat (risk) analysis parts of SRA.
2.5.1 Comparison with Network Security Games
Attack trees and NSGs are sharing the instantiation methodology because they are based on
graphs. Attack trees with “or" links may be topologically translated to NSGs in a straight-
forward way using the following steps.
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• Each leaf is considered as a source node.
• Root node is considered as a sink.
In this case, each “parent" node is accessible if and only if the attacker managed to reach
one of the “child" nodes. This directly translates to the attacker’s movements within the
graph, as it is encoded in NSGs. However, translation of an attack tree with “and" condition
is not straight-forward and involves modification of the original NSG. An approach for the
introduction of an “and" statement analogue to NSGs is covered in the next chapter of the
thesis.
However, NSGs are missing several important aspects of the attack trees and their
development process. NSGs do not explicitly specify for each node of the graph its physical
meaning, relation to the actions of the adversary, cost of each movement for the adversary. In
general, it is possible to conclude that NSGs lack “annotation" for their nodes and edges. Of
course, an introduction of this information does not contradict the instantiation of the model.
However, this type of annotation of the graph is not considered as part of the standard NSG
model, and the process of the development of the NSGs is not formalised in any manner,
opposite to attack trees.
At the same time, it is impossible to map the NSGs to attack trees, as topologically, NSGs
are much more reach. NSGs may contain multiple sinks, corresponding to various attacks
against different assets. They may represent the situation when a single condition may serve
as an enabler for a number of possible threats. The underlying graph is not restricted to be a
tree; it may contain cycles. However, NSGs may not be used for the evaluation of the threat
cost in the same manner as attack trees. NSGs are less illustrative but may capture a broader
scope of threats.
The concept of security controls is the same for NSGs and attack trees. NSG concept is
slightly different and is trivialising the problem as if all security controls were presented as
a “block" of a single edge.
As a conclusion, it is possible to state that NSGs present means for a broader scope of
modelling by capturing multiple threats at a single moment of time. Attack trees are much
better elaborated in terms of rules for construction, graph annotation, visualisation.
2.6 Graph Models for Cybersecurity Risk Assessment
Graphs are a common mechanism in cybersecurity risk assessment methods. In [20] an
extensive overview and categorisation of various techniques for cyber SRA are presented.
Some of these methods have certain similarities to the models proposed in this thesis. For
this reason, they are described further in this section and compared with the presented method
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in terms of context establishment and risk evaluation/mitigation.
The paper describes more than twenty different techniques for cyber SRA, but only a few of
them are tailored for system-scale security risk assessment, operating with high-level generic
terms. These methods are referred to as “guidelines" or “elaborated guidelines". “Elaborated
guidelines" provide a detailed scheme for end-to-end cyber-SRA, usually supported by a
graph-based mathematical formalism. These methods are listed below.
• In [8] a technique is proposed for semi-automatic graph-based cyber SRA. The method
is based on a pair of graphs: infrastructure graph and (threat) evolution graph. For
each of the graphs, a clear construction procedure is given. The attacker’s strategy is
presented as a path within the evolution graph, which encodes the evolvement of his
“access rights" from the “initial rights" to “target rights". Security controls are able to
prune some of the edges in the evolution graph and block some of the attacks. From
that sense, controls are implemented in a way similar to NSGs.
• A technique for quantitative risk assessment in supervisory control and data acquisition
systems is proposed in [45]. The described method is based on a weighted graph
that describes the main actions required to perform the attack. The weights of the
edges encode the time required for the attacker to pass from one node to other. Graph
construction procedure has an informal, conceptual description. The attack is presented
as a path from a “start" node to a “target" node. Risk mitigation means are considered
to increase the weights of the edges, thus increasing the time required to perform the
attack.
• The network security risk model [33] proposes a method for an assessment and
quantification of the risks in process control networks (extendable to cyber SRA in
critical infrastructure). The method describes the system by attack trees with and/or
junctions and barriers (controls). The system is decomposed into a subset of
components, each of the components may be in two different states: compromised
by the attacker and non-compromised. The attacker’s action space is presented as
a weighted system status graph. The system status is defined as a vector of states of
each sub-system, resulting into 2n states for n subsystems. Each edge in the state graph
represents an action of the adversary, associated weight presents the probability of that
action. The system risk level is evaluated by solving a stationary equilibrium equation
for the attacker’s set of actions. Security controls are changing the parameters of the
graph, thus changing the equilibrium.
• The technique suggested in [64] is a cybersecurity level quantification method that uses
and/or attack trees and a risk measure called “vulnerability index" (VI). VI computation
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formulas are derived from the attack tree structure and linked to specific controls
considered: port scans and password length policy.
Each of the methods is described in more detail in the following chapters of the thesis and is
compared with the proposed methodology.
2.7 Conclusion
After undertaking a comprehensive review of the extant and related literature, it is
important to consider the models observed and select the base for further development of
the methodology. Classical SRA relies on a high-level analysis of the system considered.
However, each of the methods observed has certain common features, which are listed below.
• A stage of the instantiation of the analysis or establishment of the context. During
that stage, the main purpose of the analysis is identified and the main properties of the
system observed are stated.
• A stage of threat identification. During that stage, possible attacks are described;
consequences are analysed and quantified.
• Based on the previous steps, strategies for threat mitigation are selected.
• Optionally, the SRA should be repeated and ensure the monitoring of the system
considered.
The first two stages may be mapped to the model instantiation phases of the mathematical
methods considered: definition of the gain functions and the set of strategies for game theory,
development of the graphical model and joint probabilities definition for PGMs, design of the
attack tree, and quantification of the leaves. The third part of the SRA may be mapped to the
process of game solution; attack tree analysis and controls selection. PGMs are focussed on
implementing a specific mitigation strategy related to attack detection and prediction, which
can be considered as a support for the third and fourth stage of the SRA.
Existing mathematical formalisms considered are dealing with the automation of the
following stages.
• Security control selection.
• Online data processing and attack detection.
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For this reason, the proposed model for general SRA support should be designed in a way
that it provides means for automatisation at the “third" and “fourth" part of the general SRA
process.
Next, each of the model families is considered against every criterion from 2.1.4.
System description generality. This criterion corresponds to the way how the model
is instantiated. Main entities for the system description defined by SRA usually include
vulnerable parts of the organisation/system (targets), their quantisation in terms of possible
loss (impacts for SecRAM and ISO 27005), estimation of the business and resource
limitations for the defender (stakeholder commitment in ISO 31000).
Game theory models define explicitly the set of targets, which could or could not be logically
separated from the set of strategies. Consequences estimation is encoded into the gain
function of the defender.
Attack trees have limited capabilities for system description, as their target is to describe the
threats. Any cost estimation is linked to the particular attack described by the tree. Security
controls selection process can be modelled and automatised within attack trees paradigm,
where resource limitations can be encoded.
PGMs may encode targets and impacts for the system modelled. Modelling of the resource
limitation depends on the context as PGMs do not deal with any direct optimisation (possibly,
only within the Bayesian inference process).
Attack description generality. This criterion corresponds to risk identification and
description parts of the SRA. The most important property here is that targets within the
system are logically separated from the threat description. The standard models for attack
descriptions are attack trees, as they are widely used in different fields.
In game theory, attack scenarios correspond to the attacker’s set of strategies. In addition,
they provide means for modelling the information available for the adversary by exchanging
the order of “min-max" operators, which is an important part of the stage of the definition
of the intentions of the adversary. The main problem within that context is that game theory
models may not explicitly separate the targets from the attack description. For example, the
set of targets in ARMOR is equivalent to the set of strategies of the attacker, as the attack
description does not include a logically consistent sequence of conditions that enabled the
attack (as for attack trees). At the same time, NSG family of models has this separation
and may be related to the attack trees, as shown in the previous section. NSGs may require
additional augmentation and annotation to match the descriptive capabilities of the attack
trees. The properties of NSGs are relevant for PGMs as well since the task of attack block
may be trivially converted to the task of attack detection (as shown in the next chapters of
2.7. Conclusion 39
the thesis).
Protection description generality. This part is related to the risk mitigation phase
of the SRA process. It significantly relies on the way how context establishment and risk
identification was carried out. From the scope of game theory, NSGs are considered the
most promising model that may be extended to fit the previous criteria. Protection may be
modelled in the manner that breaks the subset of links in the graph, which is equivalent to
the attack trees.
Based on the criteria 4.4.1, model requirements, and considerations above, it was possible to
draw the following conclusions:
1. An extended version of NSG model is used for generic attack modelling.
2. The model for SRA support at the system design stage is based on game theory and
PGM (security control selection automation requirement).
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The purpose of this part of the thesis is to provide a detailed description of the basis of the
proposed threat graph framework, which is one of the main contributions of the thesis. The
main target, as previously noted, is to define a generic modelling framework that can be used
for diverse problems in the domain of security. A description of the proposed modelling
scheme is given below.
• Definition of the graph-based modelling approach for generic systems and threats (as
required in Section 2.1.4).
• A model, based on the proposed graph approach, supports design-related decision-
making in security risk assessment (SRA). The model is based on game theory, and it
is evaluated on real-world systems.
• A model, based on the proposed graph approach, which supports security-related
decision-making during system operation. The model is based on Bayesian filtering,
and it is evaluated on a standard cybersecurity dataset.
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Chapter 3
Definition of Formal Threat Graph
The aim of this chapter is to present in parallel the standard steps involved in SRA, using
SecRAM as an example. Additionally, this chapter outlines the main augmentations to the
network security game (NSG) model that are performed in order to extend the generalisation
capability by adding the features that are necessary for risk assessment. Detailed motivation
for the selection of NSG as a base model is given in the previous chapter. The main reasons
are the flexibility of the model and relative topological similarity with attack trees that are a
well-established formalism for threat description.
3.1 Structure and Procedure of Security Risk
Assessment
Since the graph model is intended to support decision-making in SRA, it is important to
understand which steps in the SRA procedures can be adequately represented this way.
SRA considers a system-level architecture with different impacts at the service level (safety,
capacity, and efficiency), asset level (investment and replacement costs), and operational
level (communication bandwidth) [1]. While the main function and services are intangible,
impact conditions and vulnerability conditions are modelled for the assets implementing
the functions, including threat propagation paths within the set of susceptible (sub-)system
components [40]. The defender must act within the scope constraints (e.g., in terms of
business and cost), which are implied by the domain of the system to be protected, which
leads to a limited decision-making problem.
The threat identification part of SRA standards often aims to define a list of options with a
formal step-wise description of the actions to be performed by an adversary and the required
conditions for the attack. For instance, the SecRAM standard aims to develop a list of threat
scenarios, which are presented as a sequence of actions and prerequisites for the attacker.
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As it was discussed in the previous chapter, attack trees develop a directed graph structure,
which encodes the main steps involved in the attack.
Taking into account the facts given above, it is reasonable to consider the graph domain as
suitable for asset and threat modelling. In order to capture the complex cases with several
potential targets, NSG is used as a basis, which will be augmented with the following:
• Introduction of the “context establishment" phase, or asset model, which encodes the
main vulnerabilities of the system.
• Approach for graph development to encode possible threats, or “threat model".
3.2 Proposed Modelling Scheme
As identified in the previous chapter, a graph-based formalisation for generic threat analysis
is adequate for the current work, considering a high-level system view as it is done in SRA
standards. An attack scenario is represented as a directed path linking the targeted supporting
asset with the exploited vulnerability, as it is usually done in different graph-based attack
representations.
The proposed modelling scheme can be regarded as an extension of the domain used in
NSG [9]. The approach described in this thesis defines a regular way to extend the classical
NSG to an MO game with multiple types of attack against multiple targets, demonstrating
alignment with basic SRA procedures.
The SecRAM methodology defines four main steps, each of which is modelled in the next
subsections: primary asset (PA) and supporting asset (SA) identification, threat scenario
definition, risk evaluation, and selection of security controls.
For systematisation reasons and to achieve better alignment with existing SRA procedures,
the proposed approach is split into two sub-models: an asset model and a threat model. These
are described as follows:
• Asset model: Represents the structure of the system to be protected, its main assets,
and its functions. As shown in due course, instantiation of the asset model is closely
related to the asset identification phase of SRA.
• Threat model: Related to the definition of the main threats and the sequence of actions
undertaken by an adversary.
Additionally, this thesis offers a detailed discussion of how both of the models can be
defined. In the experimental section of this thesis an example for the development of the
TPG is provided for the Remote Tower system [1], which focuses on high-level infrastructure
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protection. Remote Tower was selected because a SecRAM process was partially debugged
over this project. For this reason, it is possible to re-use parts of the performed SRA in order
to demonstrate that the proposed framework is applicable as a support instrument. Remote
Tower analysis is performed on a high-level, and it involves both infrastructure security and
cybersecurity.
In Chapter 5, the TPG is applied to a more specific case related to a network security problem,
which was initially defined in [58]. The process of developing the asset and threat models
is presented for a small-scale system “from scratch", without the usage of any preliminary
performed SRA analysis like in Chapter 4, showing that the model may be applied in a
stand-alone fashion.
3.2.1 Asset Model
It is possible to interpret the first step as a formalised context definition phase, as in ISO
27005. This involves defining the main processes and functions of the system (or PAs,
following the SecRAM definition) and SAs that implement them. All the supporting assets
may be characterised by a set of parameters that describe the performance of the system.
Thus, the system can be considered as a set of assets that provide values for some specific
system-wide parameters W . The set of SAs is further denoted as follows:
SA = {SA1, . . . ,SAM} (3.1)
For example, a system that transmits a video stream has a SA “transmission channel". It is
characterised by its bandwidth, which is a parameter of the channel.
A PA is defined as a set of (in-)equations that employ specific limitations over W , and which
identify the limits for different subsets of system functions to be operational, as shown below.
f (W )≤ 0
g(W ) = 0
(3.2)
Let us return to the video transmission example. The transmission channel is operational
if the communication bandwidth is greater than a given threshold in Mbit/sec. Certain
parameters W can also be defined based on the system’s structure (for example, power
consumption in operation), while others may be directly controlled by the defender (such
as video compression rate). So, for video transmission example, the following limitations
can be identified.
• Transmission channel bandwidth not lower than X Mbit/sec.
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• Power supply for the video source is not lower than Y Watts.
• Compression rate is lower than Z % (for better visibility, for example).
These limitations demonstrate examples of inequalities over the system parameters, f -term
from the 3.2. An example of a g-term from 3.2 may be given by a set of equations describing
the oil-flow in a pipeline, like examples in the previous chapter.
Identification of the main parameters that ensure the operations of the system and assessing
the limitations f and g over these parameters is a part of the process that corresponds to the
PA identification in SecRAM.
Similar to the process involved in SRA, SA defines collections of targets for the adversary.
Every attack is performed against a given subset of supporting assets, affecting in a particular
manner the system’s parameters, and so the equations may be violated. Similar to the
SecRAM methodology, a set of attack types indexed by 1, . . . ,L was used (e.g., physical
attack, extortion attack, denial of service, and others). An attack of type j against supporting
asset(s) v ∈ SA is encoded as Av j.
The types of attacks discussed in this thesis are different depending on the application. This
thesis considers two main examples: remote tower security risk assessment and intrusion
detection dataset, IDS2017. Attack types definition varies depending on the nature of the
attacks considered against the assets. For the remote tower scenario, the types of attacks are
described in section 4.4.1. Attacks considered there are the physical destruction of the asset,
compromise of information and electronic interference. The last two attacks are relevant
for information exchange equipment. IDS2017 was considering a different type of system;
the scope of the analysis is biased to cyber threats. For this reason, the set of attack types
was different and is linked to non-authorised manipulation of the data or parameters of the
computational nodes of the network described, listed below.
• Data manipulation.
• Computational capacity reduction.
• Machine control.
For example, an SSH brute force attack scenario against a given host may target all three
types of attacks against the supporting asset. Denial of service attack targets only the
computational capacity.
The main target of the asset model is to define an explicit approach to calculating the impact
functions. The central assumption is that it is possible to evaluate the main types of impact
based on the values of the constraints and the parameters affected by the attack. Denoting
the changed parameters due to the performed attack by Av j(W ), the pure impact function can
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be expressed as follows:
a( f ,g,Av j(W ))→ Rm (3.3)
The term 3.3 presents a general method for defining the impact as a function of the primary
assets, expressed in the form of functional constraints 3.2; initial parameters of the system W ;
and the attack operator Av j. In this context, the term “pure" means that the impact function is
evaluated under the assumption that no (additional) security controls are enforced. In case of
MO optimisation, m > 1. A formal definition of the impact function with security controls
is given in the threat model description. The definition of such a function may be a subject
for the consideration of a security expert.
A simple example we may consider, which is similar to the defender-attacker model described
in section 2.3.2, involves a pipeline infrastructure between a set of sinks and sources, where
the parameter to consider is the throughput of each pipe. The next paragraphs demonstrate
a formal application of the proposed approach for the construction of the asset model. As a
natural PA, we can consider the required minimal throughput for each sink. The main entities
are straightforwardly formalised as T,S for the sink and source sets, respectively, as well as
the weighted directed graph G = (N,L,W ),S ⊂ N,T ⊂ N for the pipeline infrastructure. N
defines a set of nodes of the pipeline structure, L defines the corresponding set pipes (links),
and the weights W correspond to the capacity of each pipe. Denote the flow sequence for
pipe ni j ∈ L by fi j, and the maximal capacity of this pipe by wi j. The overall flow structure
is defined by graph G and a set of variables f . When an attack occurs against a subset of
pipes the values of wi j are modified (reduced). Therefore, the following limitations can be
stated for the PAs under attack Avk:∀s ∈ T ∑nis∈L fis ≥ Rs∀(i, j) ∈ L fi j ≤ Avk(wi j) (3.4)
The first inequality states that the total inflow for each sink s should not be lower than Rs.
The second inequality states that the flow at pipe (i, j) does not exceed the maximal capacity
wi j adjusted by the attack operator Avk, which represents an attack of type k against SA v.
Therefore, the set of the system parameters can be defined using the pair (F,W ), where W
represents the set of maximal capacities of each pipe (which can be modified by an attacker),
and F is controlled by the defender.
If the equation system (3.4) has a solution F = { fi j|(i, j) ∈ L}, there is no impact on the
system (according to the stated PA). In case the system has no solution, the impact function
may be defined as proportional to the lack of resources in the sinks. To give an example:




fis−Rs)+ ∀(i, j) ∈ L fi j ≤ Avk(wi j) (3.5)
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Here Cs ≥ 0 stays for the relative cost of sink s. Overall, the example measures the shortage
of inflow for each sink. Less straightforward definitions of the impact functions may be used
for different problems. For the specific case, it is important to notice that the function is not
defined as a solution of an optimisation problem, which means that the user does not adapt
the flow inside the pipelines in order to minimise the impact. However, the adaptation of the
flow δF may be regarded as a security control and, as such, defined at the later stage.
3.2.2 Threat Model
The threat scenario definition phase is used to determine the main vulnerabilities of the
system, and to identify a constructive approach for their exploitation. The term “threat
scenario" in SecRAM and ISO 27005 is defined as “chain or series of events that is initiated
by a threat and that may lead to an unwanted incident." These chains of events are formalised
in the proposed methodology as a directed graph.
Considering the literature, apart from the works that are related in a direct way to
mathematical modelling, graph-based attack description is explicitly used in the attack tree
standard [57, 25]. This describes a sequence of actions that must be undertaken to perform
the attack. Every action is assigned to an edge or node in the tree, which is related to the state
of the adversary. Another similar example is a cyber-focused attack graph, which encodes a
sequence of exploited vulnerabilities. Thus, an NSG family of models provides an adequate
set of means by which a definition can be given of the threat scenarios according to the
existing SRA standards.
The description of the attack scenario in the scope of the proposed method is further denoted
as an attack model or a threat path graph (TPG). As a concise description of the approach, the
attacker’s strategy is to select a pair of SAs and a type of attack against the target. Following
the NSG model, the adversary selects a path in the graph G = (N,E) from an entry node to
the target. This graph encodes the main steps that the attacker must undertake to perform
an attack against v ∈ SA. For instance, this may include compromising physical security by
opening doors or accessing a computer. Each node of the graph corresponds to some status
of the adversary within the system, i.e. physical position, level of control over a machine,
availability of information. Each edge corresponds to an action of the adversary that targets
changing the status. A subset of nodes of G is mapped to the set SA, defining the set of target
nodes V .
In particular, following notations for the graph properties are used:
• N, |N|= n are the set of nodes in graph G and its cardinality, respectively.
• E is the set of edges in G.
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• V denotes a subset of nodes of G, V ⊂ N, which corresponds to the SA list. |V |= M.
• T is the set of entry points (following the NSG formalism), T ⊂ N.
Next, a high-level procedure for TPG construction is given.
Threat path graph construction inputs. Main inputs for TPG construction are listed
as follows.
• List of all SAs for the system protected.
• Detailed list of possible attacks against the system’s SAs. Each threat should be
presented as a detailed sequence of actions of the attacker. The description should
be presented in the form of pairs “action performed - status obtained". For example,
“enter the room - present in the room", “enter root password - logged in with root
privilege".
• List of security controls under consideration.
Construction procedure. It is carried out as described in the list below.
• For each of the SAs, a node is created, forming the set of vertices V .
• Each threat scenario is validated against the set of all possible security controls. If
security control is relevant for the threat scenario, described sequence of pairs action−
status should explicitly mention all actions and all statuses where the security control
may be relevant. Threat scenarios should be augmented with additional pairs if needed.
• For each threat scenario, an “initial status" of the adversary is created. This status
describes the initial pre-requisites of the adversary, his physical location, etc. This
status should be obtained by the adversary by performing actions that are outside of
the scope of the SRA. For example, if a computer network with a public IP address
is protected, a potential status of the adversary may be “online with knowledge of the
public IP".
• For all statuses, corresponding nodes are created. Different threats may share actions
and statuses. In this case, a single node is created for the same set of shared statuses.
• For all actions that lead to a transition from one status to another, edges between
corresponding nodes are created.
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Figure 3.1: Graph transformation process. Image on the left-hand side represents the initial
graph with three types of attack, two entry points, and a single SA. Image on the right-hand
side shows the corresponding extended graph.
Security control allocation depends on the nature of the protective mechanisms. Some of the
security controls may block certain actions of the adversary; others may prevent obtaining
the status in principle and block all further actions. For example, assume we consider a node
that corresponds to “root login to machine" condition. An authentication mechanism may
prevent obtaining root access to the machine from a host with no ssh key. At the same time,
an administrator login notification system (when the system administrator needs to authorise
any logged users manually) may prevent any further actions even after logging in. From this
perspective, the login system blocks a subset of incoming edges to the node, while the admin
notification system blocks all possible further actions (or blocks the whole node).
For this reason, some of the security controls are assumed to block edges; some controls
block nodes. Nodes or edges which where security controls can be enforced are referred
to as “checkpoints". In order to simplify the mathematical formalisation, it is possible to
transform the developed graph in a way that all blocks correspond to an “edge block", which
is described further at the graph extension procedure.
The adversary’s attack is formalised as a pair comprising the threat path and attack type,
namely (P(b,v,G),Av j), where P(b,v,G) defines a simple path (with no loops) from b ∈ T
to v ∈ V . The adversary’s strategy may be reduced to the standard NSG formulation by
changing the structure of G. The new, extended graph G′ is constructed as follows. First,
the set of nodes related to the SAs is replicated L times, thereby meaning that vi ∈ V is
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decomposed into v1i , . . . ,v
L
i . The same operation is performed for the nodes from T . The set
of nodes and set of edges related to different attack types shall not intersect. Node v ji can be
only connected to the nodes related to the attack type j. The same rule is relevant for the
set T . Therefore, the selection of an entry node strictly determines the type of attack to be
performed. Due to this approach, it is possible to alter the graph structure for different types
of attacks, and significant flexibility is introduced into the model instantiation process.
For convenience, two additional modifications of the graph G are performed:
• All entry nodes from T are connected to an additional “start" node s. A “terminal"
node t is connected to all nodes from V . This reduces the set of adversary strategies
to a set of all paths in the extended graph P(s, t,G′).The selected path automatically
determines the type of attack.
• For some mathematical problems, it is more convenient to work with edges rather than
nodes. Examples of such well-established problems are least weighted paths, graph
cuts. Further in the thesis, the least weighted path linear programming formulation
will be used in the formulation of the game solver. For this reason, all the nodes from
Q are split into pairs of nodes and a connecting edge. For consistency, the edge that
corresponds to node n ∈ N is denoted as (ns,ne).
Suggested reformulation allows speaking about the checkpoints only in terms of edges.
Q ⊂ E denotes a set of edges where security controls may be deployed. The computational
complexity of this transformation is O(mn) where m defines the number of attack types. The
same order of expansion is required memory-wise. Such growth is not exponential, but may
significantly increase the size of the graph in case of a large number of attack types. For the
models considered in the thesis, the graphs were tens and hundreds of nodes for high-level
analysis. However, it is important to stress that such a transformation does not significantly
increase the number of edges, which may be estimated as 2m(|E|+ n). This is important
for the computational complexity of some of the algorithms, such as the least weighted
path (used in chapter 4). It depends linearly on the number of edges and O(n log(n)) on
the number of nodes. This means that the complexity of the transformation decreases the
performance of the algorithm almost linearly on m.
An illustration of the construction of graph G′ from G is given in Figure 3.1. The graph on
the left-hand side of the figure demonstrates a simplified version of an attack, which aims
to steal, compromise, or delete mission-critical data from a computer. Thus, we define three
types of attack and an SA. There are two entry points: one for access to the computer directly,
from the exact physical location, and another via SSH. The first checkpoint represents login
and password authentication, while the second node represents the data access process (e.g.,
location of the correct folder on the machine).
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For notational convenience, the assumption is made in this thesis that the extended graph is
initially used in the model structure. This means that the attack type index is omitted unless
otherwise stated. Furthermore, for the remainder of this thesis, the extended graph is denoted
as G.
It is obvious that the last two steps of SecRAM and ISO 27005 (i.e., risk evaluation and
security control selection) can be mapped to the gain function definition and the selection
process for an optimal defence strategy. In the proposed model, the set of implemented
security controls mitigates the impact of the attacks, and is denoted by Ω. Controls are
implemented at the subset of edges of the graph G (nodes of the initial graph). A list
of possible controls should be inserted into the model. Let us denote that list by Ld =
{C1, . . . ,Cr}. Then, the following assumption can be made:
Ω = {0,1}r×n (3.6)
This indicates the type of controls (among r proposed types) that are to be applied for each
of the |Q| edges that correspond to the nodes of the initial graph. This yields a control matrix
representation of the model, with Ωi j = 1 if a control C j ∈ Ldis implemented at checkpoint
(nsi ,n
e
i ) ∈ E. The approach can be extended to procedural controls, which are not assigned to
any edge (ns,ne)∈ E. This formulation can be interpreted as indicating that such controls are
assumed to be placed at the nodes from V , mitigating all attacks of a given type independent
from the path.
As this thesis considers not only the problem of attack mitigation at the design stage but also
the problem of attack detection, the concept of an “attack detector" is used in the chapter on
the dynamic model. The formal assignment can be undertaken in a way that is similar to the
security controls, where controls are assigned to nodes or edges.
3.2.3 General Recommendation for Model Development
The main purpose of the threat graph is to formalise the steps an adversary needs to perform
in order to attack the targeted SA. The path in the threat graph defines the sequence of
states that an adversary must pass through (which is analogous to the doors or rooms that
an individual must pass through in the case of real-world movements), the machines that
should be controlled in case of cyber-attacks, and others. During the experimental phase
of this thesis, the following recommendations for the initial graph construction (i.e., not the
extended graph construction) were developed:
• Split the nodes by their nature. If the node represents a position in the building, room,
or geographic area, then it should be regarded as a “geographic(physic) node". This
means that there is a geographic area associated with this point in which controls could
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be placed. The edges between geographic nodes represent possible directions in which
the attacker’s position may have changed. The area that is “close" to the supporting
asset, such that the attack type j has a link to the node in V , represents a given SA.
If the node represents control (or a level of control) over a certain machine, it is
regarded as a “cyber node". Several nodes can represent different levels of control
over the same machine. The links between nodes represent possible changes in the
level of control, data manipulation, network communication sessions, or an obtaining
of control over a different machine. It is likely that all the machines used for the
definition of the “cyber nodes" are related to an SA. Therefore, if the given node
represents an essential control over the machine, it is possible to perform certain types
of attacks against the given machine.
Separation of different types of nodes is beneficial not only in terms of modelling
convenience; at the same time, such a split is important in providing sufficient means
for the detailed encoding of the actions of the adversary. Depending on the case, it is
possible to provide semi-automatic rules for TPG validation (e.g., the physical attack
cannot be performed from a cyber node, with specific exceptions, or it is impossible to
upload malicious firmware from a physical node, given certain access requirements).
• If there is access from the node to some SA, the list of possible attacks from a given
node against a corresponding SA should be specified. With no loss of generality, all
types of attacks are possible against all SAs (though it is true that some attacks will
have no impact, such as a distributed DoS attack against personnel).
• The system entry points are specified as nodes (geographical territories or machines),
which should be monitored from the scope of SRA, and there is access to these nodes
from external (that is, external to the system) territories or machines. For example, it
could be a computer that has a direct connection to the external network or the Internet.
In the geographic scope, the entry point could be an entrance to the building in which
the system is located.
In addition to general recommendations, two specific cases are considered in the next
subsections: firstly, action plan development; and secondly, attacks with preliminary
conditions and sequential attacks.
Action Plan Development
The proposed model may be applied in a different manner, which is especially relevant for
dynamic security games with multiple actions from the side of both the defender and attacker.
Dynamic security games with action plans are established as a sequence of actions, and they
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may be represented using finite automata [6]:




where st ∈ S denotes the system state; at ,dt represent the attacker’s and defender’s actions
at time t, respectively; and At ,Dt refer to the set of available actions for the attacker and
defender, respectively, depending on the state and the other player’s actions).
The intuitive understanding of equation system 3.7 is that the system moves to another state
after the defender and attacker perform an action. The assumption is made that the attacker
responds to the actions of the defender, and so this situation can be understood as consisting
of a sequence of defender-attacker games. The set of terminal states S∗ defines the end of the
gain, after which the pay-off is calculated.
The action plan development game may be reduced to the TPG model as follows:
• Assume that the set of SA nodes is S∗.
• The set of nodes of the graph is S.
• The set of edges is {(s1,s2)|∃d,a : s2 = f (s1,a,d)}.
Based on the above, if a security control d f ixed is selected for the node s f ixed , the action of the
adversary is limited to the selection of a node s(a) = f (s f ixed,a,d f ixed),a ∈ A(s f ixed,d f ixed).
The lack of security control at any node may be considered a so-called “null-action".
The possibility of employing decision-making graphs in the TPG expands the application
scope when the TPG may be constructed in a mixed manner. For instance, if the adversary
reaches some given node (which can be a physical position or a level of access), a counter-
action can take place. In this case, the outgoing graph from the corresponding node relates
to an action-planning type of graph. This can be repeated through the overall model several
times.
The main disadvantage of the proposed methodology is the size of the graph. This is because
it should take into account all possible combinations of actions (which is an exponential
from the number of actions). Therefore, in general, the total number of nodes also grows
exponentially. However, the expected connectivity of the graph might be low, which still
may allow the application of this approach for limited-scale counter-actions.
Attacks with Preliminary Conditions and Sequential Attacks
An attack against a given SA is sometimes enabled by specific preliminary conditions, which
is achieved by an attack against another SA. For example, a data spoofing attack against a
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database is possible once the credentials for it have been obtained via brute force, or by
executing a Heartbleed attack against a centralised password management server.
Formally, let us consider an attack of type t2 against any of the SAs in an expanded graph
{SA21, . . .SA2n2}, which could be enabled after a successful attack of type t1 against
{SA11, . . .SA1n1}. It is essential to remember that, within the expanded graph, the supporting
asset node automatically determines the corresponding type of attack. Further discussion in
this section is carried out in terms of the expanded graph.
Suppose that the graph G1 describes the threat model for attack t1, and that G2 describes
the attack t2 under a condition where the attack t1 has already happened. The resulting TPG
should take into account the required sequence of actions and, accordingly, encode an attack
against multiple SAs. To define the TPG construction procedure for this case, consider first
the following notations:
• G = (N,E) - TPG. Then let us denote:
N[{SA1, . . .SAn}] = {n ∈ N|∃SAi ∈V : p(n,SAi,G)⊂ G};
E[{SA1, . . .SAn}] = {(e1,e2) ∈ E|e1,e2 ∈ N[{SA1, . . .SAn}]};
G[{SA1, . . .SAn}] is a graph defined by the pair (N[{SA1, . . .SAn}],E[{SA1, . . .SAn}]).
• We introduce an additional type of SA, which is defined as an ordered subset of the set
V . The node (SAi1, . . . ,SAik)∈V k indicates the set of “victim" SAs, as well as the order
and the types of attacks (implicitly, after the expansion of the graph, as mentioned at
the beginning of this subsection).
• par(n) – A set of parents of a given node n. The definition is correct because the graph
is directed.
The formal procedure for the TPG construction method from two linked sequential attacks
is described in Table 3.1. The presented algorithm, the sequential attack TPG aggregation
algorithm (SATAA), may be adjusted in terms of connections between the graphs. This is
because, in the presented approach, all parent nodes for a given SA in graph G1 are connected
to all entry nodes of G2. It is possible to supply additional inputs to SATAA, which could
increase the precision of the TPG.
In a general case of L attacks, it is possible to create a set of pairs of sets of SA, denoting
“enabling attack" – “subsequent attack and attack graph": {(SAe,(SAc,Gc))}. The subsequent
attack could happen if any of the enabling attacks succeeds. In this case, the TPG described
by graph Gc is enabled by attacks from SAe. It is assumed that such a subset of SAs exists,
which could have an “empty" enabler (i.e., can be executed without a “preparation" attack).
For example, a DoS attack on a server could be executed with no preliminary attacks. The
set of pairs “enabler-sequential" attacks is denoted by ES. The algorithm for the general case
sequential attack construction is presented in Table 3.2. The multiple sequential attack TPG
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Input:
• Enabler attacks: Defined by a list of SAs: SA1 = {SA11, . . . ,SA1k} of the
same attack type t1.
• Consecutive attacks: SA2 = {SA21, . . . ,SA2m} of same attack type t2.
• Graphs for single attack types: G1 = (N1,E1) for t1 and G2 for t2 (under
the assumption that t1 has already happened).
Output: Gres – TPG describing sequential attack.
1. Gres = (N,E), where N := N1,E := E1





3. For each v ∈ SA1
(a) G2v = copy(G∗2). Redefine all SAs in G2v as follows:
SA2i→ (v,SA2i)
(b) N := N∪N2v,E := E ∪E2v
(c) For each node u ∈ parent(v) and e2v in the set of entry nodes T2v:
E := E ∪{(u,e2v)}
Table 3.1: Sequential attack TPG aggregation algorithm (SATAA)
Input:
• Set ES.
Output: Gres – TPG describing all sequential attacks.
1. Select pair (SA1,(SA2,G2))∈ ES : SA1 = /0 (exists by definition, as given
above).
2. Gres := G2. Vres denotes the current set of SAs in Gres.
3. While ES changes at each iteration, do:
(a) Find p = (SAe,(SAc,Gc)) ∈ ES : SAe ∩Vres 6= /0. Remove p from
ES.
(b) V e = SAe∩Vres.
Gres,Vres := SATAA(V e,SAc,Gres,Gc)
(c) SAe := SAe \V e. If SAe 6= /0, return p to ES.
Table 3.2: Multiple sequential attack TPG aggregation algorithm (M-SATAA)
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Figure 3.2: Sub-graphs used as an input for M-SATAA. 3 connected components: initial
graph with /0 enablers (upper-left), sub-graph enabled by an attack against SA1 or SA2 (upper-
right), and sub-graph enabled by attacks against SA2 and SA3 (bottom).
aggregation algorithm, or M-SATAA, could be modified, allowing the definition of complex
multi-stage attacks when the enabler is also a sequence of attacks. It requires a modification
of the loop conditions (a) and (c). For the case of a multi-stage attack, the condition (a)
would check for p : ∃p∗1 ∈ p1,v∈Vres,{p∗1}⊂ {v}. Here the operator {v} converts an ordered
sequence into a set so that the order is not considered.
An example of graph construction is given in Figures 3.3 and 3.2. Three sub-graphs
are supplied, as shown in Figure 3.2. One of the parts contains two SAs (SA1 and SA2),
which could be attacked without specific preconditions, denoted by G1. The second graph,
containing another two SAs (SA3 and SA4), is “accessible" only after an attack against the
SAs in the first graph, denoted by G2. The third graph, G3, contains a single SA (SA5),
which can only be approached after SA2 and SA3 are attacked. Therefore, the input set for
M-SATAA is as follows:
L = {( /0,({SA1,SA2},G1),({SA1,SA2},({SA3,SA4},G2),
({(SA2,SA3)},({SA5},G3))}
(3.8)
An example of an application of these algorithms on real-case scenarios for cybersecurity is
given further in this thesis.
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Figure 3.3: Example of M-SATAA application problem showing the resulting graph for
sequential attacks constructed from the sub-graphs from Figure 3.2.
3.3 Comparison with Attack Trees
The proposed TPG method is inspired both by NSGs and attack trees. While the difference
from NSGs is defined by the augmentations described in this chapter, the differences from
the attack trees should be elaborated. The differences between attack trees and NSGs listed
in the previous section remain in place: attack trees describe only one attack at a time, but
they are more illustrative and have well-established development methodology. TPGs are
bringing the NSGs closer to the SRA domain by introducing a mapping to several important
entities of the process.
• TPGs contain an explicit link to the context establishment phase, i.e. supporting and
primary assets are introduced.
• By construction, nodes and edges are linked to the information about the statuses and
actions of the adversary, which is explicitly related to the nodes’ conditions in attack
trees. The main difference is that instead of the introduction of “and" node types, the
graph is extended using SATAA algorithm. However, it is possible to introduce “and"
nodes explicitly like in attack trees and analyse them at the stage of the optimisation
problem solving.
• A high-level development procedure is provided for TPGs.
To summarise, TPGs may be considered as extended attack trees with explicit targets (assets),
multiple attack scenarios captured in a single graph, and more complex topology. The
development process for attack trees and TPGs shares a set of common features such as the
definition of “entry nodes" (leaves), statuses (conditions and actions), attack goal (supporting
assets). However, due to introduced complexity and “topological" introduction of “and"
conditions using SATAA algorithm, TPGs could be less illustrative and not directly useful for
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manual analysis. However, some of the processes like threat quantification for the adversary
can be performed in a similar way as for attack trees: cost assignment for each node and
propagation from “entries" of the graph. TPGs share the same advantages of attack trees, like
the formality of the description, possibility for threat logging and re-using, identification, and
listing of main conditions that enable the attack.
3.4 Comparison with Cybersecurity Graph Models
In this section, the TPG is compared against the cybersecurity graphs used in the models
presented in 2.6. The method described in [64] is omitted from the comparison here, as it
relies on attack trees, which are discussed above. We will return to the method of [64] in
section 4.5.3.
3.4.1 Infrastructure and Evolution Graphs
The SRA model described in [8] relies on a pair of graphs: infrastructure graph and evolution
graph.
The method considers a system I, which is composed of a set of components C. Infrastructure
graph Ih(I) describes the system in terms of its main components and their dependencies. For
each component, three security attributes from the CIA (confidentiality, integrity, availability)
triad are defined. Ih(I) includes one node N(C) ∀C ∈ I, and one arc from {N(C1), . . . ,N(Ck)}
to N(C) for each dependency {C1, . . . ,Ck} of C. For each arc H, two attributes from the CIA
triad are defined. A pair of attributes (a1,a2) for a link (N(C1),N(C2)) means that if the
attribute a1 is controlled for C1, then the attribute a2 is controlled for C2.
The system I has a set of users. For each user u a set of rights is defined, where each right is
presented as a pair (C,A),C ∈ I,a∈CIA. Each right defines an attribute in the corresponding
component controlled by u. In [8] a special algorithm for the computation of the “extended"
set of rights is presented, which analyses the structure of Ih(I) and augments the rights of
u based on subcomponent dependencies and arc labels (referred to as “transitive closure" of
rights).
The evolution graph describes how a set of system users may acquire additional rights over
the system by implementing a sequence of elementary attacks. Each elementary attack A has
a set of precondition rights pre(A), required to execute it, and a set of post-condition rights
post(A) that the user gains after executing the attack. An infrastructure security state (or just
state) is defined as a set of pairs 〈user, user rights〉 for each user of the system. Each node of
the evolution graph corresponds to a state of the system. An arc 〈A,u〉 connects two nodes
n1 and n2 if a user u at state n1 has all rights pre(A), and execution of A by u would bring the
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system to the state n2. The graph may be constructed automatically, given the infrastructure
graph, initial user rights, and elementary attack descriptions.
The initial state of the system is defined by the “extended" set of rights for each user. An
attack is defined as a path in the evolution graph from the initial state to a set of “goal" states,
where at least one user obtained a set of targeted rights.
The pair of infrastructure and evolution graphs have certain similarities with the asset and
threat models proposed. This way, the asset model and infrastructure graph describe the
main components of the system and their dependencies, while the evolution graph and TPG
are describing the threat scenarios.
The infrastructure graph shows high-level dependencies between the components of the
system and how those components interact with each other. The asset model shows a high-
level dependency between system processes and their technical components, leaving apart
the dependencies between the SAs. This brings the proposed method closer to the SecRAM
and ISO27001 but brings a simplification of the system description.
The evolution graph is constructed automatically based on the elementary attack descriptions.
TPG has a partial construction automatisation. Evolution graphs are able to represent a
cooperative attack executed by multiple users, TPG does not have a representation mechanism
for that. At the same time, TPG is much more explicit in terms of the targets, required
sequence of actions, and attack types. TPG is designed to be applicable for both cyber and
physical domains. The evolution graph paper does not explain how to adjust the model for
the physical domain. TPG provides not only a sequence of elementary attacks but also a
possibility to introduce a detailed description for each of them.
To conclude, a direct comparison of the proposed methods is not fully complete without
taking into consideration the risk evaluation and mitigation mechanisms. However, by
comparing the graph models, the following distinctive features may be listed.
Evolution and Infrastructure graphs:
• More detailed system component dependency description that may allow a deeper
understanding of threat propagation (which parts of the system are vulnerable to which
attacks).
• Automatic evolution graph construction from the inputs, which limits the possibility
of human error.
• The evolution graph allows for the modelling of multiple attackers at a single moment
of time.
Proposed method:
• The modelling is more explicit in terms of targets of the attacks (the exact set of
supporting assets) and system services (primary assets) that are disrupted.
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• TPG gives a more detailed description of each attack, including sub-steps. This allows
for more complex defence modelling. Control might be deployed to prevent a specific
action, which is a component of various attacks.
3.4.2 Compromise Graphs and Attack Paths
Compromise graphs were introduced in [45] as a model for quantitative cyber risk estimation
methodology. The initial step of the proposed method is the identification of the main
components and devices within the system. For each device, a corresponding list of
vulnerabilities is composed. The paper suggests using open vulnerabilities identification
libraries.
The next step of the analysis is the construction of the compromise graph. The graph has
four types of nodes.
• Start - a single “entry" node of the graph. The attacker has no prior knowledge of the
system.
• Launch - enough data has been collected by the attacker to develop an exploit. There
is only one node of this type for each potential attack.
• User privilege - this state applies to a particular machine. Represents that the adversary
has gained user privilege on that machine. Only one such node for each machine is
available.
• Root privilege - similar to the previous type, represents root privilege on a particular
machine.
• Target node - any condition where the attack has succeeded.
The edges in the compromise graph represent the change of the state of the adversary. Every
change is assumed to be achieved by exploiting some vulnerability. Each arc is labelled by
one of the following vulnerability categories.
• Reconnaissance
• Breach - represent edges starting from a “launch" node.
• Penetrate - represent edges starting from a user or root permission node and end on the
same type of node.
• Escalation - escalation of the permissions on the same machine.
• Damage - represents a transition to a target node.
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An attack is presented as a path from the “Start" node to some target node.
The asset definition phase in [45] is not strictly formalised. However, it suggests listing the
main devices of the system and splitting them into primary targets and perimeter machines.
For the identification of the security requirements of the primary targets, [45] suggests using
the CIA triad. Such a representation of the attacker’s actions may be considered as a special
case of a cybersecurity tailored TPG with additional annotation, where all nodes have limited
types of categories and all arcs are explicitly labelled by a corresponding action. No other
conceptual differences with the TPG are present. Explicit definition of the node types in
compromise graphs brings stricter rules for the graph definition. However, this approach
does not detail any methods for automatic graph construction for sequential attacks.
3.4.3 Network Security Risk Model State Graph
The network security risk model (NSRM) was introduced in [33] and was designed for the
purpose of providing a measure of risk and risk management options. The system context is
defined by multiple models, which include:
• Access level and barrier diagrams that provide a mechanism for capturing at a detailed
level the requirements for obtaining a higher level of access to the system, describing
impediments to achieving new privileges, and assessing the overall security of the
system. The method may be considered as a set of fault trees with “and" and “or"
junctions. Fault trees used in NSRM may be considered attack trees, where each leaf
has an assigned probability of event occurrence.
• Hierarchical system decomposition, where the overall system is decomposed into sub-
components. The decomposition reaches the lowest level of technological enablers.
For the developed hierarchical decomposition, failure modes and main system
processes are identified.
• Formalised hierarchical descriptions of attack scenarios, that include attacker’s
objectives, attacker type and points of access.
The information above is used to decompose the overall network into a set of system
components. Each component may be in two possible states.
• Secure (indexed as 0): the attacker has no access to the component’s resources.
• Compromised (indexed as 1): the attacker has full access to the component’s resources.
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All components are mapped to the set of nodes of graph G that describes the possibilities
to compromise different components of a system. If an arc connects node ca with cb, that
means that cb can be compromised from ca.
Based on the system decomposition into n components, the tactical state-space S is defined
as a set of all combinations states of all components and two additional terminal states of
the attacker: “attack success" (state n+ 1) and “attack failure" (state n+ 2). Therefore, the
tactical state may be described as (n+ 2)-dimensional Boolean vector. At each state, the
attacker must choose one of the two types of actions.
• Attempt to compromise a secure network component. A component may be
compromised if there exists a corresponding path in G.
• Attempt to disrupt one or more infrastructure processes. The set of processes that
could be disrupted depends on the state.
In the case the system is in state si and the attacker performs an action u, the system may
transit into a state si′ with the probabilities defined below.





, where p jz,z′(u) is a probability the c j will transition from state z = s
j
i to z
′ = s ji′ .
• If the action is a process disruption attempt in component k, the probability is denoted
as pi,n+1(u) = pkm(u). Here m defines a disrupted process mode.




All these probabilities are evaluated using the fault trees developed at the context initialisation
phase. The method provides a mathematically justified approach (given certain assumptions)
for the calculation of state transition probabilities. Further, these probabilities are used to
quantify the risk and identify the most vulnerable parts of the system.
The system and attack scenario description introduced in NSRM are completely different
from TPG and asset model presented in the thesis. However, both of the formalisms are
presenting the system as a set of inter-related processes and components, describe the attack
scenario as a sequence of actions, and indicate exact processes disrupted (primary assets in
the case of the model proposed). For this reason, it is hard to compare the distinctive features
of each of the models. A more informative comparison of the models is presented for the
risk evaluation phase of the NSRM and proposed model in section 4.5.
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3.5 Summary
This chapter established a framework for generic attack modelling. As stated in the literature
review part of the thesis, the approach is developed using graph models. The development
of the approach was aligned with two main stages of SecRAM:
• Asset identification stage, which is transferred to the asset model and impact function
definition.
• Threat scenario definition, which is transferred to the threat model, or TPG.
Due to strict limitations, as given in Section 2.1.4, model development is still quite flexible
and requires significant expert involvement. This involvement may is especially relevant at
the stages of the asset model definition, identification of the main functions and parameters.
The level of detailisation of the description of the system may be different. Identification of
the set of statuses and actions of the attacker at the TPG construction phase also relies on
expert judgement and may vary depending on the analysis level.
However, the developed formalism allows the application of automatised decision-support
methodologies, which are relevant both for the next stages of the SRA process and operation-
time decision-making. These adaptations of the suggested approach are further detailed and
validated on real-world scenarios in the next chapters of this thesis.
TPG development process is similar to the attack trees and may be used to analyse possible
threats in a similar fashion. However, some complexity for manual analysis may be introduced
by the size of the graph, which could be partially solved by automatised analysis. The
descriptive capability of TPG was also compared with several cybersecurity graph models.
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Chapter 4
Static Security Model: Description
and Evaluation
4.1 Generic Problem Statement
In the previous chapter, an explanation of the threat graph preparation was given, linked
with the main steps of SecRAM. However, the security risk assessment (SRA) process was
covered only partially. This is because the graph represents only the domain and asset
description. The domain and threat descriptions are linked to the threat scenarios evaluation
and possible security control selection, especially at the stages of the expansion of the initial
graph. However, the process of the exact allocation of security controls at checkpoints should
be considered as an operation over the graph.
In this chapter, the problem of risk evaluation and security control selection is formalised
in the generic formulation (following the requirements from Section 2.1.4). The aim is to
take into account specific aspects of SRA, which includes consideration of all scenarios
simultaneously and the consideration of multiple target functions. To summarise, this chapter
deals with:
• Identification of a constructive way for impact function computation and definition of
the game theory problem for risk treatment.
• Development of an algorithm for security controls allocation within threat path graph
(TPG).
• Demonstrates the TPG and game theory model instantiation and validation over the
remote tower case. Obtained results are compared with SecRAM and standard network
security game-like (NSG) approach.
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In SecRAM, risk evaluation process separates different types of impact or impact areas.
Furthermore, the value of the impact is translated into a single number using the max
operation, but this approach may differ for different SRA methods [36]. Therefore, for
impact evaluation, we propose not a single “cost", but a vector of values. We do not
define a common gain function, but evaluate each of the impact areas separately, defining
a set of “optimal" solutions, which could be further considered by the experts or evaluated
automatically using a specific cost function. This makes the analysis more flexible, as it
would bring into consideration of the security analysts (users of the model) possible trade-
off situations when one impact function is balancing against another.
The number of impact areas is denoted as m. Each of the types of impact is evaluated
against given security controls Ω and attacks (paths in TPG G) P : Ii(Ω,P), i = 1, . . . ,m.
Next, we formulate the underlying generic optimisation problem. As we consider each of the
types of impact separately, we address the solution as a multi-objective optimisation problem
(MOOP). Accordingly, we use Pareto-optimality (PO) as a condition for the security control
selection. PO condition analyses each impact function separately, which allows for detection
of the trade-off cases. In addition, the solution that maximises an arbitrary monotonic gain
function is PO. For this reason, PO frontier identification allows the users of the system to
select and evaluate different gain functions over the PO frontier identified.
Using the impact function definition from the previous chapter and [54, 59], the Pareto-













in 4.1 stays for the search of all Ω that bring PO “impact" vectors[
max
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. It should be noted that we consider a min−max problem,
which implies that the attacker acts optimally, and with full information about the defender’s
security configuration. This is a worst-case scenario. This approach was selected because the
obtained security configuration provides an upper bound for the impact. Indeed, suppose that
the game is not a zero-sum game and an alternative gain function is defined for the attacker













Here S(Ω) stays for the set of attacker’s strategies that maximise the impact function Ua
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This property is hold due to the fact that set S(Ω) is smaller than set of all paths in TPG G.
It can easily be shown that ∀ΩU that is a solution of equation 4.2 and ∀Ω that is a solution of


















The first inequality is based on the definition of the Pareto-optimality, the second one follows
from the inequality 4.3. Given that this property is derived for any Ω, it holds for the solution
of 4.2.
The interpretation of this statement is that the obtained solution of equation 4.1 is
“dominating" any other security game over the same model with different gain functions
for the players.
An abstract definition of the impact function allows us to select an appropriate way of
calculating the impact functions depending on the domain of the SRA. In the next section,
we develop a solver for a specific case of an impact function definition, similar to [48].
4.2 Alignment with Security Risk Assessment
Methodology
The TPG definition is presented so as to ensure that the proposed structure uses as many
definitions and entities as is possible from the SecRAM procedure. This chapter suggests an
approach for the alignment of the SecRAM procedures and the TPG construction process,
and a consequent solution of the problem in equation (4.1). It is important to note that we do
not focus on the methods for the solution of equation (4.1), which means that the alignment
is generic and relevant for any way of evaluating the impact functions Ii(Ω,P). It is presented
in the next table.
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TPG + Static Model SESAR SecRAM
1. Internal model construction
• PA identification (possibly,
in a form of functional
constraints)
• Objective function definition
• Supporting asset definition
• Type of attack definition
Output:
• SA set structure
• Links between PA and SA
• Links between PA and impact
functions
• Attack operators
2. Impact matrix calculation. Output:
3D tensor A ∈ Rm×M×L – values
of every Impact Function (of m) for
every type of attack (of L) for every
SA (of M))





• Links between PA and SA
• Table of impacts for every PA
for every impact area
• Threat scenarios
2. Impact evaluation Output: table
of impacts for every SA for every
threat scenario
External model development
• Threat graph definition
• Definition of control lists
• Constraints, price definition
Output:
• Threat graph structure
• List of possible controls
Likelihood evaluation. Output: Table of
likelihoods for every SA for every threat
scenario
Pareto-optimization (4.1). Output: List of
optimal security placements Ω
1. Risk level evaluation. Output:
Risk level for every SA and threat
scenario
2. Risk treatment. Output: Security
configuration
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It worth mentioning that such an alignment may be performed for ISO 27005 too, as it
is a basis of SecRAM. So, the steps “Internal model construction" and “Impact matrix
calculation" can be considered as a part of the context establishment phase of ISO 27005,
where main functions (PA), assets, and impacts are defined. Parts related to the definition
of the TPG, controls, and limitations, aligns with the risk identification phase. Pareto-
optimisation of security controls placement is risk evaluation and risk treatment phases,
as it is done for SecRAM. The proposed alignment is undertaken so as to show the most
significant similarities and differences between the methodologies. Some observations of
the alignment are presented in the following list.
• The “internal model construction" and “impact matrix calculation" steps, which are
related to the TPG and Pareto-optimisation, can be replaced by the corresponding
SecRAM steps repeated for every objective function. As objective functions are closely
related to some of the impact areas, it is possible just to perform the impact evaluation
for these impact areas separately. Therefore, the development of the internal model
could be replaced by the procedures undertaken by security experts.
• The significant difference between the approaches is located in the “external model
development - likelihood evaluation" alignment. The “relation" between the attacker
possibilities and the system structure in SecRAM are expressed in likelihood terms
without any explicit definition of the domain, while the mathematical approach solves
this using a threat graph. However, SecRAM builds an attack representation as a
sequence of actions to be performed, which may be considered as an implicit attack
model construction.
• The “Pareto-optimisation" step can be regarded as a formalised version of the
corresponding actions in SecRAM: risk evaluation and treatment.
4.2.1 Weak Pareto-Optimality of the Security Risk Assessment
Methodology
Considering further the similarities between the SecRAM and TPG model with equation 4.1
optimisation, it can be shown that, under several assumptions, the result of the SecRAM
analysis and security control selection can be a part of the resulting PO frontier from the
solution of equation 4.1.
Assuming that the impact areas from SecRAM correspond to the impact functions in the
main PO problem, the overall impact from the threat scenario P should be evaluated as
max
i∈[m]
Ii(Ω,P). Assuming that the threat response strategy “mitigate" is selected, the set of
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Consider the solution of the problem stated above, Ωsecram. While it does not necessarily
belong to the set of PO solutions, it can be proven that it is Slater-optimal or weakly Pareto-
optimal.
Definition: (for minimisation problem) Let S ⊂ Rk,k ≥ 2,∀x ∈ S, ‖x‖ < ∞, where ‖x‖ is
any norm defined in Rk. Then p ∈ S is a Salter-optimal (or weakly Pareto-optimal) vector if
and only if @x ∈ S : ∀i≤ k xi < pi.
Let us prove that this solution belongs to the set of weak PO solutions of the problem in
equation 4.1. Suppose the opposite, from which it follows that ∃ Ω∗ :

























For this reason, Ωsecram cannot be an optimal solution, as the maximal impact function for Ω∗
is smaller than the maximal impact function for Ωsecram. This fact contradicts the definition
of Ωsecram, as it is a solution that minimises the maximal impact function. Therefore, Ωsecram
produces a weakly PO solution.
In view of the above, it is clear that, under reasonable assumptions, the result of the analysis
from SecRAM may be obtained as one of the solutions of the TPG multi-objective model
(in case Pareto-optimality is replaced by weak Pareto-optimality), assuming that the security
experts plan the security configuration such that the overall impact is minimized (i.e., by
selecting the “mitigate" strategy). It is interesting to note that the internal max
P
operator,
which is taken by definition in SecRAM, corresponds to a zero-sum security game, which
serves as an additional justification of the selected game type. This result means that none of
the obtained PO solutions of the TPG multi-objective model can produce lower impact values
for all impact types. It can be used as a high-level verification of both of the approaches in
case they are used in parallel.
4.3 Static Model Instantiation
This section presents an instantiation of the proposed TPG-based model, providing a description
of the solver for a specific case of problem (4.1).
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To complete the model definition, one needs to define a constructive approach for the
calculation of the impact function depending on the strategies of the game agents and the
TPG structure. For the presented model, the assumption is made that, if a control is placed at
a particular checkpoint, then the adversary that performs the corresponding type of attack is
blocked with some probability. Let D ∈ [0,1]r×L, where L represents the number of possible
attack types. In addition, Di j ∈ [0,1] represents the probability that control i blocks the attack







Formula 4.9 states that the probability of attack block is equal to the 1 minus the probability
that all controls fail to block the attack at checkpoint u (node or edge).
Further in this section, we will consider the extended graph by default . For this reason, the
attack type index will be omitted, and the entries of matrix Ω and block probabilities wu(Ω)
are further indexed by the extended graph edges.
The number of SAs in the expanded graph is, by construction, equal to the product of the
initial number of SAs and the number of attack types, ML. We define a matrix of pure impact
values 3.3 as A ∈RML×m with entries avi, where i refers to the pure impact type index caused
by an attack against asset v.
Variables D,A , and the (extended) graph structure G are considered as inputs to the proposed
game. The impact functions are evaluated as a probabilistic expectation of the loss:
Ii(Ω,P) = av(P)i ∏
e∈P
(1−we(Ω)) (4.10)
where v(p) denotes the corresponding SA node in path P, av(P)i is an entry of the matrix A ,
and we represents the block probability for the controls placed at edge e (0 if no controls).
Therefore, the attacker’s strategy concerning Ii is reduced to searching the attack path that
maximises the expected impact.
Also, it is important to introduce resource limitations for the defender that correspond to the
real-life constraints caused by financial or business reasons. Otherwise, the optimal solution
to the problem could be placing security controls at each checkpoint of the (extended) TPG.
4.3.1 Single-objective Optimisation
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By taking a logarithm of the expected impact expression, it is possible to convert the product






Using statement (4.10) and property 4.12, the process of selection of least-weighted path









It is clear that the values of log(1−we(Ω)) are non-negative because we ≤ 1. The value
− log(avi) is assumed to be positive without loss of generality, as this may be achieved
by multiplying every value in A by a constant that is sufficiently small. Therefore, this
optimisation problem can be represented as a least weighted path search with positive weights
in G from s to t. For an edge e ∈ A that is not connected to any SA the corresponding weight
is − log(1−we(Ω)). Edges that are connected to SA nodes have weights − log(avi).




Here Ω(k,l)u defines the Boolean components of the matrix Ω that correspond to the checkpoint
(k, l) ∈ A.
We also consider the optimisation problem of − log(Ii(Ω,P)), where the inner max operator
of 4.11 is converted into min, and the outer min operator is substituted with max. To reduce
the settle point search to a standard optimisation problem, the inner least weighted path
problem is replaced by its dual mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) formulation, as
shown in [48].
The dual translation of the MILP problem is not applicable in a general case. However,
the inner minimisation problem here is a classical least weighted path problem. The linear
programming (LP) formulation of the least weighted path problem has a property that all
corner points are integer-valued. Therefore, the MILP may be replaced by a standard LP
problem and the dual replacement can be correctly used.
The specific case of problem (4.11), which uses the impact function definition described
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∀(k, l) ∈ A yl− yk ≤ ∑
u<r
Ω(k,l)u log(1−Du)




Problem 4.15 has a definition similar to the dual shortest path problem. For each node k
of the graph G a “dual variable" yk is defined. Second and third inequalities state that the
difference between the dual variables that correspond to connected nodes is not larger than
the weight of the connecting edge. These inequalities are of critical importance for further
analysis. It is easy to show that if node t is reachable from node s (exists a path in G from s
to t), the difference yt−ys is not larger than the weight of any path that connects those nodes.
If there exists a path P = (t, p1, . . . , pn,s) then
yt− ys = (yt− ypn)+(ypn− ypn−1)+ · · ·+(yp1− ys)≤ ∑
e∈P
de (4.16)
Here de denotes the weight of link e, which may have a different form depending on the
presence of SA node in this link. Obviously, the minimal value is reached when yt − ys
equals to the weight of the minimal weighted path between t and s. The last inequality and
equation in 4.15 (which are not initially presented in (4.11)) define the resource (or price)
limitations for the defender. The optimisation problem may easily incorporate inequalities
such as f (Ω) ≤ F or g(Ω) = 0 as long the vector functions f and g are linear. They may
present business-flow limitations over the security configuration Ω, system parameters, or
feasibility (i.e., cost) constraints.
The following property holds for the optimisation problem (4.15):
Lemma 1. For impact type i,
∀ Ω : f (Ω)≤ F,g(Ω) = 0, ∃Y,P :
max
Y







Proof. The lemma is proven using a constructive approach, variables Y,P are defined explicitly.
Consider any fixed feasible Ω. In turn, define a set of variables Y = ˆY (Ω), where each
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defines a feasible configuration of variables for equation (4.15). This
trivially follows from the fact that, for each e = (k, l) ∈ A,
ŷl ≤ ŷk + log(1−we(Ω)) (4.19)
Indeed, the weight of the optimal path to node l is not larger than the weight of the optimal
path to node k plus the weight of the edge (k, l). It should be noted that for each feasible
configuration Y ,
∀P(s, t,G) yt− ys ≤ ∑
e∈P
log(1−we) (4.20)
Therefore ˆY (Ω) provides a maximal value for the optimised function. The statement of the
lemma is satisfied by the construction of ˆY (Ω).
4.3.2 Multi-objective Optimisation
Consider the MOOP in equation (4.1). For the search of solutions that belong to the PO
frontier, an iterative epsilon constraint (IEC) algorithm [63, 16] can be used. The IEC
algorithm iteratively solves a sequence of optimisation problems using an abstract solver
(also referred to as an “internal solver"). These optimisation problems are stated for one
of the objective functions with different constraints over other functions at every iteration
of IEC. In the scope of the MOOP in equation (4.1), the internal solver shall meet the
requirements listed as follows.










Ii(Ω,P)≤Ci, i ∈ 2, . . .m
(4.21)
where Ci are input parameters.
2. The solver must produce solutions that belong to the PO frontier, given the same
constraints as are present in the optimisation problem in equation 4.21.
The next task is to construct the procedure for the internal solver, suitable for IEC algorithm,
which has to solve equation (4.1).
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Internal solver as mixed-integer linear programming. Consider item (1) in the
abovementioned list of requirements. First, we reduce the problem in equation (4.21) to a
MILP. Hereafter we assume that functions f ,g are linear. The initial optimisation of equation
(4.15) must be modified to take into account the constraints over the various objective
functions. This may be achieved by the following MILP, which may be considered as a
constructive statement of the problem (4.21):{
Optimisation problem (4.15)




Theorem 1. The value Ω is a solution of equation system (4.21) if and only if it is a solution
of the problem (4.22).
Proof. The proof consists of two parts, each part is proven constructively.
1. Denote the solution of (4.22) by Ω′. Let us prove that Ω′ is a solution for (4.21). First,
we will show that the constraints max
P
Ii(Ω,P)≤Ci are maintained for each value Ω from the
feasible region defined by the limitations of (4.22). From the structure of the optimisation
problem (property (4.16)), we have:



















log(1−we))≥− log(Ci)+ log(avi) (4.24)
Alternatively, the statement can be reformulated as follows:
min
P,v∈P
(− log(Ii(Ω,P))≥− log(Ci) (4.25)
The right part of the inequality does not depend on v, therefore it may be re-stated:
min
P
(− log(Ii(Ω,P))≥− log(Ci) (4.26)
Therefore, the feasible region of (4.22) is a subset of feasible region of (4.21). Further, using
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Lemma 1, one can obtain that ∀ Ω
min
P
(− log(I1(Ω,P))) = ŷt(Ω)− ŷs(Ω)≤




Therefore, Ω′ is a solution of (4.21).
2. Let us prove that, if Ω∗ is a solution of (4.21), then it is a solution of (4.22). First, we
show the feasibility of Ω∗. Let us consider the configuration (Ω∗,Ŷ (Ω∗)) defined by Lemma
1. From (4.21), we have:
min
(P(s,t,G))
(− log(Ii(Ω,P)))≥− log(Ci) (4.28)







− log(aiv)≥− log(Ci) (4.29)
which implies
ŷv− ŷs ≥− log(Ci)+ log(aiv) (4.30)
The left part of the inequality does not depend on i, therefore:
ŷv− ŷs ≥ max
i∈2,...,m
(− log(Ci)+ log(aiv)) (4.31)
Thus, (Ω∗,Ŷ (Ω∗)) lies in the feasible region of (4.22). From Lemma 1, we have that for
every feasible Ω:





(− log(I1(Ω∗,P))) = ŷt(Ω∗)− ŷs(Ω∗)
(4.32)
This fact implies that Ω∗ is a solution of (4.22), and so the proof is complete.
Pareto-optimality of the internal solver. Let us denote the solver for the problem
(4.22) by Φ(G,A,C), where variables G and A define the structure of the proposed NSG
extension, and C ∈ Rm−1 denotes the vector of constraints for Ii(Ω,P). The solver outputs
an optimal security configuration Ω for the given constraints and structure. However, neither
of the equation systems (4.22) and (4.21) guarantees that the resulting solution belongs to
the set of PO solutions, which is stated by requirement (2) given above. To ensure that
the resulting solution belongs to the PO frontier, we propose an iterative approach for the
instantiation of the solver, required by the IEC algorithm. The methodology is detailed as
follows.
For the optimisation problem defined by graph G, impacts A , and constraints C, the following
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steps are to be performed:
(a) Ω′ = Φ(G,A ,C)








∀(k, l) ∈ A, l /∈V yl− yk ≤ ∑
u<r
Ω(k,l)u log(1−Du)




yti− yv ≤− log(avi)
f (Ω)≤ F
g(Ω) = 0
yt1 = ytyv− ys ≥ maxi∈2,...,m(− log(Ci)+ log(avi))
yt− ys = ŷt(Ω′)− ŷs(Ω′)
(4.33)
In (4.33) additional variables are introduced, yti , which can be considered as “stop" nodes for
each impact type from 2 to m. This is a convenient augmentation, as the problem optimises
the values of the impacts Ii, i ∈
[
2, . . . ,m
]
. The physical meaning of the system (4.33) is
to “strengthen" the solution of Φ(G,A ,C). While Φ(G,A ,C) guarantees that I1(Ω′,P) is
minimal, there is no guarantee that the rest of the impact functions are minimal too, they
just fit the threshold. For this reason, (4.33) defines an optimisation problem that holds
the I1(Ω,P) at the optimal value reached by Ω′ for the given constraints (last equality). It
builds a feasibility region for Ω that lies within the feasibility region of (4.22) because it
includes the constraints of (4.22). And, it tries to optimise the values of the rest of the impact
functions. Impact I1 is taken into account in the optimised function “artificially", it is fixed.
It is introduced for further denotation simplicity.
Let the solver defined by steps (a), (b) be denoted as Ψ(G,A ,C). The next step is to show
that the resulting solution, Ω∗ = Ψ(G,A ,C), matches the requirement list for the internal
solver of the IEC algorithm. The general motivation underlying this is that, due to the discrete
nature of the optimisation problem Φ(G,A ,C), the set of optimal solutions cannot be a
single point, but it must be some finite number of possible configurations. Significantly, this
is required to select the PO configurations.
Theorem 2. The solution produced by steps (a) and (b) is a PO solution, given the constraints
in Φ(G,A ,C)
Proof. The proof consists of 2 parts: first, some additional properties of the problem 4.33
are studied, after that the statement is proven by contradiction.
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First, let us consider the properties of the solution of the problem 4.33. Using the same
reasoning used during the proof of the lemma, it is possible to show that, for each of
the summands from the optimised function, the following statement holds for fixed Ω (if









This statement can be proven using constructive approach, when each yi is set to the weight
of the optimal path from node s in the graph. The same property holds for yt − ys, as it is
optimal by definition of Φ(G,A ,C).
Next, let us consider a solution defined by the following procedure:
Ω
∗ = Ψ(G,A ,C) (4.35)
Corresponding values of the auxiliary variables are denoted as Y ∗. Suppose that it is not PO
solution, which is to say that ∃Ω̂ : f (Ω̂)≤ F,g(Ω̂) = 0










In addition, there exists a j for which the inequality is strict. Let us define the corresponding






















with a strict inequality for t j. One can easily show that Ω̂ is a feasible point of the problem
Ψ(G,A ,C). Therefore, by computing the optimal configuration of Ŷ for problem Ψ(G,A ,C),
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which contradicts the definition of Y ∗ as a solution of Ψ(G,A ,C), thus completing the proof.
Thus, the set of PO solutions may be obtained by applying the IEC algorithm with Ψ(G,A ,C)
as an internal solver.
4.4 Results and Discussion
This section presents results on the validation of the static TPG-based model, as well as
an interpretation of the obtained results. The aim is to demonstrate that general real-world
relationships between input characteristics are retained by the model, and to show some of
the basic properties of the approach. To achieve this, an evaluation was performed using a
simplified Remote Tower and an airport model.
4.4.1 Airport Model Description
In this section, an example of the proposed approach for security configuration selection is
presented. The tests are performed on a Remote Tower (RMT) system, using inputs from
standard SecRAM techniques.
The novel concept of RMT aims to enable the remote control of incoming or outgoing airport
traffic. Traditionally, airflow control operations undertaken by air traffic control services are
handled in a local control tower. Thus, the RMT concept is to equip an airport with a set of
sensors, allowing operators in air traffic control to gain a complete overview of the runway
and other mission-critical aspects from a remote control centre. Notably, remote control
would provide a possibility for one RMT to perform air traffic control for several small
airports simultaneously.
RMT equipment consists of cost-efficient optical camera sensors, and the video images that
these systems capture reflect a broad range of the aerodrome area. This online video stream
is displayed on a video panorama in order to provide the visual appearance from that facility
without needing a direct, out-of-the-window view. Airflow management is then performed
using sensor information.
Definition of Primary and Supporting Assets
To develop the internal model of the RMT, the initial results of SecRAM were used. It is
essential to define all PAs and related SAs for the following development of the internal
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Figure 4.1: Scheme used for implementation of the airport threat model
model. Also, security impact functions should be defined. To follow the SecRAM approach,
we use a subset of the impact areas defined in [1] as impact functions:
1. Safety (S) – Capability to provide all functions with minimal level of risk events.
2. Capacity (C) – Capability to provide all functions and services at the desired level.
3. Personnel (H) – Number of killed or injured people during functioning.
4. Economical (M) – Monetary loss in case of successful attack.
The list of SAs is presented schematically in Figure 4.1, consistent with the initial SecRAM
document. In the next table, a correspondence between the SA identified in [1] and used in
the current validation is established.
1. Remote Tower Facility: Corresponds to SA1 from the initial report and its sub-parts.
This includes the air traffic controller working position, communication, information,
control, flight data display, incident and distress alarms, visual tracking unit (VTU),
and multi-display system.
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2. Flight Information Service: Corresponds to SA2. Used to display and update met and
operational flight information.
3. A/G Transmit/Receive Aerial Stations: Corresponds to SA3.
4. Aerodrome Staff: Corresponds to SA5.
5. Runway Visual Range Equipment: Corresponds to SA6. Consists of a set of cameras
and optical sensors installed close to the runway.
6. Runway Approach Lights, Centre Line, Taxiway, and Stand Route Lighting: Corresponds
to SA7 and all sub-parts.
7. Instrument Landing System: Corresponds to SA8 and SA8.1. Includes status monitoring
for air traffic controller.
8. Aerodrome Visualisation System: Corresponds to SA9.1 and all sub-parts.
9. Binocular View: Corresponds to SA10. Includes a set of pan-tilt-zoom cameras for
detailed observation of the landing and approaching area.
10. Transmission System: Corresponds to SA11 and all sub-parts. Consists of data between
external sites (e.g. A/G coms sites and remote centre).
11. Radar Stations: Corresponds to SA12.
12. Audio Monitoring Stations: Corresponds to SA14. System consists of audio monitoring
around the aerodrome and on tower.
13. Anemometer: Corresponds to SA15.
14. Processor of Station Identifier Tags for Visualisation Data: Corresponds to SA16.
To simplify the scenario, not all SAs from the original analysis are included in the modelling
approach. SA17-SA24 and SA28 are related to the communication infrastructure between
the tower and the airport. In the structure of the proposed TPG (as detailed in due course),
these are observed on a higher level as, due to the selected attack types, no specification is
needed.
SA25 and SA30 are considered to be a part of the overall hardware and software of the RMT,
which is SA1 and SA10. SA26, consisting of the RMT and aerodrome building and facilities,
is also considered to be out of the scope of the assessment as an attack that could damage the
building is expected to be prevented before the airport is accessed. This is a decision similar
to the SecRAM “transfer" option.
SA27 from the original report is considered to be a part of SA7 in this thesis. Additionally,
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every PA is linked to the corresponding objective function, where every SA has a
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Table 4.1: Links between supporting assets, primary assets and impact criteria, used in the
model.
Attack Types and Impact Definition
All the PAs are related to information transfer from the RMT to the airport and backward.
To define the set of required parameters, it is necessary to consider their relation to the CIA
triad system-wide, as suggested by [2].
At the outset, the following definitions are introduced for the functional description of the
PAs:
• Rt(a) – Data rate (Mb/sec) of the information of type t incoming to ATCo, related to
PA a.
• Lt(a) – Delay (latency) of the information of type t transmitted from data sensors/sources
of PA a, and received by ATCo.
• RtNC(a) – Data rate (Mb/sec) of uncompromised information of type t incoming to
ATCo, related to primary asset a. By “uncompromised information", we understand
the information, which comes to a given communication node with no changes, as
produced by the source node.
It is clear that RtNC(a)≤ Rt(a).
Let us consider the CIA triad in the scope of the given definitions.
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• Availability: To ensure system availability, several limitations should be satisfied.
Namely, for any PA a, the data rate of given information type is higher than given
limit: Rt(a) ≥ tht(a). In addition, the total delay of information a is lower than the
given limit: Lt(a)< limt(a).
• Integrity: Provide accuracy and completeness of the assets. Fraction of the
uncompromised data is not higher than the given limit: (RtNC(a))/R
t(a)≥ thtNC(a).
• Confidentiality: Confidentiality of the information flow is not considered in the current
RMT modelling.
Confidentiality is omitted from the analysis based on the considerations listed as follows.
• A significant part of the data is public and may be captured using simple radio equipment,
such as ADS-B information, flight plan data, air/ground (voice) radio communications.
• Visualisation data, binocular view, instrument landing systems controls, and few other
types of the data are not public. Obtaining that information may lead the attacker to
the exact position of the aircraft and advice on the attack time. However, the current
model operates under the assumption that the adversary has complete knowledge of
the system attacked, so it would not add anything to the analysis.
Still, lack of assessment of confidentiality may lead to, for example, reputational losses under
certain conditions. This may be represented in financial losses, too, if a specific type of attack
is considered. Types of attacks considered in this thesis are targeting a direct impact on the
performance of the airport/tower that leads to a decrease of safety and capacity of operations.
For this reason, omitting the confidentiality of the data is acceptable.
Omitting the confidentiality for the RMT example still allows demonstrating the main
properties and the behaviour of the static model. The confidentiality criteria for each PA
is considered in an equivalent manner as integrity and availability. For this reason, adding
confidentiality into the analysis could change the impact function values and, therefore,
the set of PO solutions and optimal security control configurations. Additionally, if more
attack scenarios are added, confidentiality consideration could change the topology of the
underlying TPG. However, it does not change the modelling scheme conceptually.
A network topology is required to calculate the parameters Rt(a), Lt(a), and RtNC(a) for each
relevant information type. The data exchange network for the RMT was developed and is
represented in Figure 4.2, where relevant acronyms are also introduced.
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Figure 4.2: Network nodes are related to different SAs, and directed edges indicate
information exchange
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Figure 4.2 represent the topology of the information flows in terms of the supporting assets
used to transmit the information. Ground data transfer (GDT) service of the airport collects
the information from the airport sensors and sends it to the ground communication system of
the remote tower. Ground communication system (GCS) accumulates the information from
several possible airports and sends it to the input pre-processing service, which sends it to
the RMT. In addition, GCS obtains the information about flight plans (planned routes of each
flight) from the flight information service. Real-time aircraft communication from the RMT
is done using air data transmitters/receivers. RMT controllers are able to control the airport
sensors via the GCS and GTD.
The calculation of these values involves the parameters of the subsystems. As an example,
a “binocular view" (BV) PA is considered. This PA corresponds to the video feed that air
traffic controller receives from the pan-tilt-zoom cameras installed on the airport site. The
air traffic controller should also be able to control the cameras remotely. This PA is required
to provide the controller with real-time visual information of what is going on at the airport.
Formulating in terms of information streams, this PA is related to the following services:
firstly, information provision from the binocular to the ATCo; and secondly, control of the
view parameters from ATCo.
The assumption is also made that the information is provided using the following “route":
• BV → ATCo (“video stream" (VS) information type): BV → GDT → GCS→ IPP→
RMT
• ATCo→ BV (“control stream" (CS) information type): RMT → GDT → GCS→ BV










The total RV S(a) parameter for the video stream is calculated as a minimum capacity of
every link at the path (BV → ATCo ). The latency LV S(a) is calculated using “worst-case"
estimation formulas, which involves the frame size parameter, the capacity of every link,
and the latency at every node. The non-compromised data rate, RV SNC(a), is estimated as a
total data rate, RV S(a), multiplied by the “true data rate" of every node of the path. The true
data rate depends on the error rate of the device or node, or on the character of the attack
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performed.
Different attacks are intended to change the values of the internal parameter so that the
limitations can be violated. For instance, the physical attack against GDT could increase the
latency of the node, meaning that the total latency constraint of the BV PA would not hold.
Let us define the objective functions as a mapping.
• C ∈ {0,1} – Represents system capacity. The system evaluation is performed in a
Boolean manner. If the value is 1, then the system capacity is unacceptable, and if it is
0, then it is acceptable. The function is set to 1 if any of the CIA constraints of the PA
related to this objective are violated.
• S ∈ {0,1} – Represents system safety. The calculation approach is similar to the
capacity.
• H ∈ {0,1,2,3, . . .} – Represents personnel loss (i.e., the number of injured staff
members). Occurs when a certain type of attack is performed against staff. The value
depends on the path in the threat graph model.
• M ∈ R - Represents economic (i.e., monetary) loss. It depends on the type of attack
and the attacked asset. In general, it can be calculated as an economic loss of the attack
towards the SA summed with the prices of the affected PAs.
As pointed out above, the next step of the asset model instantiation is the definition of attack
types against the system and the system’s impact values. Types of attacks are established
from the threat scenarios provided in [1]. Certain attack scenarios given in the report are
not specific and may serve as an “additional bonus" to a specific attack being performed.
Examples of such scenarios from [1] include “abuse of rights", “denial of actions", and
“forging of rights". Taking these scenarios into account, and on the basis of security expert
recommendations, the attack types are separated into two groups: internal and external.
The group of the attack is essential during the development of the matrix D because some
controls, despite being efficient against external attackers, are useless against internal
attackers. Internal attacks are performed by an adversary that is a “part" of the system (e.g.,
a staff member or systems developer). By contrast, external attacks are performed by an
adversary that is external to the system. A list of possible internal attacks, along with their
impact on the attacked asset, is given below.
• Physical: It decreases capacity of the node (SA) to 0 Mbits/s, and increases latency to
infinity. If the personnel SA are attacked, the number of human losses is equal to the
number of people close to the SA. Economic loss is set at the price of the asset. This
type of attack can be understood as a generalisation of the “blockade of facilities",
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“breach of personnel availability", and “theft/fraud and criminal damage" threats from
the original SRA of RMT [1].
• Compromise of Information: This attack decreases the “true data rate” of the device
to 0. There is no direct economic impact on personnel. In reference to [1], this can
be understood as a generalisation of the “corruption of data", “data manipulation",
“tampering of software", and “virus and trojan" attacks.
• Electronic Interference: This attack decreases the capacity of the node (SA) to 0. This
type of attack may cause the destruction of the data transmission equipment, which
could lead to the full replacement of the asset. During the modelling the economic
impact is estimated to be half of the price of the asset that is attacked, which is a
compromise value between “no damage" and “full replacement" cases. It relates to the
following attack scenarios from [1]: “electromagnetic pulses or radiation", “denial of
service", “viruses and trojans" (depending on the virus), “failure of
telecommunications equipment", “failure of third-party service provision", and “hackers
/ social engineering".
The list of external attacks is the same, and the impact over the parameters is supposed to be
the same. However, the separation between internal and external attacks is required because
external attacks can be prevented by less “hard" controls, while certain procedural controls
may only target internal attacks (e.g., staff monitoring).
The following attacks are not considered in the report:
• Indirect Disruptive Events: Attack scenario seems to be non-specific, which is the
rationale for excluding it from consideration.
• Thermal Radiation: Omitted from consideration in [1] at risk assessment.
Threat Model
The report does not contain any detailed description of the steps taken by an attacker.
Therefore, the TPG is developed based on expert suggestions from Eurocontrol.
The TPG threat model involves defining the structure of an attacker’s actions. To develop
the structure of the threat paths, it is necessary to investigate the system environment and
structure. As described previously, two types of nodes were considered: physical nodes and
cyber nodes, as proposed in 3.2.3.
Considering the physical nodes, the system can be separated into two parts: firstly, the part of
the remote control operator interface; and secondly, the airsides of the controlled airports. In
this thesis, a system with a single airside is considered. The airside of the airport is separated
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into several sub-areas, which are related to different physical checkpoints.
Schematic representations of an airport and remote tower are presented in Figures 4.3 and
4.4. Bold borders of the rectangles indicate the airport’s global sub-structures, including
the airport building, the airside, and the staff entry. The thin border indicates the sub-areas
related to the checkpoints in the threat graph. The graph’s edges interconnect the “neighbour"
sub-areas. The number of areas will be used further to indicate the checkpoint where a
security control should be placed. If the asset is placed at the sub-area, then there is an
access to the checkpoint with access to the asset. An additional checkpoint is placed “in
front" of the asset so that the access to the asset is “individualised".
Figure 4.3: Scheme used for implementation of airport threat model
Figure 4.4: Scheme used for implementation of remote tower threat model
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Nodes 20, 22, and 23 represent the separation of the airport building into nodes, and node
21 represents the staff entrance to the airside. Additionally, node 38 indicates the main
entrance to the building, where the RMT operator interfaces are placed. Node 39 represents
the “switch" between the server room and operator workplaces.
The cyber nodes were developed according to the network structure of the IT-kind supporting
assets, as represented in Figure 4.2. The level of access was not specified because the
proposed controls, which are discussed in due course, consider the structure of different
access layers. If the asset related to the cyber checkpoint is placed at the given geographic
position, access to the cyber-paths is possible from the given geographic checkpoint.
After applying the main steps of the graph transformation, the overall system threat model
may be seen in Figure 4.5. In this figure, blue nodes represent cyber nodes and yellow nodes
represent physical nodes. Each node number corresponds to a specific rectangle position in
Figures 4.3 and 4.4.
As the next step, it is necessary to define the list of deployable and procedural checkpoints,
as well as the block probability matrix D.
The presented list of controls is aligned with the security controls from [1]. As the original
report operates at a much larger scale than the current model, only a part of the security
controls were taken into account. Each of the security controls has constraints in terms of
the installation node, the number of installations, and the different price.
• Authorisation Computer Procedure/Antivirus: Assumed to be effective (non-zero block
probability) against compromise of information by an external attacker, labelled C1.
Could be aligned with “anti-virus installation" and “data input credibility check" given
in the original SecRAM RMT report.
• Checkpoint: Assumed to be effective against external physical and interference attacks,
labelled C2. Could be aligned with “CCTV" and “automated access control" from
RMT report.
• Full Security Scan: Assumed to be effective against external and internal physical
and interference attacks, labelled C3. A combination of “guards", “barriers", and
“automated access control" from the original report.
• Security Patrol: Assumed to be effective against external physical attack, labelled C4.
It is related to “guards".
• Security Patrol (close to SA): Effective against compromise of information and internal
or external physical interference, labelled C5. It is related to “guards".
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In the list above, the effectiveness denotes a set of attacks with non-zero block probability.
As the reader may be aware, certain internal attack types are not blocked by any controls.
For this reason, two types of procedural controls are considered for enforcement. Procedural
controls were added as an additional type of security control. These controls are assumed to
“operate" between the nodes adjusted to the SAs and the SAs themselves. This formalisation
was adopted because no cyber or physical location can be attributed to these controls.
Nevertheless, they mitigate risk for a specific subset of SAs against certain attack types.
• P1, Staff Surveillance: Assumed to be effective (to a limited degree) against all types
of internal attacks.
• P2, Enhanced Staff Surveillance: Assumed to be effective against all types of internal
attacks, and more effective compared to the limited efficacy of P1.
Procedural controls are related to “personnel vetting" and “policy organisation & effective
HR management" from the original report.
4.4.2 Experimental Results with Artificial Data
This experimental section of the thesis is separated into two different setups:
1. The first setup aims to complete SRA over the RMT system described in the previous
sections. For this, a detailed description is given of the resulting Pareto-optimal frontier,
and an analysis is undertaken of the solution of the system.
2. The second experimental setup aims to provide an analysis of the presented models,
to compare these with the classical NSG, and to identify dependencies on the main
parameters.
Remote Tower Threat Analysis
The results of the optimal security control assignment for the RMT model are described as
follows. For modelling purposes, a number of different security controls are considered,
and the corresponding results of the optimisation problems are listed. Two types of cost
constraints are given: installation cost and maintenance cost. Thus, each security control is
tagged by two types of costs. The costs for each security control are given in the table 4.2.
Security Control Installation Cost Maintenance Cost
C1 750 750







Table 4.2: Security controls’ costs
As mentioned before, collected impact functions are highly correlated. Therefore, for all
cases, the set of PO solutions contains just a single element. In the table 4.3, the results of















• Deploy C4 at nodes 21, 20, and 37.
• Deploy C1 at nodes 58, 60, 61, 62,
63, 65, 69, and 70.
The current solution may be considered
as the “worst-case" option in case of lack
of resources. It is not possible to mitigate
fully any of the attacks.









• Deploy C2 at nodes 21 and 20.
• Deploy C4 at node 37.
• Deploy C1 at nodes 58, 60, 61, 62,
63, 65, 69, and 70.
Additionally, a procedural control of type
P1 is enforced. The provided amount
of resources is sufficient to mitigate all
attacks, which reduces all impact types
to a certain level. The main advantage
is based on the enforcement of the










• Deploy C2 at nodes 21 and 20.
• Deploy C4 at node 21 and 20.
• Deploy C1 at nodes 58, 60, 61, 62,
63, 65, 69, and 70.
Additionally, a procedural control of type
P2 is enforced. Due to the enlarged
amount of resources, the mitigation level
is increased even more. Mostly, it
is achieved by using better procedural
control and by adding more controls
against physical attacks.









• Deploy C2 at nodes 22, 26, 27, 21,
19, and 20.
• Deploy C4 at node 37, 28, 27, 26,
21, 20, and 19.
• Deploy C1 at nodes 58, 60, 61, 62,
63, 65, 69,and 70.
Additionally, a procedural control of
type P2 is enforced. Despite the
significantly larger amount of resources,
no improvement is achieved in terms of
impact function values. One way to
account for this is by referencing the fact
that procedural controls handle internal
attackers, and the impact functions
consider only the worst-case scenario. As
the procedural control is the same for
the previous case, no improvements are
achieved. However, the average impact
per asset should be lower due to the
structure of the optimisation problem Ψ.
Table 4.3: Results of the static model validation
The experimental setup outlined in the previous table demonstrates that the security level
improves with the growth of the amount of resources only up to a certain degree. After
some threshold is reached, no improvement is possible. Adding more security controls
and resources of any types can not improve the protection level due to the specifics of
the formulation of the problem 4.2). It states a zero-sum game and only the attacks with
the highest impact are considered. Some of the internal attacks are only mitigated with
procedural controls. Therefore, as soon as the amount of resources is sufficient to deploy
the best available procedural controls, it is impossible to minimise the impact functions by
allocating more resources.
The level of improvement is dependent on the qualitative characteristics of the security
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controls. The only improvement of the impact functions level may be achieved in case the
security controls are enhanced or more security controls are added at different nodes.
Comparing the results of the model with the SecRAM results, a key similarity is that the
“Guards" (related to C4 in the model), “Automated Access Control" (C2) and “Antivirus/Data
Credibility Checks" (C1) are applied for all SAs in the scenarios with sufficient funds (security
controls’ relation described in 4.4.1). However, security control C3 is not used anywhere,
but the two reasons given below may account for this:
• “Barriers"(C3) control is considered by the graph structure, assuming that the system
is physically accessible only from a limited number of locations.
• “Guards" and “Automated Access Controls" are deployed wherever they are needed
by the model (that is, in case of sufficient funds).
The model selects the procedural control, which mitigates all types of internal attacks. In the
report, only “Personnel Vetting" control is enforced for all SAs, while the “Policies" control
is implemented only for a subset of SAs (related to “Personnel"). The difference between
the selected procedural controls comes from the simplification of the security controls used
in the validation.
Compared to the standard manual SRA procedure, the proposed model provides several
important advantages.
• It quantifies the protection level and resources required for the protection. Proposed
model explicitly demonstrates that adding more resources into the security may not
be effective if no new controls are considered because the impact functions are not
reduced with the growth of available resources.
• The model automatises the process of risk treatment and risk re-evaluation. Security
controls selection is done optimally with no manual analysis. In some cases, the model
may be more precise by providing an explicit link to the optimal geographical position
of the security control (which may be missing from the analysis).
• The model allows for a wide range of “what-if" simulations with no redevelopment
of the most complex part: TPG. The validation demonstrates a range of possible
thresholds with different risk levels. A similar type of analysis is demonstrated in
terms of security controls efficiency in the following subsection. Such experiments are
beneficial for cost optimisations or analysis of the security control’s efficiency.
Model Parameter Validation and Comparison
In this section, several experiments undertaken using simulated data are presented. The aim
of the section is to illustrate the theoretical properties of the developed models.
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The security configuration cost limitations give one of the key model parameters. Figure
4.6 shows the dependency between the cost limitation threshold and the minimal feasible
impact, resulting as a solution of problem (4.11). The results are provided for two types of
problems:
• For an approach with all attack mitigation probabilities taken from [0,1] (i.e., “soft"
model).
• For an approach with all attack mitigation probabilities taken from {0,1} (i.e., “hard"
model).
The charts in the figure demonstrate that, at low-cost thresholds, the impact value is
comparable for both models. However, as the constraint is relaxed, the soft model assesses
the impact in a significantly more conservative manner, decreasing as a partially constant
function. Impact drops correspond to a new control added to the solution. At the same
time, the hard model evaluates the system as fully-secured when there is at least one security
control at every path in the graph. Therefore, the standard NSG neglects to consider the
cumulative effect added by the security controls.
Figure 4.7 demonstrates the dependency of the impact function on security control
efficiency, which corresponds to Du parameters in 4.15. Efficiency parameters of the security
controls grow linearly from 0 to 0.8 across 20 iterations, and at each iteration, an optimisation
of a single impact function is performed. The resulting impact chart demonstrates a decreasing
partially linear function with a variable slope. The linear form of the function is ensured
by the form of equation (4.10). In a general case, the function would have a polynomial
structure with an order equal to the number of controls at the “most vulnerable" path. In the
proposed model, the order is one, which reflects that there is a single control that can block
the most vulnerable directions (this is related to internal cyber-attacks). Slope change in the
graph indicates that the adversary’s strategy (i.e., target selection) changes in line with the
efficiency of security controls.
Evaluation of problem (4.1) is performed on the reduced number of impact functions. Impact
function values pointed in the SecRAM document for the Remote Tower SRA are highly-
correlated, which leads to a single PO solution. This is a positive result because it mitigates
the problem of selecting of optimal solutions. For experimental purposes, the same RMT
problem was considered with two impact functions. In particular, using a random number
generator, the impact matrix was generated, thereby eliminating the correlation effect.
Results for problem 4.2 are provided in the following table for fixed-cost thresholds.
Impact Function / Solution Number Impact Function 1 Impact Function 2
Solution 1 0.1155 0.1585
Solution 2 0.1247 0.0950
Solution 3 0.1444 0.0841
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The results above demonstrate the standard trade-off behaviour of the PO frontier.
Due to the structure of the extended graph construction approach, the problem size grows
linearly depending on the number of attack types. Figure 4.8 presents the performance
measurements for the airport model and demonstrates unstable growth in execution time
growth with no visible increase in slope. This behaviour may be motivated by the tree
structure of the graph. It leads to a linear increase in the number of edges (and, hence,
equations) depending on the number of vertices.
4.4.3 Model Limitations
The proposed methods is intended to support the generic SRA decision-making process.
However, several significant points were not considered due to the nature of the initial
assumptions.
1. TPG is non-formal in a general case. The definition of nodes and arcs is a highly-
heuristic procedure, and the influence of changing of the graph structure by adding
nodes has not yet been investigated. However, in the case of the analysis of the
detailed scheme of the system, the approach can be used with no such investigation,
but this creates problems in terms of computational speed. A possible improvement or
mitigation of this effect may be achieved in a way similar to attack trees, by creating
a database of different typical sub-systems. Development of such a database may rely
on already existing attack tree databases.
2. It is a complex procedure to estimate the performance of the attack operators. The
dependence of the objective function on the parameters of the model is also an issue.
However, the current state of the model allows working with the upper bound of the
impact. Estimation of the impact may be enhanced and done in a more precise way by
applying statistical means, which may be combined with the process of TPG database
creation.
3. For complex systems, the reproduction of the impact functions requires complex
modelling. Also, the influence of the security controls over the business processes
is oversimplified and could be presented only in the form of a set of linear restrictions.
However, some minor changes in the model are required to dealing with the last fact,
and in significant number of cases, the business and cost limitations can be presented as
linear constraints. Non-linear restrictions for Boolean matrix Ω may be re-introduced
in the form of auxiliary variables. For example, disjunction function Ωi j ∨Ωkl may
be expressed in the form of the following linear in-equations over auxiliary Boolean
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di jkl ≤Ωi j +Ωkl
di jkl ∈ {0,1}
(4.42)
“Not" function is linear. Therefore, the basis of all Boolean functions may be expressed
in linear form. However, such an approach needs to be more effective, as it increases
the MILP’s size.
4. It is assumed that only one attack against a single SA is performed. However, for
some specific cases, the current model deals with multiple attacks by calculating only
the maximal impact (a proof is provided in due course).
Let us consider the last item in the previous list, related to multiple attack types. Define the
attacker’s strategy as a set of attacks performed simultaneously, namely AT = {P1, . . . ,Pk}.












To limit the number of simultaneous attacks, the assumption can be made that |AT | ≤ K.
Therefore, the consideration approach depends on the definition of Ik and its dependency
on AT . Two obvious definitions can be considered: firstly, maximal impact among AT ; or
secondly, a sum of impacts. For both definitions, the model defined by the proposed IEC
algorithm may be applied directly with no changes. For this, with no lack of generality, it is
assumed that |AT |= K. Detailed consideration of both cases and a proof of optimality of the
IEC procedure is given as follows:
• Consider the “sum" joint impact function, defined as follows:







Here fi is any increasing real-value function. Thus, it follows that
max
AT















As the optimisation of a single-argument increasing function is equivalent to the
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optimisation of its argument, the IEC optimisation procedure is correct for the
considered definition of the joint impact function.
• For the “maximum" joint impact function, it is obvious that
max
AT







When the joint impact function is structurally more complex, the proposed IEC procedure
may not provide PO solutions. However, it does not limit the generality of the TPG and the
definition given in (4.1).
4.5 Comparison with Cybersecurity Risk Assessment
Models
In this section, the model described in this thesis is compared with several cybersecurity risk
models discussed in 2.6. The instantiation phases of the models were discussed in 3.4, so
the main attention is paid to the functionalities of the models, especially risk evaluation and
mitigation mechanisms.
4.5.1 Hierarchical Risk Management using Evolution Graphs
The SRA methodology discussed in this section was introduced in [8] and the instantiation
details were briefly introduced in 3.4.1. The risk mitigation mechanism of the model is
discussed below.
Risk mitigation is performed within the scope of the evolution graph Eg(I). This process is
defined as “a step of the assessment that selects which elementary attacks should be stopped
and, hence, which countermeasures should be implemented". Countermeasures C(A) for
elementary attack A may include changing the dependencies in the infrastructure graph Ig(I)
that result in the corresponding changes in Eg(I); changing the initial access rights for the
users; pruning the arcs labelled by A. The method mainly focuses on the pruning mitigation
mechanism.
The overall risk mitigation criterion is defined as a selection of a minimal set of controls
C that prevents the users from reaching the goal nodes. The set is considered minimal if it
is impossible to select a smaller set of controls that stops all attacks in Eg(I). The paper
briefly mentions, but does not detail the algorithms for the selection of the cut. However,
a formulation of a corresponding integer optimisation problem is not complex, as it has no
significant differences from the standard graph-cut problem.
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Comparing to the static model, the proposed method has a more flexible mechanism for the
Eg(I) adaptation as a security control, despite the fact that it is not detailed in the paper.
The method introduces several measures for the efficiency of a set of security controls C, but
those are focused only on the properties of C. The model does not define any user-related
criteria on the price and business limitations for the deployed security controls apart from the
minimality of the set. Security controls are assumed to have absolute efficiency, represented
by a “Boolean" cut of the Eg(I). No explicit impact values are used, as suggested in SRA
standards.
At the same time, the proposed method allows for explicit modelling of multiple attackers,
which is not directly possible in the static model. Some discussions on multiple attackers
modelling are given in the previous section, but no explicit mechanism is introduced. In
addition, the automatic generation of the graph Eg(I) from Ig(I) allows for semi-automatic
evaluation of the security of the infrastructure at the design stage.
The main advantages of both of the models are summarised below.
• Evolutionary graph-based model advantages: explicit modelling of multiple attackers;
possibility of semi-automatic Eg(I) restructuring as a security control.
• Static model advantages: multiple explicit optimisation criteria, as suggested in SRA
standards; cost-related constraints captured in the optimisation; no absolute-efficiency
assumption of the security controls allows for “protection in-depth" modelling.
4.5.2 Quantitative Cyber Risk Estimation Methodology
The quantitative cyber risk estimation methodology (QCREM) [45] is described in this
subsection and compared with the static model. It is based on the “compromise graph"
description discussed in 3.4.2, which has a similar definition and construction procedure as
TPG.
During the constructions of the compromised graph, for each edge, a non-negative weight
vector is assigned. The weight vector defines the time required by the attackers with different
skills to pass from one state to another. For example, one may define three skill levels:
beginner, intermediate, and expert. This means that for each edge a three-dimensional time-
vector is assigned. Some ways for assessing these values are provided in the paper. After
that, a dominant attack path is identified for each skill level, which corresponds to the least-
weighted path in the compromise graph from the “start" node to any “target" node.
QCREM allows for comparing two system configurations. In the paper it refers to a “baseline"
and “improved" (with additional controls) system configurations. Graph construction and
time estimation for the dominant paths is repeated for both of the system configurations.
After that, a heuristic formula is used to assess the risk reduction level.
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QCREM suggests a way to evaluate the risk reduction but provides no specific mechanism
for security controls selection mechanism. Given the problem formulation, an approach
similar to the static model may be used to do that (maximisation of the shortest path).
However, the method still operates in terms of just one risk metric. A the same time, the static
model defines the graph weights in a uniform probabilistic manner for all impact functions,
which prevents a full replication of the skill-differentiation mechanism used by QCREM.
The introduction of different weights for different impact functions is a technical task, but
there are no guarantees that the results of the theorems will be valid.
• QCREM advantages: explicit attack skill introduction.
• Static model advantages: provides more than one measure of the risk; automatically
suggests optimal security control configurations; cost and business limitations of the
security controls taken into account; semi-automatic graph construction.
4.5.3 Cybersecurity Modelling Using Attack Trees and
Vulnerability Indices
The cybersecurity framework analysed in this subsection was initially designed for power
station protection [64] but can be generalised for supervisory control and data acquisition
systems. The model focuses on password policies and port auditing.
The modelling scheme may be decomposed into the steps listed below.
• Identify attacker’s objectives.
• Identify possible security vulnerabilities and formulate a set of and/or attack trees that
describe the attack scenarios.
• For each leaf of the attack trees, determine cybersecurity conditions, compute the
vulnerability index (detailed further).
• Compute the vulnerability index of each scenario and the overall system.
• Decision-making to improve system vulnerability.
The vulnerability index (VI) is a measure of how vulnerable a certain part of the system is.
In order to evaluate that for each leaf, a cybersecurity condition ξ must be evaluated. It is
computed using three conditions: lack of evidence of previous exploitations (1), advanced
counter-measures are deployed (2), comprehensive password policies are enforced (3). ξ
may take three different values.
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• ξ = 0.33 if all conditions are satisfied.
• ξ = 0.67 if any two conditions are satisfied.
• ξ = 1 if less than two conditions are satisfied.
Next, a vulnerability index of each leaf G is defined as follows: V (G) = ξ ∗max(vα ,vβ ).
Here V (G) denotes the vulnerability index, vα ,vβ are measures of the strength of port
auditing policies and password combination policies. The paper describing the model
suggests some ways to evaluate those values given some parameters like password length
and previous port audit results.
VI of a scenario is defined as a product of VIs of all leaves that are related to this scenario.
VI of the whole system is identified as a maximal VI among all scenarios multiplied by the
“mitigation" factor that is evaluated based on the deployed countermeasures enforced.
The method described allows to automatically evaluate the protection level for different
configurations of predefined controls. Comparing the functionality of the static model and
the method described above, it may be concluded that the overall functionality of the static
model is wider but is achieved using different techniques. However, some of the mechanisms
proposed in the paper may be re-used in the static model for the estimation of the effectiveness
of the mentioned security controls. Both of the models are characterising the system’s
security using the worst-case scenario. ξ -value may be considered as a product of procedural
controls in the static model, but with a higher degree of flexibility (different procedural
controls may mitigate different attack scenarios).
• VI-based model advantages: semi-automatic evaluation of the effectiveness of two
types of security controls.
• Static model advantages: wider range of SRA-related parameters are captured by the
model; automatic selection of counter-measures based on multiple impact factors.
4.5.4 Network Security Risk Model
The network security risk model (NSRM) was introduced in [33] and its instantiation phase
is detailed in 3.4.3. Here the risk evaluation and mitigation stages are covered.
Risk evaluation in NSRM is done by analysing the optimal behaviour of the adversary within
the state transition graph. The expected return of the attacker from any transient state is
denoted by Ji, where i ∈ {0, . . . ,n,n+ 1,n+ 2} indicates the state number. Assuming an











U i stays for the set of actions available at state i, Gi(u) denotes the attacker’s return from
action u, pi, j(u) are state transition probabilities (briefly discussed in 3.4.3).
Defined rule for Ji may be rewritten in a vector form. The following denotation is introduced:
π(si) =
{









Thus, the following vector equation is hold:
J = G(π)+Φ(π)J
where J,G(π)∈Rn+2; the i-th component of J is Ji, of G(π) is Gi(π(si)). Φ(π)∈Rn+2×n+2,
Φ(π)i, j = pi, j(π(si)) for i, j≤ n. For states n+1,n+2 the only non-zero transition probability
is for self-transition.
The method explains how the equilibrium equation can be solved and derives a formula for
the gains of the attacker and defender.
The NSRM method allows for evaluating the security risks given certain parameters of the
system. Most of the parameters rely on the estimations of the times required to “hack" certain
components of the system, and times required by the detection mechanism to identify the
attack and render the adversary harmless. Therefore, using given estimates it is possible
to automatically quantify the cybersecurity risks of the system considered. In addition, the
method allows for multiple impact types calculation. This was not detailed in the paper but
it is obvious from the formulation of the equilibrium problem solution.
The static model also allows automatic evaluation of multiple impact functions. However,
it does not provide any specific mechanisms for automatised selection of the efficiency
parameters of the security controls, while NSRM relies on time estimates in order to calculate
the probabilities of state transitions. Both of the methods can consider sequential attacks:
NSRM by the means of model state combinations, the static model using M-SATAA
algorithm. At the same time, the static model performs the automatic selection of security
controls.
• NSRM advantages: automatic assessment of the efficiency of security controls.
• The static model advantages: automatic selection of the optimal security controls
configuration.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, a security configuration selection static model method was proposed. The
method given in this chapter is based on the definition of the TPG offered in the previous
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chapter. It still operates with general entities in order to meet the requirements given in
Section 2.1.4, which are necessary for an SRA support tool. Each step of the method is
aligned with the corresponding SecRAM analysis phase.
The proposed modelling framework is based on the extension of the NSG formalism, and
it deals with the MO optimisation technique. An algorithm for the solution was developed,
and a proof was given of its correctness. Several of the model’s theoretical properties were
also considered.
The model was validated on the RMT project example, taking the original SecRAM
evaluation of the security controls as a basis. The resulting configuration was compared
against the security controls selected in [1], the RMT report. Additionally, simulations were
used to demonstrate several of the model’s theoretical properties.
The static model was compared against four different cyber SRA methods. For each of them
functional advantages and shortages of the static model were identified.
The static model may be applied as a support tool for SRA and security risk mitigation.
However, it does not consider the “in-operation" scenario for the system, namely the attack
detection problem, consideration of which was a key motivation for this thesis.
The model was compared in terms of functionality with other competing high-level, generic
cyber SRA methods. For each of the techniques, the static model has certain advantages
and disadvantages. The static model performs an automatic selection of the security controls
based on multiple impact types, which is not the case for any of the models considered.
This brings the static model closer to the SRA standards described earlier. The static model
provide means for capturing business limitations of the security controls and is not focussed
on a specific types of controls.
At the same time, the model provides means for security control selection, but not for
event detector selection, which should be aligned with the attack detection process. These
problems constitute the focus of the next chapter.
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Figure 4.5: Threat graph model for remote tower
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Figure 4.6: Minimal feasible impact depending on cost limitation. Top image (solid line)
presents the dependency for the case of a “soft" model of security controls, while the bottom
image (dashed line) presents the dependency for the “hard" model.
Figure 4.7: Dependence of impact function on efficiency of security controls
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The static model was introduced and described in the previous section. The aim of the
static model is to perform the optimal assignment of security controls within the system.
However, the static model neglects to consider ongoing “in-operation" development within
the system and temporal dependency, which is critical for the continuous monitoring and
situation awareness.
As the first step, it is necessary to provide a basis for this section’s discussion by defining
the term “situation awareness". As defined in [28], the concept of situation awareness, as
initially discussed during the First World War by Oswald Boelke, refers to the act of “gaining
an awareness of the enemy before the enemy [gains] a similar awareness, and [devising]
methods for accomplishing this." After some time, the definition of situation awareness was
expanded at the system level. [71] pointed out that, to maintain an adequate awareness of
system status, tracking the development of events as they gradually unfold is necessary. In
the years since then, situation awareness has been defined differently in the literature, but
almost all researchers define an agent environment, and refer to a perception of the goals and
current status of the agents in time and space. The dynamic model introduced in the next
paragraph addresses the problem of improving situation awareness within a system.
The dynamic model has the same grounding as the static model (i.e., the threat path graph,
TPG). However, the main focus of the dynamic model is not threat prevention; rather, it is
the detection of an ongoing attack, the estimation of the current “status" of the adversary,
and the prediction of the set of possible targets. Therefore, the asset model part is not a
significant element of the model’s definition because the impact estimation is not a priority
(but still could be taken into account). The threat model is altered slightly to fit into the “event
detection" domain. The system under protection is assumed to generate security-relevant
information through a set of detectors. This information may be diverse, and in terms of its
quality, it may also be heterogenous. Following the definition of situation awareness given
above, this research’s operational definition of the main aim of the dynamic model is that it
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monitors relevant information and, moreover, addresses the following questions:
1. Is the system under attack?
2. How can event detectors be managed during security risk assessment (SRA), similar
to security controls?
The second question can be considered an expansion of the SRA-support process, as
discussed in the preceding chapter. It can be applied simultaneously with the static model
optimisation process, but it requires a different apparatus for its formulation. Implementation
of the dynamic model does not require any change in the approach used for TPG development.
Therefore, it may be used in combination (or consequently) in order to accomplish the output
of the static model.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows:
• The main additional entities and notations are introduced, and the questions stated
above are formalised into specific probability estimation problems.
• BF-based dynamic model design and derivation is given for the estimation of the
“state" of the adversary.
• BF-based model for “under attack" probability detection is derived, accompanied by
theoretical analysis.
• Validation results over a cybersecurity intrusion detection dataset are provided, showing
the performance of the model in relation to the two guiding questions for this chapter,
as given above.
5.1 Threat Model Modification and Notations
To adjust the proposed TPG model for the purposes of attack detection and situation
awareness, this section introduces several abstract entities. Consider a TPG, as defined in
the previous section: G = (N,A), with a set of nodes N, |N| = n, and a set of arcs A. The
adjacency matrix of G is denoted as A. In addition, E ⊂ N is the set of entry points, and
T ⊂ N is the set of targets. The letter t is used to denote time, and for modelling purposes,
discrete time is used.
As the main aim of the model is attack detection, it is necessary to introduce the set of
problem-relevant parameters which are to be estimated by the model. The adversary’s state
space is given by S = N∪{ /0}, where the empty set means that the attack has not started.
Let us formalise the information flow from the event detectors that may be received. Any data
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source that produces any information that characterises the system state may be considered
an event detector. For instance, consider two types of information: firstly, an alert from an
intrusion detection system; and secondly, a “door opened" signal. Both signals can be used
for incident investigation, and they complement each other. It is clear that the detection rate
of “door-opened" signals is significantly higher than, and is not strictly related to, attack
detection. However, if an intrusion does not happen without a door being opened, this signal
may be useful in assessing false alerts from an intrusion system.
Formally speaking, the graph is equipped with a set of event detectors D. At each moment
of time, the defender receives a set of detections
Dt = (dt1, . . . ,d
t
Kt )
For each di, an associated vertex (or subset of vertices, given that the approach is easily
extendable) exists, denoted as v(di) = n ∈ N. Each detection indicates the possible position
of the adversary within the graph. Furthermore, each detector d is characterised by a set of
parameters:
• True positive detection rate pt p(d): Probability of the detector sending information
about an ongoing event in case an attack is happening.
• False positive detection rate p f p(d): Probability of the detector sending information
about an ongoing event in case no attack is happening.
Returning to the “door-opened" example, in case the system has recorded an intrusion detection,
there exist two combinations of events.
• Intrusion detection signal is followed by “door-open" signal.
• Intrusion detection signal is not followed by “door-open" signal.
The probability of the door being opened when no attack happens is quite high, so this type
of detection alone does not give a lot of information. Assuming that the respective “door-
open" detector is somewhat precise (which is a realistic assumption, given the simplicity of
the event), the final false positive rate of the event is almost equal to the true positive rate.
In case the intrusion detection signal is not followed by anything, the probability of this
detection being correct is significantly reduced, as it implies a false negative condition for
the “door-open" signal. At the same time, for the second combination, the probability of a
true or false detection depends on the false positive rate of the “door-open" sensor.
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5.2 Bayesian Filter Model
In this section, an exact probabilistic dynamic model formulation is described, along with
the derivation of several important measures. It is assumed that the adversary is moving
within the graph as a random Markov walk. At one step, the adversary may move to the
neighbouring nodes of G. One may assume a uniform probability, but it is possible to embed
a “motivation" parameter, which could parametrise the transition matrix.
The formalised problem is an estimation of pt(vt , l|Dt0), which is the probability distribution
of the adversary’s position, given all detections obtained before and at moment t. To introduce
an “ongoing attack" probability, an additional node is added to G, as discussed in due course.
This family of models is referred to as Bayesian filters (BF), which is a baseline approach
for object tracking problems [12]. Considering the proposed formalisation of the dynamic
model, it may be considered as standard discrete-space tracking problem in the graph, hidden
Markov model (HMM).
5.2.1 Model Derivation
Here, the case of a single adversary is detailed. The derivation is carried out using the belief
propagation algorithm, which has an efficient implementation scheme for BF-type models:
namely, incremental recursive estimation of the probability distributions using Bayes formula.
The derivation relies on the probabilistic graphical model presented on 2.4. Hidden variables
of the model correspond to the positions of the adversary within the graph (described by
nodes of the graph), visible variables are the event detections. The goal is to derive a
constructive method for the estimation of the position of the adversary at time moment
t, given the observed detections at all times before t, detections obtained at time t, and
probability distribution of the position of the attacker at time t−1: p(vt−1|Dt−10 ).
The first step involves estimating a predictive distribution, which is then corrected using the
data observed at the current moment of time.
Consider the joint distribution of vt ,vt−1,Dt , given all detections before moment t, Dt−10 :
p(vt ,vt−1,Dt |Dt−10 ) = p(Dt |vt)p(vt |vt−1)p(vt−1|D
t−1
0 ) (5.1)
Therefore, “summing-out" the vt−1 variable, the probability distribution of vt is defined as:
p(vt |Dt0) ∝ p(Dt |vt) ∑
vt−1
p(vt |vt−1)p(vt−1|Dt−10 ) (5.2)
The term p(vt |vt−1) is assumed to be a pre-defined parameter of the model and is shortly
discussed in the introduction of 5.2. In order to finish the derivation, let us define the
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Equation 5.3 states that if the attacker is at node vt , the probability of the observed detections
Dt is defined as a product of following terms:
• Probabilities of false positive detection for all event detectors not at node vt but present
in Dt .
• Probabilities of true negative detection for all event detectors not at node vt but present
in Dt .
• Probabilities of true positive detection for all event detectors at node vt and present in
Dt .
• Probabilities of false negative detection for all event detectors at node vt and not
present in Dt .
Derived equation 5.2 and defined likelihood 5.3 allow to estimate the hidden variables of the
model at each time step (referred sometimes as “iteration of the model").
5.2.2 Optimal Assignment of Event Detectors
This subsection considers the issue of optimal event detector placement. Optimality is
defined in relation to the minimisation of the probability of an undetected attack. Two main
sub-models are considered:
• Model with no false positives: For this model, only missed attack minimisation is
performed.
• Model with false positives: For this model, we will consider an optimal event detector
placement for best false alert filtering with constraints on real attack detection.
Initially, a theoretical analysis of the proposed framework is performed.
5.2. Bayesian Filter Model 112
Theoretical Analysis of the Dynamic Model Framework
Let us consider the simplified model where no false or true positives are present. In addition,
in this model, no security controls exist. In such a scenario, we iterate the system state, as
presented before.
Let pt be a vector of p(vt |Dt0) for each node of the graph. The transition matrix A(l) is
defined by the structure of the graph such that each node of the graph defines a state in the
transition matrix. For correctness, we define one additional state (or an additional node) vna,
which corresponds to the condition where the attack has not started. This node is “connected"
to the entry nodes of the graph and has a self-transition probability ana, which defines the
probability that the attack will not start during the next time step. This node has no incoming
links from the rest of the nodes in the graph. Furthermore, we refer to the augmented state
vector pt ∈ Rn+1, where pt(vna), which is the probability of the adversary being at the
additionally introduced node (i.e., no attack is happening and no attack has occurred). At
that special node, no event detectors can be installed.
The formulas given in the previous section can be rewritten, for the simplified case considered
here, using matrix notation:
pt ∝ Γ∗A∗ pt−1 (5.4)
Here, matrix Γ is a diagonal matrix with components equal to the false negative probabilities
of detection for each node in the graph, which are defined as γ j j for node v j ∈ N.
Such an equation defines a recurrent definition of the state. We are interested in the static
distribution, which defines the probability of the adversary remaining undetected until a
given node in the graph, in case of an infinite observation period. One may define a “restricted"
area in the graph such that the probability of the adversary reaching that area undetected is
minimal. That subset may be related to some critical infrastructure area, where the system is
most vulnerable (e.g., a firewall-protected sub-network).
Therefore, we are interested in the formulation λ ∗ p=Γ∗A∗ p, which leads to the eigenvector
search for the matrix Γ∗A. Here, it is easy to show that the lemma given below holds, as the
proof below indicates.
Lemma 2. If pna 6= 0, then:
1. Matrix Γ∗A has an eigenvalue equal to ana.
2. If p is a stationary distribution and p(vna) 6= 0, then p is right-side eigenvector for the
eigenvalue ana.
Proof. The lemma is proven directly, using the properties of the matrices A and Γ.
1. First, we prove the first statement that Γ∗A has an eigenvalue equal to ana. Let us consider
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Figure 5.1: Propagation vs eigenvector component. It demonstrates the temporal
convergence to the limit pointed in the lemma.
the structure of matrices A and Γ. As stated previously, the additional “no-attack" node has
no incoming links and has a self-transition probability. This means that the last row of matrix
A has one non-zero entry at the diagonal, which is equal to ana. Γ is a diagonal matrix with
entries corresponding to vna equal to 1, and so the structure of the last row of Γ ∗A is the
same. Therefore, ana is a solution to the characteristic polynomial
det(Γ∗A−λ ∗ I) = 0
Therefore, ana is an eigenvalue.
2. Next, we prove the second statement of the lemma. Consider the stationary distribution
p, if it exists. Following the same idea as in the previous part of the proof, the component
corresponding to vna of the vector (Γ∗A∗ p) is equal to ana∗ pt(vna)= λ ∗ pt(vna). Therefore,
if p(vna) 6= 0, then it is correct that ana = λ .
Figure 5.1 outlines the evolution of pt(vna) through time with the corresponding component
of p(vna) with pna = 0.9 for the TPG from the previous sections. However, the previous
lemma only states the properties of the stationary distribution, which may not exist in a
general case. The analysis of its existence is considered to exceed the scope of this thesis.
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Impact of False Positive Events
We consider the model where event detectors may produce false positive events and no attack
is ongoing. Figure 5.2 provides an example of the behaviour of pt(vna) for the false positive
areas. One can see that the false events force pt(vna) to generate sudden drops, which rapidly
disappear (i.e., in 2-6 time steps). However, the value pt(vna) represents the probability that
the attack never started. Let us assume that the restricted area is defined as a 2-neighbourhood
of the SA nodes. If we consider the same values for the restricted area and the SAs, we can
state that:
• The baseline value for both of the areas is significantly higher than for vna. Thus, the
probability that the adversary is not at the restricted area is relatively high.
• The drops are significantly less wide and the probability of not being attacked is always
higher for the restricted area rather than for the full graph.
Let us analyse the proposed model. For a moment of time t, the current distribution of the
attacker’s appearance pt is defined by the sequence of matrices Γ0,Γ1, ...,Γt , where each
matrix Γi is diagonal and represents a list of probabilities of true or false positive detections
for each node, as derived earlier. Considering the expected value of pt , given the “no attack"







where the sum is taken over all possible configurations of values received from the event
detections at time t. Γ(Dt) represents the corresponding detection matrix for false or true
positives. In addition, Z(D, p) is the normalisation constant, which is computed as follows:
Z(D, p) = 1T Γ(D)Ap (5.6)
The expected distribution of the “no attack" case could be of benefit for attack detection
problems, as shown in the experimental section of the thesis.







Let us analyse the meaning of Ep. It is clear that the component related to vna describes
the probability of no ongoing attacks in the case that observed detections are sampled from
the distribution p(Dt |vna). For the rest of the nodes of the graph the interpretation is similar.
The component Ep(v) describes the (average) probability that the adversary manages to
5.2. Bayesian Filter Model 115
reach node v by producing a set of event detections that fit the distribution of false positive
reactions.
Due to the normalisation constant, the problem 5.7 cannot be converted into an eigenvalue
problem, as was done for the case with no false positives. The expectation on the right-hand
side of equation 5.7 might not be tractable, especially considering that the distribution over p
is discrete. This follows from the fact that p represents a transformation of the multinomial
binary distribution of the event detections. Therefore, an approximation of the random value
parameter is suggested, which can be performed in the manner described in the following
paragraphs.
Numerical Optimisation Techniques. To estimate E, it is possible to use numerical























Equation system 5.9 defines a system of non-linear equations that may not have an analytical
solution. For this reason, numerical solution methods can be applied.
One of the essential properties of the equation system 5.7 is that the number of equations
is equal to the number of variables. Therefore, it is possible to apply Newton’s method.
Newton’s method of equation system solution is equivalent to a minimisation of an auxiliary
function using iterative second-order descent. Obviously, if F(x) : Rn→ Rn, then
F(x) = 0 ⇐⇒ ‖F(x)‖2 = 0 (5.10)
where ‖∗‖ denotes the L2-norm of a vector. The overall iteration of the method is based on
the following first-order approximation:
‖F(x+δ )‖2 ≈ ‖F(x)+∇Fδ‖2 = ‖F(x)‖2 +2〈δ ,∇FT F(x)〉+ 〈∇Fδ ,∇Fδ 〉 (5.11)
where ∇F ∈ Rn×n. Assuming that the matrix is invertible, equating the derivative to zero
gives the update rule:
x := x+δ = x+(∇FT ∇F)−1∇FT F(x) = ∇FF(x) (5.12)
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Figure 5.2: Propagation of “non-attack" probability with false positives
However, it is sometimes the case that the Jacobian matrix might not be invertible. In this
case, the Levenberg-Marquardt method can be applied, in which the second-order term is
regularised:
δ = (∇FT ∇F +λ I)−1∇FT F(x) (5.13)
where λ is a regularisation constant.
For a numerical solution of 5.9, additional limitations should be considered. One is the fact
that the sum of the components of the solution is equal to 1. Another limitation is the non-
negativity of the components of the solution p. These limitations define a set of solutions
Θ = {p ∈ Rn+1|〈p,1〉= 1,∀i ∈ 1, . . . ,n+1, pi ≥ 0}.
Therefore, the update rule for the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm can be adjusted using the
gradient-projection method:
x := pro jΘ{x+δ} (5.14)
Projection to the set Θ is a quadratic programming problem, which can be solved using
standard tools.
The main drawback of the proposed approach is the need to compute the sum over all
possible configurations at each iteration. If the number of nodes and event detectors is large,
this action might be computationally expensive. Another drawback is that the derivation
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Figure 5.3: Ep approximation quality, difference between sample estimation and Levenberg-
Marquardt algorithm
of various statistics, which characterise the distribution of p, is complicated due to the
requirement to present the time-propagation equation of type 5.7 and its approximations
explicitly, as well as the gradients, and so on. The advantage of the method is its computational
stability, which stems from the fact that it is not dependent on the detector parameters.
Sampling. Another approach used to estimate the expected value and the distribution
of p (and other parameters) is the sampling method, in which the detections are generated
according to their false positive rates. To estimate the expected value (or, for that matter,
any other distribution parameter, such as variance or median), standard unbiased statistical
assessments can be applied.
The sampling method has a significant advantage compared to numerical optimisation. This
is because it does not require the summation over all possible configurations, which
significantly decreases the computational complexity for large-scale systems. At the same
time, variance of the estimator depends on the false positive probabilities. Assuming that the
central limit theorem conditions hold, the size of the confidence interval depends linearly on
the variance and decreases as a square root of the number of samples used for the estimation.
Therefore, if the probability of false positives is large, the estimation may require a large
number of samples. It may be possible to identify the exact number of samples using the
confidence interval method for an unknown variance. For the approximation of the overall
distribution of p, it is possible to apply density estimation methods such as kernel methods,
Gaussian mixture models, and others.
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Figure 5.4: Graph used for dynamic model simulations, where the entry point is labelled
with 0, and SA nodes range from 10 to 13
To evaluate the approaches for expected value approximation, numerical experiments were
conducted in a simulated environment. For this purpose, a simplistic TPG-graph was
constructed, consisting of 10 standard nodes and 4 SA nodes. A scheme for the graph is
shown in Figure 5.4.
The experimental results indicated that the quality of the approximation depends almost
linearly on the false positive rate of the sensors, as shown in Figure 5.3. Two metrics
are given, which describe the dissimilarity between the expected value obtained using the
Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm and the actual value obtained using sampling. One of the
metrics shows the maximal absolute difference between the components of the distribution,
while the second one represents the symmetric KL-divergence metric [12]. Monotonic
growth with no signs of saturation may suggest that the approximation quality suffers
significantly in case of large false positive rates of the sensors within the system. At the
same, for all tested false positive values, the maximal absolute difference criteria remained
within one sigma value (estimate).
Figure 5.5 demonstrates the projected samples of p over two SA nodes, as well as two
projected expected value approximations: firstly, the sampling method; and secondly, the
numerical method.
5.2.3 Attack Detection Method Assumptions
Proposed Bayesian filter model estimated the probability distribution of the attacker’s position
given the detections up to the current moment of time. Thus, this probability distribution pt
is a function of random values Dt0, so it is a random value itself. Using the approximations
of 5.7 it is possible to obtain some of the main statistics of the random variable of pt for
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Figure 5.5: Sample projection (blue dots) and Ep approximations for two methods:
Sampling (violet dot) and Levenberg-Marquardt (red dot)
the case of non-attacks happening, such as expected value and the variance. Estimation of
the probability distribution of pt for the case of an ongoing attack should define different
functions for different steps of the adversary. It can be performed in iterative manner.
Suppose an estimation is done for an attack described by a path in the graph
V = (v0,v1, . . . ,vM) that starts at time moment ts. For time ts + k the attacker moves to the
node vk, and the corresponding probability of observing detections Dts+k at different nodes
of the graph is defined by p(Dts+k|vk), as stated at 5.3.







A similar rule may be used to derive other relevant statistics. The formula is similar to the
static distribution of the system for the case of no attacks. However, it has a few important
key differences:
• The distribution is not static, and it evolves over time. Therefore, the inference should
be repeated for each time step separately.
• Probability distribution p(Dts+k|vk) is different for each step k.
Therefore, the structure of the distributions for the cases of ongoing attacks is more complex
than for the case of no attack ongoing.
A theoretically justified approach for attack detection would be to select such a path V that
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maximises the probability of previously observed data. However, such a solution would
require an estimation of distributions of pt (or relative statistics) for all possible attack paths
in the graph and comparing the observed values against those distributions at each moment
of time. This procedure is complex and theoretically expensive. For these reasons, within
the thesis, a simplified version of the attack detection mechanism is applied that analyses
the components of pt estimates related to the nodes of the graph, which are close to the
targets. The metric used to detect an ongoing attack at time moment t is a probability that
the adversary is present in one of the critical nodes of the graph, expressed by term 〈w, pt〉.
Here w is a vector of zeros and ones, w(v) = 1 if node v belongs to the critical section
of the graph. The critical nodes are defined by the user. Possibly, it can be the whole
graph without vna node. The key assumption of the model is that components of pt (except
for node vna) are significantly higher than Ep in 5.7 in case of an ongoing attack. This
assumption may be informally justified in the case of high true positive and low false positive
rates of the detectors, which may lead to a significant difference between the distributions
p(Dt+s|vk),vk ∈V and p(Dts+k|vna). This fact may be heuristically justified by the following
optimisation problems.
5.2.4 Optimal Event Detector Placement
In this section, the event detector placement optimisation problem is considered. It addresses
question 2 from the initial model formulation given at the beginning of this chapter. Let
us consider the vector Ep from 5.7 and it’s physical meaning. Intuitively, event detection
allocation problem should minimise the probability of the attacker reaching critical nodes
of the graph and producing a set of event detections indistinguishable from false positive
reactions.
The main assumption of the modelling mentioned in the previous section may be formally
translated to the optimisation process. If the probability of reaching node v with event
detections indistinguishable from false positives is minimised, an ongoing attack would
produce a completely different set of event detections that could be recorded by the system.
This is not direct proof for the proposed approach, but an informal justification. Attack
detection optimisation process is computationally complex and is not considered within the
current thesis for the reasons mentioned in the previous section.
Therefore, optimisation problem can be considered with respect to the two main objectives:
• Minimisation of the probability of a successful undetected attack (for static distribution).
• Minimisation of the impact of false events in terms of probability drops (i.e., variance
minimisation problem).
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Minimisation of Probability of Successful Non-detected Attack. Let us consider
the problem of minimal non-detection probability. The problem takes into account the static
distribution of the system with no false positive events, and it minimises the probability
of a successful attacker intruding into the restricted subset of nodes (similar to the critical
nodes, but may be a different subset). Such a subset of nodes within the graph is denoted as
w ∈ {0,1}|N|+1.
Denote the event detection placement within the graph by E. Thus, using the results of










where F(E)≤ G represents any arbitrary linear constraints over E (e.g., cost or deployment
limitations, maintenance costs, or business limitations).
By considering the case of a system with false positives, it is possible to conclude that
the evaluation of the expected value of p and the respective non-detection probability is
an iterative algorithm. This makes the evaluation of the loss-function non-trivial, and it
complicates the application of the standard gradient or corner-point methods. However, it is
possible to apply heuristic optimisation techniques, including evolutionary methods and the
simulated annealing method.
Minimisation of Impact of False Events in Terms of Probability Drops. This
quality function can be applied effectively in combination with the sampling probability
estimation method. This is because it requires both the information about the expected value














where the parameters wa and wv represent the weights of the expected value and the standard
deviation, respectively. To introduce a “physical meaning" into the optimisation function,
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Table 5.1: Initial attack detectors allocation and associated parameters
the following rules are suggested to be used for weight selection:
• The weight corresponding to ana should be non-positive, while the rest of the nodes,
especially the SA, should be non-negative.
• The weights of the variances should be set according to the following rule: ∀i ∈ [N +
1] wvi = nsigwai.
In this way, a lower bound of Epna + nsigDpna is maximised and the upper bound for the
remaining nodes Epi +nsigDpi is minimised.
The stated optimisation problem was tested on the same simulated TPG presented in Figure






The first term of the suggested optimisation function minimises an undetected attack
probability and is computed directly via the previously described eigenvalue approach. The
second term corresponds to the upper bound of the probabilities of the nodes, and it is
computed using the model with false positive detections. Given that the sampling approach
provides a means for variance estimation, it was applied to compute this part. Nodes [4, . . . ,9]
in the target function sum correspond to the set of nodes, which are directly connected to the
SA nodes of TPG.
Initial placement of attack detectors in the model was set as presented in Table 5.1. The
optimisation of the selected target function was performed over all possible replacement
of the existing event detectors within the graph nodes [1, . . . ,9]. Simulated annealing was
selected as an optimisation technique due to its simplicity.
For each iteration, Figure 5.6 demonstrates the evolution of the target function values
throughout the optimisation process. Due to the stochastic nature of the algorithm, the value
descent is not monotonic. However, simple replacement of the event detectors produced a
reduction of the upper bound (and, therefore, the false-positive impact) by more than 15%.
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Figure 5.6: Simulated annealing optimisation process of the target function








Table 5.2: Allocation of attack detectors and their parameters after optimisation
The produced event detector allocation is presented in Table 5.2 Figure 5.7 demonstrates
the change of the detection variance Dp for each node after applying computed allocation.
5.2.5 Attack Detection Algorithm
In this section, an algorithm for attack detection based on the derived Bayesian filter technique
is described. This algorithm is a heuristic that relies on the assumptions described in 5.2.3
and is validated over a cybersecurity dataset later in the next section.
The key idea of the proposed attack detection algorithm is that some “attacker presence"
probabilities pt in the graph nodes are significantly higher than Ep in case of an attack
happening.
The model assumes that a system with a set of event detectors is observed. The information
from the event detectors is streamed in real-time and the model analyses them and performs
an online two-class “attack/no attack" classification. The key steps of the algorithm
5.2. Bayesian Filter Model 124
Figure 5.7: Change of variance Dp after optimisation
initialisation are described in the following list.
• Build the TPG graph G for the system using the techniques described in 3. Add the
auxiliary node pna as explained at the beginning of this chapter.
• For each event detector within the system, assign it to a specific node within the graph.
Each event detector should be characterised by its false positive and true positive rates.
• Optional step: optimise event detection placement using the approach 5.2.4.
• Select a set of “critical nodes". A node is considered critical if the presence of an
attacker at a given node is unacceptable from the point of view of the security policy of
the organisation. This may be established because the TPG nodes have clear references
to specific physical/logical states of the system and adversary. For example, a specific
node may represent a state of “root access to a server", which may be considered
critical. This set is denoted by C.
• Estimate Ep for G and event detector assignment. These statistics could be estimated
using the techniques described in the previous sections.
• Assign the initial node probability state to its initial value p0. In the case when no
attack is expected to happen at the first iteration, the initial state could be selected as
p0,na = 1 and p0,v = 0 for the rest of nodes v in G.
After the initialisation of the algorithm is complete, online classification is performed in two
steps for each moment of time t.
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1. Obtain event detections Dt . Evaluate pt as given by 5.2.












Here (∗)+ stays for a function that returns the input value if the argument is positive and
0 if the argument is negative. th is an input parameter for the model, which could be
selected based on cross-validation, as shown in the next section. It may be selected based
on the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, which could be evaluated using attack
simulations.
The intuitive meaning of the rule 2 is that it measures the increase of the probability from
the expected one. If the total probability of the attacker’s presence within the critical area is
significantly higher than the expected assessments of the model, an attack flag is raised.
5.3 Model evaluation
Model evaluation was performed over the Intrusion Detection Evaluation Dataset 2017
(CICIDS2017) [58]. It is an open dataset available for download after filling the registration
form. This dataset contains some of the most up-to-date and commonly seen attacks, and so
it resembles real-world data (PCAPs). Additionally, the dataset includes the results of the
network traffic analysis using CICFlowMeter with data exchange flows formed as typical
machine learning feature vectors. Each recording (vector) includes the time stamp, source
and destination IPs, source and destination ports, and protocol and attack types (label).
For the CICIDS2017 dataset, the abstract behaviour of 25 users was simulated based on the
HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, SSH, and email protocols used for data exchange. The simulated attack
types included brute force FTP, brute force SSH, DoS, Heartbleed, Infiltration, Botnet, and
DDoS.
The following experiments were carried out over the selected dataset:
• Optimal event detector selection over limited resources.
• “Under attack" condition detection, based on the estimated variances of the attack flag.
At the moment of model development, there was a number of alternative datasets available
on Kaggle [65] or Zendoo [50]. However, CICIDS2017 had several important advantages.
• It had a proper description of the system with multiple hosts, where SRA is more
applicable compared to a single host network driver analysis like for Zendoo.
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• CICIDS2017 includes a machine learning dataset in the form of comma-separated
value files, which are convenient for detector training.
• It had raw network capture data that allowed for using additional non-ML event detectors,
as presented in section 5.3.3. This is not presented in most ML-driven cybersecurity
datasets like Kaggle.
In order to perform the experiments listed above, a TPG should be developed and additional
event detector types should be specified.
5.3.1 Dataset Description
The CICIDS2017 dataset consists of a recording of network activity logs for five sequential
working days (i.e., from Monday to Friday). The network topology includes a modem,
firewall, switches, and routers. Network nodes have a variety of operating systems, including
Windows, Ubuntu, and Mac OS X. During the recorded period of time, several attacks were
undertaken against the network. Information about the network state was logged for each
moment of time. In the experiments, the network consisted of an internal part (with two
servers), which was bridged to the external network.
The attacks came from two agents residing in the external network with known IP addresses
(for labelling simplicity). The dataset includes the following attack types:
• Brute force FTP attack using Patador Python script for brute force attacks. This type
of attack potentially grants access to the data on the FTP server, or some portion of it.
• Brute force SSH attack using Patador. This attack may grant control over the victim
machine, which – as before – is potentially partial depending on the installed policies.
• DoS attack using Slowloris and Slowhttptest tools. These tools implement “low and
slow" attack types that are not easily detectable and use low bandwidth. Hulk script
was also applied, which is easier to identify. Finally, the GoldenEye tool for security
testing was used to attack the network. The aim of this type of attack was to render a
specific service unavailable.
• Heartbleed attack (OpenSSL vulnerability) on port 444. The vulnerability is linked to a
bug in the OpenSSL implementation, which allows internal information to be obtained
from the server using so-called “heartbeat" messages.
• Various web attacks, including cross-site scripting (XSS), SQL injection, and brute
force attacks. These attacks types may grant partial access to the data on the machine
and partial control over the machine.
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• Infiltration attack. This type of attack exploits vulnerabilities in any applications
installed on the target machine. In the CICIDS2017 dataset, these applications are
Dropbox, Meta Exploit, Windows Vista, and Cool Disk for Mac. Depending on the
specific attack type, the attacker may achieve partial control over the machine and
partial data access.
• Botnet attacks using ARES, targeting IoT devices. These attacks operate using scans
for open debug bridges (usually Android devices, possibly virtual), as well as by
uploading malicious software to the corresponding devices. This software can
subsequently be used to recruit a device to the botnet, thereby gaining control over the
machine’s data or computational resources. Also, the botnet can be used to implement
a DoS attack against the given network, but this is not the case for the current dataset.
• Port scan. An attack that sends client requests to a range of server port addresses
on a host, trying to find an active port and, in turn, attempting to exploit a known
vulnerability associated with the service.
• Distributed DoS attack using LOIC application. This attack has the same approach
and same aim as DoS attack, but the flooding requests are sent from different hosts,
which complicates the counter-action that a defender must take.
The dataset contains the timing information for each attack type, as well as the data about
the IP addresses of the victims and attackers. The dataset is available on the following links:
• Dataset description form, where the dataset is explained and a download link is given.
• The dataset itself. Split into two parts: raw packet capture (pcap) files and pre-
processed machine learning dataset. The raw data contains the information about all
messages sent across the network. Machine learning dataset presents the information
about the network data exchange in an aggregated form of feature vectors.
5.3.2 Event Detectors
The application of machine learning (ML) models is now widespread as a strategy for
addressing cybersecurity and intrusion detection problems. For the proposed dataset, this
methodology is well-suited, as the data is provided in the format of feature vectors, which is
a classical input for ML model training.
The feature vectors are formed based on the available “*.pcap" files, which record network
packet traffic. This detailed information is aggregated into vector form using the
CICFlowMeter tool. Each vector corresponds to a communication session between two
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given network nodes, representing a set of characteristics (e.g., session duration, total packets
sent/lost). In total, 78 characteristics are measured. Each vector is labelled by a corresponding
attack type or by a normal behaviour label (“benight").
Considering data representation in CICDS2017, intrusion (event) detection can be formalised
as a classification problem. A classifier model forms a function from the input set X , which
is usually a Rn, to a finite set of output labels L. The training procedure can be formalised as
a function mapping of the training dataset D (usually represented by a set of feature vectors,
matrix) to a set of all classifiers [66]. This can be expressed as follows:
T : Rn×M→ (Rn→ L) (5.19)
Therefore, the recorded CICFlowMeter vector-form information can be used for ML-based
event detector input. Due to the localisation of the scope of the vector (as a characteristic
that describes a communication session only between two machines in the given period of
time), the resulting event detectors could be applied on a per-machine basis.
Classification Problem
To select suitable event detectors, several state-of-the-art classification models were considered,
including the following:
• Bagged decision trees or random forests
• Linear/kernel classifiers, support vector machines
• Neural networks
• Deep generative models
Detailed information about the quality of some of the most successful approaches is given
at section 5.3.3. It provides information about neural networks (NNs) and deep generative
models (DGMs) that achieve the best quality. Non-linear SVMs had incoherent convergence
and a large number of kernels in the decision function, for these reasons they were ruled out.
Bagged decision trees achieved significantly lower quality in both false positive and true
positive rates compared to deep learning approaches. This result is aligned with the current
state-of-the-art in ML, as in the last decade, NNs have grown significantly in popularity,
showing top results in different ML contests in various domains. DGMs represent a “mixture"
of NN models and probability distribution approximations by Bayesian inference. Therefore,
for the validation of the dynamic model, NN-type classifiers were considered in this thesis.
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One-class Classification
Another approach, similar to classification, which is applicable for the domain, is known as
anomaly detection (often denoted “one-class" classification). Anomaly detection is widely
applied to security and safety problems, including the field of cybersecurity. This class of
models aims to distinguish “normal" system behaviour from abnormal behaviour, which
displays outliers. For the CICDS2017 dataset, a possible application of one-class classifiers
is to assume that the vectors with the “benight" label constitute a normal class, while all
the vectors labelled by any attack type are considered outliers. The training of one-class
classifiers does not require training over anomaly examples, which stems from the fact that
the methodology creates a model only for the normal data and measures the deviation from
that. This limitation decreases the precision of the modelled distribution of normal data, but
it can capture anomalies (attack types for CICDS2017) that are not represented in the dataset.
This leads to a potentially higher capacity to generalise [10].
In the scope of the selection of ML-driven event detectors, several of the most common types
of one-class classifiers were tested: one-class SVMs, compression NNs, independent or
principal component analysis, and variational auto-encoders. The tests demonstrated that the
quality of the one-class models was significantly lower compared to regular classifiers. The
best result was achieved with a variational auto-encoder, which had an attack detection rate of
45% and a true negative rate of 95%. However, these results are significantly outperformed
by the classical classification model. Therefore, despite the potentially high generalisation
capability, further consideration of one-class classification models was ruled out in this
thesis.
Classification Neural Networks
NN models represent a construction concept for parametric models, where a superposition
of linear (weights or convolution) and non-linear (activation) functions are alternated. This
pair is often named as a layer. Formally, a neural network can be represented as follows:
F = fn ◦Wn ◦ fn−1 ◦Wn−1 ◦ . . . f1 ◦W1 (5.20)
where n denotes the number of layers, and ◦ denotes a superposition operator.
The term “model training" refers to an optimisation of the loss function over the training
dataset by the model parameters. Usually, the loss function is designed to be an upper bound
of the error of the model over the dataset. In the case of NN models, optimisation is usually
performed over the parameters Wi, while the rest of the parameters are considered to be
fixed, or they are selected during cross-validation (i.e., hyper-parameters). NN training is
usually based on different adaptations of stochastic gradient descent [29], when the partial
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derivatives of the model are computed using the back-propagation algorithm.
Classification NNs are usually trained using cross-entropy criteria (CEC). CEC is a non-
symmetric difference measure between two probability distributions, defined over the same





In the case of the discrete probability distribution domain, as is the case for classification
problems, the integral is replaced by a sum. For each classification sample x ∈ Rn, the
classification NN output defines a probability distribution q(y|x) = F(y,x), where y ∈ L
represents a label of the output class. For the training samples (xi,yi) ∈ D, the target
distribution may be defined as a one-hit vector oh(yi) ∈ {0,1}|L|, which represents the





This type of loss function accumulates (or averages) the cross-entropy loss over the whole
dataset D.
Deep Generative Models
Generative models represent a family of methods that can be used to learn a data distribution
using unsupervised learning. Generative models are widely applied in transfer learning,
data sampling, and anomaly detection [29]. All types of generative models aim to learn
the data distribution of the training set, and the typical application of the trained model is
the possibility to generate samples. The main difference between the standard approaches
for data distribution approximation is an application of NNs, which ensures the capacity to
handle complex interdependencies in the data.
Two of the most commonly used and efficient approaches are variational autoencoders (VAEs)
and generative adversarial networks (GANs). VAE training typically aims to maximise the
lower bound of the data log-likelihood [38], whereas GANs aim to achieve equilibrium
between the generator and discriminator [30]. However, as mentioned before, the one-
class classification approaches did not yield high-quality results in processing CICDS2017.
For this reason, it is necessary to consider a model that can be extended to a standard
classification task. Such an extension is further demonstrated for VAEs.
Standard VAEs are trained so as to project high-dimensional data X to a latent space consisting
of a smaller number of dimensions T . The concept is based on the maximisation of the
likelihood of the training set P(D) of independent data samples and simultaneous training
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of the projection. This is performed in a way that is similar to the expectation-maximisation
algorithm derivation (i.e., using log-likelihood decomposition), as shown below.
log(P(D)) =
∫


















The term KL denotes the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, which is a positive dissimilarity
measure between two probability distributions. In certain special cases, it is equivalent (but
not equal) to the CEC.
Therefore, considering the non-negativity of the KL divergence, the following lower bound
can be derived from 5.23:








−KL(q(T |D)||p(T )) (5.24)
The inequality becomes an equality if q(T |D) = p(T |D). Furthermore, q is named as an
approximate latent variable distribution.
In VAE, two models are trained simultaneously, as shown below:
• The approximate distribution q(T |D) is defined as an NN with parameters θ : qθ (T |D).
• The distribution p(D|T ) is modelled using an NN with parameters φ , pφ (D|T ).
• The assumption is made that the dataset is independent such that, if D = {x1, . . . ,xM},
then p(D,T ) = ∏Mi=1 p(xi, ti). The same assumption applies for q(T |D) and p(T ).
• The distribution p(T ) is fixed, in continuous cases usually zero-mean Gaussian.
• The expectation taken over T at 5.24 is usually approximated using Monte-Carlo (MC)
methods, by sampling from the corresponding distribution q(T |D). Often, the so-
called “one-shot" strategy is used for gradient calculation, when just a single sampled
item is used for the approximation at each iteration. Thus, for gradient calculation
purposes, the lower bound for a sample xi is transformed into the following:
E(xi,θ ,φ) = ∑
tki ∼q(t|xi)
(
log(p(xi|tki ))− log(q(tki |xi))+ log(p(tki ))
)
(5.25)
Following the points above, the typical process for VAE training involves selecting a batch
from the dataset D, selecting sample latent variables for each data instance from the batch,
computing the loss and gradients of E with respect to θ ,φ using equation 5.25, and performing
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the optimisation step (i.e., any type of gradient descent).
The described method is suited for distribution approximation problems, but not for
classification. In classification tasks, the training samples are represented by pairs (xi,yi).
To enable the classification using VAE, the following assumptions are made:
• The variables xi and yi are conditionally independent given the corresponding latent
variable ti, i.e. p(xi,yi|ti) = p(xi|ti)p(yi|ti)
• The approximate distribution q(ti|xi,yi) depends only on xi, and not on yi.
Therefore, the sampled batch loss function 5.25 is transformed as follows:
E(xi,yi,θ ,φ) = ∑
tki ∼q(t|xi)
(






log(p(xi|tki ))+ log(p(yi|tki ))− log(q(tki |xi))+ log(p(tki )
) (5.26)
The term E obtained at 5.26 defines the loss function for the classification VAE and can
be used during training. All the distributions are defined in the same way as given in the
explanations before 5.25. The term p(yi|tki ) is modelled using classification NN.
Due to the stochastic nature of the model, which stems from the use of MC sampling for each
training batch, the convergence is slower than for standard NN models. To overcome this
problem, a novel Nesterov-type gradient descent algorithm was applied, which is known as
LAMB [73]. This algorithm stabilises the training batch variance and speeds-up the training
process.
5.3.3 Results and Discussion
In this subsection, the experimental results over the CICDS2017 dataset are presented. At
the outset, the quality of two selected event detectors, classification NN and VAE, is detailed.
After that, the results of the application of the dynamic model over these event detectors are
presented.
Quality Measurement
In this work, standard event detection quality measures were used (i.e., false positive rate,
true positive rate, precision, and area under the ROC-curve, or AUC).
Quality measurement was performed via cross-validation with 10 iterations. At each iteration,
the overall dataset was split into two parts: a training set (70% of the data) and a test set
(30% of the data). The partition was performed randomly, but the following restrictions
were considered:
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Figure 5.8: ROC curve for attack detection of classification neural network and variational
autoencoder
• To balance the training and testing for different classes, the partition was performed
individually for each attack type (and “benight" data for each date independently).
Therefore, for each attack type, 70% of the samples were assigned to the training set,
and the remainder were assigned to the test set.
• The vector type data in the dataset are presented in chronological order. Therefore,
temporal dependency cam be considered for processing, which is a feature of the
dynamic model. Also, the vectors representing close moments of time are situated
proximately in the feature space. Training and testing over close data samples may
bias the error assessment, leading to lower error rates on the training set due to data
homogeneity. Therefore, the training and testing partition was established by selecting
random sequences of data from different moments in time.
Event Detector Performance
Figure 5.8 presents detailed performance results for the selected models in terms of event
detection (i.e., only “attack" and “no attack" classification). The figure also represents the
ROC curves for both models, as built over the test samples.
As indicated in the graph, the average detection quality was high for both models, achieving
more than 97% detection rate with less than 1% false positives. Precision and recall values
for the fixed false positive rate of 3% are presented in Table 5.3.
The results demonstrated that VAE performance was less favourable compared to NN
in terms of the average detection rate. However, this representation misses the per-label
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Model AUC Recall True Positive Rate Precision
Variational Autoencoder 0.991859 0.969999 0.938469 0.984691
Classification Neural Network 0.998750 0.969999 0.996006 0.998992
Table 5.3: General precision metrics for selected models










0.864333 0.981523 1.0 0.999646
Web Attack XSS 0.9492386 0.990792 1.0 0.999397
Web Attack SQL
Injection
1.0 0.995415 0.363636 0.9205171
DDoS 0.998646 0.999595 0.9998958 0.9999207
Port Scan 0.9985727 0.99971 0.9999790 0.9999817
DoS Slowloris 0.912119 0.987601 0.9954049 0.998552
DoS Slowhttptest 0.9981862 0.998693 0.9915356 0.9948188
DoS Hulk 0.97460855 0.99608 1.0 0.9999713
DoS GoldenEye 0.9854274 0.997484 1.0 0.9999833
Heartbleed 0.83333334 0.881489 0.6666667 0.8798783
Infiltration 0.72727273 0.959772 0.18181818 0.8998308
Port Scan 0.997964067 0.999182 0.99995802 0.9998049
BotNet 0.255499 0.899293 0.983079 0.992576
SSH-Patador 0.457110 0.930525 0.987020 0.995782
FTP-Patador 0.998323 0.998343 0.903983 0.989259
Table 5.4: Per-attack precision metrics for selected models
classification quality, which is given in Table 5.4.
As shown in the table, VAE outperformed NN for several attack types. It is essential to
mention that these attack types were represented with a small number of samples in the
training dataset. Comparison of tables 5.4 and 5.3 serves as empirical evidence that the NN
classifier requires more balanced data, and might not be resilient to imbalanced datasets. NN
biases its results to classes that are better presented in the dataset, which results in a higher
average precision. At the same time, VAEs still can be used for the detection of attacks that
have smaller representation in the data.
Dynamic Model Preparation
In this sub-section, the preliminary steps required for optimal event detector allocation and
computation of the “under attack" probability are presented. TPG is also developed based
on the topology of the network used for dataset generation.
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Target System Description. TPG development depends on network topology to ensure
effective security and protection. In the CICDS2017 dataset, there are two main components
in the network: “trusted" or “victim" internal network with an IP range of “192.168.10.*";
and secondly, an external network with the attacker’s machines (referred to as the "attacker
network") with an IP range of “205.174.165.*". In this thesis, the attackers are referred
to as Kali, who was operating from “205.174.165.73", and Win, who was operating from
“205.174.165.69", “70", and “71".
The victim network has two machines with public IPs:
• Web Server 16 Public: 192.168.10.50 and 205.174.165.68
• Ubuntu Server 12 Public: 192.168.10.51 and 205.174.165.66
The victim network consisted of 12 machines in total, each running a different operating
systems: Windows Vista, 7, 8.1, 10; Ubuntu server, 14.4, 16.4; and Mac OS X. Thus,
different vulnerabilities could be exploited against different machines.
The network firewall operates with the IP address of 205.174.165.80. The other machines
in the victim network are introduced while describing attack scenarios. Most attacks target
public servers (e.g., web DoS attacks), but the infiltration attack in the recorded data targets
all machines inside the victim network by operating in two steps: firstly, a vulnerability on
the target machine is exploited, granting control over some machine functions; and secondly,
by using the victim’s machine, an attack on the rest of the hosts in the network can be
performed using a trusted IP.
TPG development was accomplished by following the methodology presented in the previous
chapter. The main difference is that, in this case, there was no impact minimisation task,
meaning that the impact matrix definition was omitted.
Definition of PA, SA , as well as the links between them. As the network for the
dataset is defined generically, with no explanation of the primary purpose of the activity,
the assumption was made that each machine on the network had its own specific role and
served a dedicated function. Therefore, the high-level PA could be defined as “Data on
Host" (DoH) and “Operations on Host" (OoH). DoH denotes all the sensitive or operation-
related non-public information stored on the corresponding machine. OoH is related to
the possibility that the specific function of the machine will become operational. In this
context, the SAs were also defined in a high-level way, and this occurred independently
for each host in the victim network. The SAs for each host were DoH (repeating the
corresponding PA), Command and Control (CCo), and Computational Capacity (CCa). CCo
was considered independently from CCa, as it may serve as an enabler for a sequential attack
using the controlled host (e.g., infiltration attack), while the second one may serve just for
the degradation of the OoH.
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Threat Scenario Definition. In the proposed TPG model, all the CICDS2017 attack
types were presented in the threat scenarios. Each attack type was considered independently
as follows:
• DoS and DDoS attacks in the dataset were presented only against the public IPs
despite the fact that, in a general case, these attacks can be performed against the
host machines within the victim network. However, this can be performed against
the internal network only after gathering access to the network via NAT procedures
associated with the firewall or any other method. By contrast, public machines can
be attacked without preliminary conditions. The TPG is constructed in a way that
take the indicated sequence of actions into account. The targeted SA for each host is
CCa. Attacks of these types are denoted further as DoSGoldenEye, DoSHulk, DoSsht (for
Slowhttptest), DoSsl (for slowres), DDoS. In general, this family of attacks is denoted
as DoS.
• The representation of web attacks in the TPG followed the same approach as was the
case with DoS. This implies an assumption that each host is running an instance of
a specific type of web server. The information about running services is not given
explicitly in the dataset, and therefore it is assumed that each host could be a victim.
All SAs related to a host form a set of potential targets. Attacks of these types are
denoted as WAXSS, WABF , WASI (for Sql Injection), or WA in general.
• Infiltration attacks. Targets all hosts, but could be performed after additional
information is gathered via preliminary attack (e.g., via web attack or Heartbleed
attack). It may target all SAs associated with a given host. This type of attack is
denoted as In f .
• Brute force SSH attack and FTP attacks are possible against any host. For simplicity,
it is assumed that an FTP server is running only on the machine with IP 192.168.10.50.
The SSH attack targets all the SAs of a host, while the FTP targets only DoH. These
two attacks are defined by BFssh and BFf t p, BF for the family.
• Heartbleed attack may target any machine with a service using OpenSSL library, and
which is accepting incoming connections. Therefore, all hosts are supposed to be
vulnerable to this attack type. The attack can be performed under the same conditions
as the DoS attack. It targets the DoH, and it is denoted as HB.
• Port scan targets all hosts after a firewall NAT process. As the dataset does not detail
an exact vulnerability used by port scan, a raw “*.pcap" data was used to identify the
nature of the attack. According to “*.pcap" files from the dataset, the attacker machine
was sending an “nmap" command to the victim machines, which identifies open ports
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and (possibly) the name of the corresponding running service. Therefore, this type of
attack targets the DoH SA type but mainly serves as an enabler for other attack types.
It is denoted as PS.
• Botnet attacks are possible against all hosts running a specific type of debug bridge. In
the dataset, the attacks are not limited just to one host, but to all Windows machines:
Windows 10 192.168.10.15, Windows 7 192.168.10.9, Windows 10 192.168.10.14,
Windows 8 192.168.10.5, and Windows Vista 192.168.10.8. Therefore, the assumption
was drawn that these machines are vulnerable to these types of attack. This attack
targets all SAs, and it is denoted by BN.
The SAs for the non-expanded graph are denoted by type of asset (DoH, CCa, CCo) and the
IP address (e.g., DoH(192.168.10.51)). An additional type of attack, which is related to the
NAT process on the firewall, is denoted as NAT P.
TPG Construction. By considering the set of proposed threats, it is important to analyse
the prerequisites for each attack against each node. Attacks that exploit certain vulnerabilities
may require knowledge of specific credentials. For instance, an infiltration attack using
Dropbox requires a an upload of CCo software to the victim machine via synchronisation
with cloud storage. These credentials can be obtained from a centralised password
management tool using another attack (e.g., the Heartbleed or web attacks).
For the reasons stated above, the TPG was constructed using the sequential attack
methodology described in the previous chapter, namely the application of SATAA and M-
SATAA. As noted in the description of M-SATAA, a set of attack pairs and graphs should
be defined. Since the sequential attack algorithms are applied over the extended graph, a
denotation over the set of extended SAs should be introduced. The naming follows the
following structure {A}−{SAT}(IP)
, where A represents the attack type acronym, SAT denotes the SA type acronym, and IP
specifies the targeted host. The set of internal hosts is defined by IPINT , while public hosts
are denoted as IPPUB.
The sequences of attacks are described above in the threat scenario definition. It is assumed
that the NAT process is not detectable and does not require any pre-requisites. This
assumption was made because the process is not outlined or found in the labelled vector
dataset, and it is not obviously identifiable in the “pcap" data. Therefore, it was excluded
from the scope of the assessment. The formalisation of the attack sequences is presented in
the following list:
• As a first step, it is necessary to identify the attacks with no pre-conditions. Let us
denote PEXT = {A− t(A)(ip)|A ∈ DoS∪WA∪BF ∪PS∪HB, ip ∈ IPPUB, t ∈ T (A)}.
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Here, T (A) represents all SA types targeted by the corresponding attack type A. The
first item in the list is defined as {( /0,(NAT P∪PEXT ,G1)}. It was impossible to retrieve
any signs of communication between the firewall and the attacker’s IPs in the “*.pcap"
file. Therefore, the part of the graph related to NAT P is trivial. The rest of the attacks
were performed against the public IPs.
• Let us define PINT = {A− t(A)(ip)|A ∈ DoS∪WA∪ BF ∪ PS∪HB, ip ∈ IPINT , t ∈
T (A)}. Then the second item in the list is {(NAT P,(PINT ,G2)}. Attacks against
internal IPs are possible after the firewall NAT procedure is performed.
• Additional sequential attacks against public hosts are introduced as follows:
({PS−DoH(ip)|ip ∈ IPPUB},({BN− t(ip)|ip ∈ IPPUB, t ∈ T (BN)},Gebn) (5.27)
Botnet attack after a port scan:
({A−DoH(ip)|ip ∈ IPPUB,A ∈WA∪BF},
({In f − t(ip)|ip ∈ IPPUB, t ∈ T (In f )},Gein f )
(5.28)
An infiltration attack follows after WA, HB, or BF attacks.
• Sequential attacks against internal network hosts, constructed in the same way as for
the public network part:
({PS−DoH(ip)|ip ∈ IPINT},({BN− t(ip)|ip ∈ IPINT , t ∈ T (BN)},Gibn) (5.29)
For a botnet attack after PS. Sequential attack structure for infiltration is as follows:
({A−DoH(ip)|ip ∈ IPPUB,A ∈WA∪BF},
({In f − t(ip)|ip ∈ IPINT , t ∈ T (In f )},Giin f )
(5.30)
Here, it is assumed that the data stored on the public machines might be used for an
attack against the internal network machines (which is an obvious vulnerability), but
this explains the sequence of attacks given in the dataset and gives an opportunity to
demonstrate the sequential attack scenario application using TPG.
To finalise the definition of TPG, it is necessary to define the graphs from the attack sequences
described above: G1 and G2 for the public and internal attacks, and Gebn, Gein f ,Gibn,andGiin f
for different types of sequential attacks.
The general approach for constructing the graph assumes that the set of steps needed to
perform a given attack against each host is similar. This assumption is postulated partly
due to a lack of information about the services running on different machines. The data
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Figure 5.9: TPG for NAT Process. Here, an additional SA is introduced, representing a
consistency of the firewall rules.
about network topology and the nature of attacks provides the information required for attack
sequence definition, but no additional details are given. The rest of the data is organised in
the form of vectors, describing the communication sessions between two hosts.
Each attack type is described separately in the next paragraphs. In turn, the overall graph is
constructed.
NAT Process on Firewall. As mentioned previously, the dataset does not contain any
records about the NAT processes on the firewall presented in vector or in “pcap" format. For
this reason, the graph is kept trivial. It is presented as an entry node, the sequential node
representing the execution of the procedure, and the SA. As no information is given, it is
assumed that no event detectors are deployed in this case. This makes the condition of the
experiment more complicated as, in reality, it is possible to analyse the logs and events at the
service. The corresponding graph is presented in Figure 5.9.
Brute Force Attacks: SSH and FTP . The target of this attack is to gain access to the
host machine via sequential login attempts using semi-random credential generation. The
SSH attack grants access to the machine on the level of the corresponding user. In this
experiment, all the users are assumed to be “sudoers" (which is to say, they have admin
rights).
Therefore, the first action after the start of an attack is a login request to the system using
the Patador script. SSH access is usually protected by a password, which can be considered
a security control. The next step involves gaining control over the system. In turn, for each
type of asset, an additional abstract action is added.
The graph for an FTP attack has the same structure, given the limited set of SAs under attack.
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Figure 5.10: TPG for brute force SSH attack against predefined host
Figure 5.11: TPG for brute force FTP attack against predefined host. The distinguishing
feature compared to the SSH TPG is that there exists only one SA, DoH.
DoS Attacks. This set of attacks targets the CCa of the victim host. The attack is
organised in the form of launching a specific script and performing an attack. Therefore,
the graph has three different simple paths from the entry point to the corresponding SA of
the victim host. Each path has two main steps: script launch and pre-SA node. Figure 5.12
represents the graph for DoS attack.
It should be noted that, for the case of a DDoS attack that is executed after a botnet attack,
the graph might be different. However, this case is omitted from consideration as it is not
presented in the experiment’s dataset.
Heartbleed Attack. A Heartbleed attack occurs when requests are sent to services on
victim machines, thereby leading to the acquisition of pseudo-random information stored in
the machine’s memory. To execute this attack, the “heartbeat" OpenSSL message is sent to
the services of the machine, usually running on port 443. The graph targeting a specific host
is considered to be trivial, and it is represented as in 5.13, which is as follows:
• Start node
• Node, representing a communication “heartbeat" exchange between the attacker and
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Figure 5.12: TPG for DoS attack against predefined host. Targeted SA: CCa
Figure 5.13: TPG for Heartbleed attack against predefined host. Targeted SA: DoH
the victim machines
• Node, representing the acquisition of relevant information (pre-SA node)
• DoH SA node
Web Attacks. For each type of web attack, it is necessary to detail the graph structure
independently given that the approach differs. Additionally, the sequence of actions involved
in each attack depends on the targeted service, which influences the TPG construction process.
To obtain more details about the victim services, “pcap" data was used as a reference in the
present experiment. For all cases, communication was undertaken using HTTP with no SSL
encryption, and so it was possible to obtain information.
• Brute-force web attack is the simplest example. It targets to perform authentication
on target web-server. Construction of the graph is based on the recorded data, as it
depends on the specifics of the targeted web server. Brute force-related “pcap" files,
as well as the vector representation of the data, indicate that the attack was recorded as
a communication session between the victim machines and the firewall (external IP).
The communication session targeted port 80 and contained the scripts “login.php" and
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Figure 5.14: Joint TPG for 3 different types of WA after applying M-SATAA. SA naming
preserves the formalism introduced in the algorithm description.
the image “login.png", along with POST requests with content “username=admin",
and so on. Therefore, it is assumed that the attacker made a login attempt to the
protected webpage. As no additional information is given, it is assumed that the
targeted SA is DoH. The implementation of the graph is the same as it is for FTP
BF attacks.
• SQL injection attacks target data-driven applications by inserting malicious SQL code
for execution. In the “pcap" data, attacks against the server are represented by the
concatenation of SQL expression to the parameters of the GET requests (requesting
information about usernames and passwords in the database). Therefore, it is assumed
that the attack is performed against a web application, targeting internal host data. The
attack is represented as a path from 3 nodes: start, communication session, DoH.
• XSS attacks usually target user web applications by sending malicious scripts in
requests. Again, the nature of the attack depends on the targeted service or infrastructure.
In the “pcap" data, the communication session for the attack is represented in the
form of GET HTTP requests, which contain the script in the request’s parameters.
Corresponding replies contained a list of sites. Therefore, it is assumed that the XSS
attack is targeting the web application data stored on the host. The attack is represented
as a path from 3 nodes: start, communication session, and DoH.
By considering the exact sequence of attacks performed in the dataset, it is assumed that
the SQL injection and XSS attacks are only possible after the brute force attack against the
server. Therefore, the joint graph for a sequential attack (after the application of M-SATAA)
is prepared for the whole WA family, as shown in Figure 5.14.
Infiltration. This attack has a preparatory stage, which aims to obtain information about
potentially vulnerable services. In the dataset, the In f attack is performed using Dropbox
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Figure 5.15: TPG for infiltration attack against predefined host. Targets all types of SAs.
vulnerability, that allows uploading CC software on the synchronised machines. To achieve
this, the corresponding Dropbox credentials are needed. After obtaining the credentials, the
attack is undertaken in several sequential steps:
• Upload CC software to the user account and wait for it to synchronise on the victim
machine.
• CC auto-launches on the victim machines and allows external communication.
• Obtain control over the machine (all SAs under possible attack).
All these actions are represented in the corresponding graph given in Figure 5.15.
Port Scan. A portscan attack shall be performed against the machine, which considers
the attacker machine to be from the trusted network. The attacker actions are consecutive.
Therefore, the corresponding TPG is constructed as a simple path, consisting of start node,
“nmap" node, pre-SA node, and DoH SA node.
Botnet. This attack is performed after the PS attack. As this attack type is not presented
in the validation scenario, TPG construction is trivial. Otherwise, the construction process
depends on the exact type of vulnerability exploited for each service. In this scenario, the
BN attack has a trivial representation with three linearly connected nodes: start node, attack
execution, pre-SA node, and SAs. The TPG structure is the same as in the case of the
infiltration attack, as illustrated in Figure 5.15.
Overall Graph Construction Process. The sub-graphs required for the construction
of the joint attacks include the following:
• The graph G1 is constructed as a union of three graphs: NAT process graph, and graphs
from PEXT attacks against both public IPs.
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Figure 5.16: High-level view of TPG for CICDS2017dataset
• The graph G2 is constructed in the same way as G1, but with no NAT P attack. It uses
the attack graphs against all internal hosts defined by PINT .
• The remaining graphs are directly mapped to the corresponding attack types for each
vulnerable host.
The final extended TPG was constructed using the previously defined sequential attack
lists, the sub-graphs for each attack type, and M-SATAA. The resulting graph was used to
validate the dynamic model. It is important to stress that semi-automatic graph construction
procedures, such as M-SATAA, are crucial for TPG development. This is because the
resulting model tends to be large (but sparse). The TPG for the CICDS2017 dataset consists
of 422 nodes in total.
The resulting TPG structure is presented in Figure 5.16, giving a high-level illustration of
the model. Two main sub-models are obviously visible: the sparse structure at the lower-left
part of the graph represents the G1, while the dense circle part shows that G2. G2 is centred
around the NAT attack, which gives access to all attacks against the internal network.
Dynamic Model Application
Two event detectors detailed in the previous section were used: VAE and NN. They were
deployed at different nodes of the TPG. As the TPG structure defines explicitly the
corresponding type of attack for each node, the parameters of the event detection placements
(false positive and false negative detection rates) were defined as shown in Table 5.4. In
this experiment, there were no additional event detectors apart from the listed ones (for
example, SSH authorisation event could serve as such). This can be attributed to the lack
of information in the dataset “pcap" data. For this reason, each host had only one possible
event detection placement node, which was related to the network communication action of
the attack.
For the validation of the dynamic model, three possible event detection setups were compared:
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• Random event detector allocation among the graphs.
• Optimised event detector allocation using the simulated annealing algorithm.
• General network analyser with no specific allocation. It is equivalent to the application
of the data mining model directly to the feature vector type of data.
To carry out the comparison, it was necessary to derive the optimised allocation.
Optimal Event Detector Placement. Optimisation of event detector allocation was
undertaken using simulated annealing allocation. The computation of the static distribution
was achieved using the sampling approach, where the rationale for this stemmed from the
fact that the numerical optimisation was too slow on the available computational resources.
The target function was defined in a way, similar to 5.17 in order to balance the probability
of an undetected attack with the false positive detections. Initial allocation of event detectors
for the simulated annealing algorithm was selected randomly.
The “adaptation" part of the simulated annealing algorithm was modified to fit the size of the
problem. At each iteration, two types of modification were applied several times in order to
derive from the current “optimal" allocation, as detailed below:
1. Move a random existing event detector from the current node to a different “free" node.
2. Select a random node with a detector and change the detector’s type.
The “adaptation" part of the algorithm demonstrated that the number of event detectors
remained the same, while only the placement changed. The number of applications of
the listed modifications decreased at each iteration as O( 1√n), where n denotes the iteration
number. At step 0, modifications were applied 150 times. Overall, the optimisation procedure
had 1,500 iterations. Figure 5.17 outlines the typical behaviour of the optimisation algorithm
when a fast function decreased at the beginning and slowed down as the number of iterations
increased. There is no standard approach for the selection of the number of iterations, but
several heuristics exist. For this current experiment, the number of iteration was fixed to
1,500, which is a compromise in terms of the time and the achieved result. As the experiment
sought to show the added value of the proposed optimisation procedure compared to “general
network analyser" and random allocation, even a sub-optimal solution was considered to be
acceptable for the purpose.
By considering different components of the target function, the following behaviour was
observed:
• The undetected attack probability did not fall, and it increased slightly at the end of
the optimisation procedure, as shown in Figure 5.19.
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Figure 5.17: Event detector placement optimisation process for CICDS2017
• The variance upper bound probability dropped significantly at the initial stages of the
optimisation and, in general, resembled the fall of the target function.
The fact that the undetected probability did not fall for the optimised allocation may be
considered a form of trade-off behaviour when more sensitive event detectors (with lower
false negative rate and higher false positive rate) were replaced with detectors with fewer
false positives and true positives. This replacement resulted in a lower variance of the static
distribution and led to a better attack detection capability of the model, as shown in the next
paragraph. Lower false positive rates allow using lower probability confidence thresholds
for overall attack detection, which neutralises the effect of the increased undetected attack
probability.
Under Attack Probability Evaluation. This was undertaken by analysing the behaviour
of the event detections coming from the NN and VAE model, allocated in the developed TPG
graph. An algorithm for attack detection described in subsection 5.2.5 is applied.
Model instantiation phases related to graph construction and event detector set definition are
described in subsections 5.3.3 and 5.3.2 correspondingly.
The metric used for attack detection was the 1− pna probability of the dynamic model for
two allocations: random and optimised. Such a selection of a metric is equivalent to defining
the critical set of nodes C as all nodes of the graph except vna. This way, the function 2 is
fully-defined except from the threshold th. In order to avoid static selection of threshold and
observe various combination of true and false positive rates, the ROC curve is analysed. A
comparison with fixed event detectors (VAE and NN) was given, as if these models would
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Figure 5.18: “Under attack" detection ROC curves CICDS2017
be applied without TPG at all, similar to standard ML algorithms over vector data.
In the experimental data, the attacker performed two main types of attack against the system:
WA, as described in the section above, and INF attack sequentially. For each data vector
from the machine learning dataset, it was possible to evaluate the response of each of the
detectors (if deployed on the given host). In this way, the attack probability for each node of
the TPG could be calculated. The VAE and NN models were configured such that the true
positive and false positive detection probabilities were the same as those given in Table 5.4.
The quality of attack detection was compared using ROC curves, as shown in figure 5.18.
The false positive reaction probability fell dramatically compared to the application of general
network analysis. The false positive probability for each event detector was fixed at 3%,
while the aggregated rate of false reactions was only a fraction of a percent. This can be
explained by the fact that the significant part of the false events was recorded for attacks
that succeeded a different type of attack, which was not recorded beforehand. Therefore, the
detection did not fit into the “temporal context" of all recorded events.
At the same time, the true positive detection probability for each attack type was slightly
lower compared to the application with no TPG (by 0.5% for each type of attack). This
difference can be attributed to the fact that the dynamic model does not react to each detection,
but analyses the probability that the detection fits the context. The false negatives usually
occurred in the first vector describing the attack. However, usually, there were several
sequential vectors related to the same attack.
The difference in terms of the maximal achievable true detection rate between the optimised
and random allocation was negligible, amounting to less than 0.2%. At the same time, a
relatively significant difference existed in terms of the number of false detections, amounting
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Figure 5.19: Behaviour of pna probability under no attacks for the optimised and random
allocation for CICDS2017 dataset. Orange line corresponds to optimised allocation and blue
line corresponds to random allocation.
to approximately 0.01% of the total number of registered events. Given that the total false
positive rate was 0.11%, such a reduction resulted in a 10% improvement.
The difference between the optimised and random allocation is illustrated in Figures 5.19
and 5.20. On average, the false-positive-related probability drops of the optimised allocation
were low in terms of their amplitude, as demonstrated in Figure 5.19. After the occurrence of
the false positive, the sequential increase of the respective pna value was faster, and it reached
the “baseline" in several time steps, as shown in Figure 5.20. The demonstrated behaviour
supports the result shown in Figure 5.18, where a sufficient reduction was recorded in the
false positive rate for optimised allocation.
Considering the respective baseline values for both allocations, it is reasonable to state that
the optimised allocation yielded counter-intuitive results with a lower pna value. One way to
account for this is by referencing the fact that the event detectors were placed at the part of
the graph related to “no preceding" attack conditions, and they had lower false true positive
rate. Therefore, their output was taken by the dynamic model with lower confidence, as one
can conclude from Section 5.2. For the same reason, the respective maximal true positive
detection range of the optimised model was slightly lower.
5.3.4 Model Limitations
The temporal model described in this chapter is based on the TPG approach. Therefore, it
suffers from the same TPG-grounded problems, including the absence of a fully-formalised
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Figure 5.20: Behaviour of pna probability under no attacks for the optimised and random
allocation for the CICDS2017 dataset, with detailed representation of a specific false event.
Orange line corresponds to optimised allocation and blue line corresponds to random
allocation.
methodology for graph definition and consideration of a single attack at one moment of
time. The second problem becomes more significant because the analysis is undertaken in an
online manner, and it is impossible to converge the analysis of multiple simultaneous attacks
to a consideration of a worst-case scenario, as it was done in the static model description. In
future research, extending the model for multiple-attack cases using latent-variable modelling
is a promising idea, when the number of ongoing attacks is a hidden variable, which needs
to be derived from the incoming data.
The presented dynamic model has the following drawbacks, related to its formulation:
• The conditional probabilities of the transition matrix, as defined by the graph, do
not have a specific rule for their definition. In this chapter’s experiments, a uniform
probability distribution was used, which is a case of “no-preferences". It is possible
to improve the model by making the conditional probability dependent on the ongoing
attack and estimating the attack as a hidden variable in Bayesian inference.
• A temporal component was trivially introduced into the model (i.e., the time spent by
the attacker at each node is supposed to be the same). To mitigate this problem, it is
possible to define the time spent explicitly, as a probability distribution over “time to
pass a given edge". In this way, it is possible to define a joint probability over the pairs
(n, t), where n is a node and t is time. Alternatively, it is possible to introduce loops
into the graph, as an absence of loops is not a requirement for the theoretical properties
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of the dynamic model (notably, loops are not possible in the static model).
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, an extension of the TPG was presented, which sought to capture the problem
of attack detection. The dynamic model was built on the same basis as the static model.
This fact simplified the process of applying both methods to the system because the model
instantiation prerequisites could be partially reused.
The dynamic model deals with the problem of allocating event detectors within the TPG
nodes, and it estimates the probability that the attacker is currently at a given node (or set of
nodes). An analysis of the behaviour of such a probability is given under different conditions,
and an asymptotic behaviour model is provided, as well as a method for the identification
of the “under attack" condition depending on the given metric. A detection scheme was
proposed, given specific assumptions of the quality of the event detectors.
A problem of “optimal event detection placement" was also considered, which targeted the
allocation of the event detectors in the graph in a way that minimised (or maximised) a given
metric. The metric could be related to early attack detection, minimisation of false detection
impact, and others.
Both problems were described and validated on the CICDS2017 cybersecurity dataset. This
chapter’s experiment also demonstrated how to produce a TPG model for a cybersecurity
domain, filling some of the gaps in the example given in the static model remote tower. The
results demonstrate a drastic reduction in the false positive detection rate compared to the






Contributions overview and future
work
The aim of this thesis was to address the problem of mathematical modelling and to support
security risk assessment (SRA) activities. As indicated in the first part of this thesis, the main
requirements for the models that the researcher sought to develop were generality in terms of
applications and a common language with existing SRA techniques. After reviewing relevant
literature, the graph-based approach was selected for the instantiation of the model, and game
theory (in particular, network security games, or NSGs) and probabilistic graphical models
were used as the basis for the decision-making process.
The key contributions of this thesis reside in the following areas:
• Definition of the threat path graph (TPG) in chapter 3.
• Development of a game theoretic model for general SRA support in chapter 4.
• Proposal of a security awareness model for “in-operation" streaming data processing
in chapter 5.
The TPG development process was described with an explicit alignment to the SecRAM
method, providing general recommendations for the definition of the structure of the graph.
The graph definition was conducted so as to handle multiple attack types. Special attention
was paid to the case of sequential attack definition when one attack enables another and
multiple assets are targeted. For this purpose, two algorithms for semi-automatic graph
construction were presented.
An NSG-based game theoretic model, referred to throughout this thesis as the static model,
was augmented with several algorithmic extensions, including complex security controls
structure definition, procedural controls formalisation, and multi-objective optimisation
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problem statement. The generic game definition converged on a sequence of issues in multi-
integer linear programming (MILPs), and this convergence was theoretically justified. To
support the statement of generality, model instantiation was aligned with
SecRAM procedures, demonstrating the correspondence with the main steps of this classical
methodology. The considered approach, despite involving a large number of parameters,
strictly limits the scope of the analysis defined by the graph structure, the properties of the
controls, and the impact functions. The primary benefit of the approach is the capability
to support and verify expert judgements, and to offer “what-if" considerations in terms of
control selection and changes to the goal statements. The combination of TPG and the static
model was applied to the remote tower example. The remote tower model development
process was compared with the respective steps of the SecRAM analysis report for the same
system. The results obtained from the static model were compared with the security control
allocation from the SecRAM report.
The problem of “in-operation" event detection was addressed by the probabilistic model over
the TPG in the form of the dynamic model. This model dealt with the enhancement of event
detector allocation within the system and offered a definition of attack detection criteria.
Several of the proposed model’s theoretical properties were derived and proven. Based
on these properties, an event detection criterion was introduced, and the event detector’s
allocation problem was stated. A family of methods for the solution of the allocation problem
was proposed. Developed algorithms were applied to a cybersecurity intrusion detection
open dataset. This experiment demonstrated the process of graph development for a
cybersecurity problem (by using the semi-automatic algorithms from the previous chapter),
event detector allocation, and attack detection. The results were compared with the “plain"
results with no graphical model, and a significant reduction in the false positive rate was
identified.
It is important to note that both of the models share the same basis. Furthermore, they
are applicable to sequential problems: system security design and situational awareness in
operation.
6.1 Modelling Process Outline
This section summarises the proposed modelling framework for SRA support. It consists of
three components: TPG model for system description, game theory-based model for security
controls allocation, and “dynamic" model for on-line data processing and attack detection.
TPG development is split into two main phases listed below.
• Asset model development.
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• Threat model development.
Asset model instantiation is close to the context establishment phase of ISO 27005. It
identifies the main functions of the system (primary assets), main assets that enable these
functions (supporting assets), and corresponding vulnerabilities. For each possible
vulnerability (or attack type) against every asset, a set of impacts is evaluated. Values of
these impacts are determined depending on the level of “interruption" of the primary assets.
The threat model may be considered as a combination of NSGs and attack trees. It corresponds
to the risk treatment phase of the SRA process. The threat model describes a set of steps and
statuses that the attacker needs to go through in order to reach the supporting asset. TPGs
provide means for a description of complex, sequential attacks. Some of the arcs of the TPG
may be used for security controls or event detectors deployment.
Security controls may be allocated on the TPG by using the “static model" described in the
thesis, which determines a set of possible Pareto-optimal event allocations. “Static model"
relies on game theory and may consider different types of limitations over the set of security
controls. These limitations may correspond to business or price constraints.
Apart from security controls, it is possible to allocate event detectors on the graph. The
event detection allocation mechanism proposed in this thesis relies on the minimisation of
undetected attack probability (given some assumptions). The allocation may be done using
a combination of Monte-Carlo and heuristic optimisation algorithms.
Parts related to security controls and event detector allocation may be aligned with risk
treatment and risk acceptance parts of the SRA.
Apart from that, this thesis proposes methods for attack detection based on aggregated
analysis of the registrations coming from all event detectors. Event detector allocation
and analysis is based on Bayesian inference techniques and probabilistic graphical models
(namely, Bayesian filter).
The implementations of both the static and dynamic models are available at the following
gitlab link, which contains:
• Data for the airport model.
• Matlab scripts for the airport static model.
• Python scripts for event detector training and dynamic model application over CICDS2017.
For any questions regarding the implementation please contact Denis Kolev.
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6.2 Model Limitations
The limitations of the static and dynamic models were described in Chapters 4 and 5,
respectively. While certain drawbacks arise from the specifics of the mathematical
formalisation (e.g., simplification of attack mitigation for the static model), others are
grounded in the TPG implementation scheme. The most critical drawbacks of both models
include the following:
• Each model considers a single action at one point in time. This problem is “encoded"
into the TPG, and it leads to complexities when introducing multiple attacks into both
the static and dynamic models. Additionally, it leads to an overwhelming growth of
the graph when a set of unordered conditions must be met. This problem could be
overcome by using the SATAA and M-SATAA algorithms, but still, the graph size will
be large, and it could result in computational problems for the models. The SATAA
and M-SATAA algorithms for a set of n unordered enabling conditions would produce
O(n!) additional nodes. It is likely that the graph size issue could be partially fixed by
the introduction of additional labels to the graph links and nodes. However, this would
be likely to “spoil" the least weighted path formulation of the problem, meaning that
the static and dynamic models should be partially redeveloped.
• Certain attack types are characterised by a waiting pattern (e.g., stealing credentials
using malicious software). This type of attack has no convenient means for
representation in the dynamic model, as the sniffer waits until the credentials are used
by the victim. This time span is not pre-determined and can hardly be assessed in
terms of average waiting time, which confounds an accurate definition of the transition
matrix. This issue is less important for the static model in the form in which this thesis
presents it, though it could introduce an additional problem in a more complex risk
mitigation scheme. One of the possible solutions is to make the transition matrix
time-dependent such that some of the links have non-zero probabilities only if specific
conditions are satisfied.
• There is also an implicit dependency between the set of detectors and the TPG.
Although the TPG could be formally developed independent from the specific list of
event detectors and security controls, the resulting graph might not be adaptable to the
considered set of security controls. For example, the TPG for the case of “SSH login"
in case of public key protection and with no public key protection could be different.
The possibility of a public key mechanism creates a full separate branch of the graph,
related to “pubkey" stealing or login from an authorised IP. For the cases in which the
list of security controls and detectors is preliminarily fixed, this fact does not create a
problem, but it could undermine the method’s scalability.
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6.3 Future Work
Directions for future work for each of the models are defined by the drawbacks listed in the
corresponding chapters, as well as suggested possibilities for improvement.
Apart from limitation-related points, an attempt to create a stronger link between the models
should be made when event detectors and security controls are considered simultaneously.
This addition could be critical for the cases when a security control serves as an event
detector. It could be partially implemented by merging the optimisation problems of static
and dynamic models. To correctly define these types of problems, an explicit dependency
between “attack mitigation" and “attack detection" should be introduced.
Another significant large-scale modification would be counter-action planning by deploying
additional controls over the graph depending on the observed detections. This could be
possibly formalised as a sequential application of the static model within dynamic model
iterations.
The last important direction for further research involves the creation of a library of graphs
for well-known attacks, such as the ones mentioned in dynamic model validation. Such a
library would simplify graph creation up to an application of the M-SATAA algorithm over
a set of existing, semi-finished sub-graphs.
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